The Supreme Court of India has raised serious concerns over India’s growing road safety crisis and directed strict enforcement of vehicle safety regulations across the country. In S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, the Court observed that “there is no concept of lane driving in this country,” highlighting lane indiscipline as a major cause of road accidents in India. The Supreme Court stressed the urgent need for strict compliance with Rule 125H of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, which mandates Vehicle Location Tracking Devices (VLTDs) and emergency panic buttons in public service vehicles. The Court noted that less than 1% of such vehicles currently comply with these mandatory safety requirements. To strengthen road safety laws and passenger protection, the Court directed that no public service vehicle should receive a fitness certificate or permit unless safety devices are installed and verified. The bench also emphasized integration with the Vahan portal for real-time monitoring and digital compliance checks. The judgment reinforces the importance of traffic rules, lane discipline, vehicle tracking systems, and effective implementation of road safety regulations under Article 21 and the Motor Vehicles Act.
The Supreme Court, in *In Re: “City Hounded By Strays, Kids Pay Price”*, refused to dilute its earlier directions aimed at addressing the growing stray dog menace across India. The Court held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right of citizens to access public places without fear of dog attacks. Observing that incidents involving children, elderly persons, and pedestrians had reached alarming proportions, the Court emphasized that public safety cannot be compromised. It upheld directions requiring the removal of stray dogs from sensitive locations such as schools, hospitals, railway stations, and bus stands, and ruled that they should not be released back into those areas. The Court further held that rabid, incurably ill, and demonstrably dangerous dogs may be euthanised in accordance with statutory safeguards and veterinary assessment. States were directed to strengthen sterilisation, vaccination, shelter, and anti-rabies infrastructure.
The Rajasthan High Court, in Kiran Bishnoi v. Sunil Kumar, strongly condemned the practice of “Atta-Satta” marriages involving minors, holding that such customs are unconstitutional and incompatible with the principles of dignity, equality, and free consent. The case arose from a divorce appeal where the wife alleged cruelty, harassment, and dowry-related abuse. During proceedings, it emerged that the marriage was part of a reciprocal “Atta-Satta” arrangement linking two family marriages. The Court observed that such practices treat girls as bargaining tools, undermine autonomy, and reinforce patriarchal structures. Emphasizing that customs cannot override statutory protections or constitutional rights, the Court held that child marriage and coerced reciprocal arrangements violate Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. Finding that the wife had successfully proved matrimonial cruelty, the Court granted divorce and called for complete legal and social repudiation of such exploitative customs.
The Jharkhand High Court, in *Md. Mumtaz Ansari v. State of Jharkhand*, held that inquiries into custodial deaths, custodial disappearances, and custodial rape must mandatorily be conducted by Judicial Magistrates under Section 176(1-A) CrPC and Section 196(2) BNSS. The Court was hearing a PIL highlighting that 427 custodial deaths had occurred in Jharkhand since 2018 and that authorities were routinely appointing Executive Magistrates instead of Judicial Magistrates for inquiries. The Court observed that custodial violence is a serious violation of Article 21 and described it as an affront to justice. It held that the statutory use of the word “shall” makes judicial inquiry mandatory and that Executive Magistrates cannot substitute Judicial Magistrates. Noting systemic non-compliance and discrepancies in official records, the Court directed fresh judicial inquiries in improperly handled cases and ordered strict compliance with future reporting and inquiry requirements.
The Supreme Court, in *Prakashjhot Samajik Sanstha v. Union of India*, reiterated that the right to peaceful protest is a fundamental constitutional right but cannot be exercised in a manner that disrupts public order or inconveniences citizens. While hearing a matter concerning the proposed naming of the Navi Mumbai International Airport, Chief Justice Surya Kant observed that every citizen has the right to lawful and peaceful protest under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. However, the Court emphasized that protests cannot create law-and-order problems, block public spaces, or disturb normal life. The Bench further clarified that fundamental rights are subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order and public safety. The Court also declined to interfere in the policy decision regarding the airport’s name, reiterating the principle of judicial restraint and holding that such matters primarily fall within the executive domain.
In Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court held that threatening to upload a woman’s private bathing video on social media amounts to criminal intimidation under Section 506 Part II IPC, as it constitutes a threat to impute “unchastity.” The Court clarified that the concept of unchastity must no longer be viewed through traditional patriarchal notions of morality but through the constitutional values of dignity, privacy, and sexual autonomy protected under Article 21. The accused had secretly recorded the woman while she was bathing and later threatened to publish the video online. Upholding his conviction, the Court observed that circulation of intimate images violates a woman’s bodily privacy, dignity, and reputation, regardless of whether the content depicts a sexual act. It further noted that in the digital era, online reputation forms an integral part of personal dignity. The Court also ruled that recovery of the mobile phone was not essential for conviction where credible oral evidence existed. However, considering the passage of time since 2015, the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone.
Following a viral social media movement sparked by remarks made by Chief Justice of India Justice Surya Kant, two trademark applications have been filed for the phrase “Cockroach Janata Party” under Class 45 of the Trade Marks Act. The phrase gained popularity after the CJI’s comments during a Supreme Court hearing were widely interpreted as referring to unemployed youth engaged in activism through social media and RTI mechanisms. Although the remarks were later clarified, the term was embraced online as a symbol of satire and dissent. The applications, filed by Azim Adambhai Jam and Akhand Swaroop, are currently at the “Formalities Check Pass” stage. The development raises important questions about whether political or satirical expressions can be monopolized through trademark registration. Under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, slogans and phrases may qualify for protection if they are distinctive and not contrary to public policy or morality. Even if registered, trademark rights would generally extend only to commercial use and would not automatically restrict public discussion, criticism, satire, or free speech protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
The Delhi High Court, in Parmal & Anr. v. State & Ors., held that a daughter-in-law cannot claim a right to permanent alternate accommodation from her in-laws under either the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 or the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The Court clarified that the DV Act only grants a woman the right to reside in a “shared household” and does not create ownership or lifelong housing rights. The case involved an elderly couple who sought eviction of their son and daughter-in-law due to alleged harassment. While the eviction was upheld, the appellate authority had directed the parents-in-law to provide permanent alternate accommodation to the daughter-in-law and her children. The High Court set aside this direction, observing that no statutory provision imposes such an obligation on in-laws. Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav emphasized that the primary duty to maintain and provide shelter rests with the husband. Balancing the rights of senior citizens and the daughter-in-law, the Court awarded monthly financial support but rejected the claim for permanent accommodation.
In Sonu Ram v. State of Rajasthan, the Rajasthan High Court held that a criminal trial cannot proceed against an accused who is mentally incapable of understanding the proceedings. The Court emphasized that the Right to Fair Trial under Article 21 includes the accused’s ability to comprehend charges, participate in proceedings, and defend himself. The accused, arrested in 2024 in a 1994 murder case, was found by a Medical Board to be suffering from dementia, rendering him incapable of understanding legal proceedings, with no likelihood of recovery. Upholding the trial court’s order releasing him, the High Court observed that continuing the prosecution would violate principles of natural justice and constitutional due process. The Court also directed annual medical examinations and clarified that the trial may resume if the accused’s mental condition improves in the future.
In State of Himachal Pradesh v. M/s Kundlas Loh Udyog, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the State to grant benefits that were never intended under a government policy. The dispute arose when an existing industrial unit sought concessional electricity tariff benefits under the Himachal Pradesh Industrial Policy, 2019 after undertaking substantial expansion. The Court found that the policy benefit under Clause 16(a) was intended only for new industrial enterprises and not for existing units undergoing expansion. It rejected the argument that the phrase “eligible enterprises” expanded the scope of the policy, observing that equitable doctrines cannot be used to rewrite government policies or create rights beyond their intended framework. The Court also noted that the respondent had already availed benefits under another clause, and granting additional concessions would result in an impermissible double benefit. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and reaffirmed that promissory estoppel remains subject to policy intent, statutory limits, and public interest.
In Raghavendra Fakeerappa Chandranavar v. Department of Backward Classes Welfare, the Supreme Court questioned whether children of socially and economically advanced OBC families should continue receiving reservation benefits after achieving significant social mobility. The case arose when a candidate from Karnataka’s Kuruba community was denied an OBC caste validity certificate on the ground that his parents, both government employees, had a combined annual income of about ₹19.48 lakh, exceeding the creamy layer limit. During the hearing, Justice B.V. Nagarathna observed that reservation is intended as a tool for social upliftment and not a perpetual or hereditary benefit. The Court remarked that when parents attain high educational, professional, and economic status, continued reservation for subsequent generations may require reconsideration. It also raised questions about whether children of highly placed officials, such as IAS officers, should continue availing reservation benefits. The Court has issued notice and no final ruling has been delivered. The matter remains pending adjudication on creamy layer principles and inter-generational reservation benefits.
In Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court held that personal liberty cannot be sacrificed due to bureaucratic delays and awarded ₹11 lakh compensation to a prisoner who remained incarcerated for 24 days despite a valid court order directing his release. The Court noted that Daudayal had complied with all conditions imposed by the Rajasthan High Court, yet authorities failed to release him and continued his detention without any stay order. Emphasizing the importance of Article 21, the Court observed that liberty is one of the highest constitutional values and cannot be curtailed because the State is still considering whether to file an appeal. It clarified that court orders must be implemented immediately unless stayed by a superior court. The Court further reaffirmed that even convicted persons retain fundamental rights and are entitled to protection against unlawful detention. Relying on precedents such as Rudul Sah, Bhim Singh, and Nilabati Behera, the Court held that monetary compensation is an appropriate public law remedy for violations of personal liberty and directed the State to pay ₹11 lakh for the illegal detention.
The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) refers to a common set of civil laws governing matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, adoption, maintenance, and succession for all citizens, irrespective of religion. Its constitutional basis lies in Article 44 of the Constitution, a Directive Principle of State Policy, which urges the State to secure a uniform civil code across India. Supporters argue that UCC promotes equality, gender justice, legal uniformity, and national integration by replacing religion-based personal laws. Critics, however, contend that it may interfere with religious freedom and India’s cultural diversity. The Supreme Court has repeatedly highlighted the desirability of a UCC in cases such as Shah Bano Case and Sarla Mudgal Case. Assam’s passage of the UCC Bill, 2026 marks another significant step in the ongoing debate over balancing equality, social reform, and religious autonomy in India.
In Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, the Supreme Court held that a bus driver cannot be held criminally negligent merely because a passenger falls while alighting if the driver moved the bus only after receiving the conductor’s signal. The case arose from a 2011 accident in which a passenger suffered fatal injuries after allegedly falling from a KSRTC bus while getting down. The Court found that the conductor had signalled the driver to move only after passengers had alighted. Emphasizing the functional division of responsibilities in public transport, the Court observed that a driver is expected to focus on driving and is entitled to rely on the conductor’s instructions regarding passenger movement. It stated that a driver cannot reasonably be expected to repeatedly turn back and personally verify whether all passengers have safely disembarked. The Court reiterated that the mere occurrence of an accident does not automatically establish criminal negligence under Sections 279 or 304A IPC. Since the prosecution failed to prove rashness or negligence beyond reasonable doubt, the driver’s conviction was set aside and he was acquitted.
In Darubai v. Kamalabai, the Supreme Court held that property inherited through intestate succession under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is inherited as tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares, not as joint family or coparcenary property. The dispute arose after a widow sold part of the inherited property, claiming she acted as Karta for legal necessity related to a daughter’s marriage. The Court clarified that heirs inheriting under Section 8 acquire individual ownership rights in their respective shares. Since the property does not become coparcenary property, the concept of Karta does not apply. Consequently, no heir can claim authority to manage or alienate the shares of other heirs on grounds of legal necessity. The Supreme Court held that the widow could legally deal only with her own 1/5th share and had no power to sell the shares belonging to the daughters. Upholding the lower court’s findings, the Court reaffirmed that succession under the Hindu Succession Act creates separate ownership interests, with survivorship and kartaship having no application.