In A. Radhakrishnan v. P. Madhusudhan Reddy, the Madras High Court held that a temple deity, recognised as a juristic person, cannot be left without legal protection merely because it lacks voting rights. The Bench of Justice P. Velmurugan and Justice B. Pugalendhi examined continued encroachments over land belonging to Arulmigu Balasubramaniaswamy Temple, Vennimalai despite earlier judicial directions. The Court criticised authorities for delaying eviction citing protests and political pressure, emphasising that electoral considerations cannot override the rule of law. Observing that a deity is a legal person capable of owning property and seeking remedies, the Court found wilful disobedience of prior orders. While refraining from immediate punishment for contempt, it directed expeditious disposal of pending civil cases, quarterly compliance reports by the HR&CE Department, and police protection during eviction drives to ensure recovery of encroached temple lands.
In Mahesh v. State, the Madras High Court, through Justice N. Mala, set aside a conviction under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 366 IPC arising from an alleged adolescent relationship. The Court held that proof of the victim’s age is a foundational requirement in POCSO prosecutions. The trial court had relied on photocopies of age-related documents despite availability of originals, violating principles of primary evidence. Due to failure to legally establish minority, the conviction was held unsustainable. While reiterating that consent of a minor is legally irrelevant under POCSO, the Court observed that many cases stem from consensual adolescent relationships later criminalised due to social pressure. The appeal was allowed, conviction quashed, and the State directed to implement awareness programmes under Section 43 of the POCSO Act to prevent misuse and promote legal awareness.
In State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Ashish Saxena & Ors., the Rajasthan High Court held that divorce between parents cannot defeat a son’s claim for compassionate appointment. The Bench comprising Sanjeev Prakash Sharma and Baljinder Singh Sandhu upheld relief granted to the deceased employee’s son under the Rajasthan Compassionate Appointment of Deceased Government Servant Rules, 1996. The State had rejected the claim citing parental divorce and appointment of the second wife. The Court ruled that divorce does not sever the legal relationship between father and son, nor negate dependency merely because the child resided with the mother. It further held that appointment granted to a widow under a separate quota cannot extinguish an eligible son’s independent claim. The appeal filed by the State was dismissed.
In Vinit Kumar Adiwal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., the Rajasthan High Court held that freezing a bank account without establishing a prima facie connection to an alleged offence violates fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The petitioner’s account had been completely frozen during a fraud investigation, severely affecting his personal and business transactions. The Court observed that freezing bank accounts is an extraordinary power that must be exercised cautiously and only when authorities demonstrate a clear nexus between the account and the alleged crime. It criticized blanket freezing orders passed without recorded reasons, specific amounts, or time limits, calling such action arbitrary and disproportionate. Holding that unrestricted freezing interferes with livelihood and the right to carry on trade, the Court directed authorities to lift the blanket freeze and allow operation of the account, permitting restriction only on the disputed amount linked to the investigation.
In Dr. Sushil Kumar Purbey v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court of India, through Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta, held that vague allegations such as merely “quarrelling” with a daughter-in-law cannot constitute cruelty or dowry harassment. Examining proceedings under Section 498A IPC, the Court found no specific acts or incidents attributed to the parents-in-law, noting that general and omnibus accusations cannot justify criminal prosecution. Applying the principle of parity, the Court observed that since identical allegations against the sister-in-law were already quashed, similar relief must extend to the parents-in-law. Emphasising the need to prevent misuse of criminal law, the Court quashed proceedings against them while permitting the case against the husband to continue in accordance with law.
In Poulomi Pavini Shukla v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India considered a challenge to Muslim personal law inheritance rules alleged to discriminate against women. The Bench led by Chief Justice Surya Kant, along with Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice R. Mahadevan, questioned whether courts can invalidate personal laws without creating a legal vacuum. Referring to Article 44, the Court observed that a Uniform Civil Code may offer a comprehensive legislative solution. The matter remains pending, with the petitioner directed to clarify the legal framework sought if existing Shariat inheritance provisions are struck down.
The Karnataka High Court held that mere possession or storage of child pornographic material on a mobile phone can constitute an offence under Section 15 of the POCSO Act and Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The case arose after forensic examination of the petitioner’s seized mobile phone revealed numerous child pornographic images and videos, leading to registration of a separate criminal case. The petitioner sought quashing of proceedings, arguing that he had neither circulated nor transmitted the material. Rejecting this contention, the Court clarified that Section 15 of the POCSO Act criminalises different degrees of conduct, including simple possession, storage with intent to distribute, and commercial exploitation, depending on inferred intention. The Court held that possession itself may indicate criminal intent based on surrounding circumstances. Since the forensic report disclosed a prima facie offence, issues of intention and liability must be determined during trial, and quashing at the initial stage was impermissible.
The Supreme Court of India held that OBC creamy layer status cannot be determined solely on the basis of parental salary, reaffirming that social status and the nature of parental employment are the primary determinants. The dispute arose after the Union of India denied OBC Non-Creamy Layer benefits to civil services candidates whose parents worked in PSUs and banks and earned above the prescribed income limit. The Court clarified that the 1993 Office Memorandum, issued following the landmark Indra Sawhney judgment, excludes salary income from the income/wealth test except in residual situations. It held that a 2004 clarificatory letter could not alter or override the established policy framework by treating income as the decisive factor. The Court further ruled that differentiating between children of PSU employees and government employees violates Articles 14 and 16. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed, reconsideration of affected candidates was ordered, and the objective of reservations for genuinely backward classes was reaffirmed.
In Harish Rana v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India permitted withdrawal of life support for a man in a permanent vegetative state, marking the first judicial implementation of passive euthanasia guidelines evolved in Common Cause v. Union of India. The Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan reaffirmed that the right to die with dignity forms part of Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court held that Clinically Administered Nutrition (CAN) constitutes medical treatment and may be withdrawn when recovery is medically impossible. Relying on unanimous opinions of primary and secondary medical boards, the Court found continued treatment merely prolonged biological existence without dignity. It directed shifting the patient to palliative care for humane withdrawal of life support and issued nationwide procedural directions to streamline passive euthanasia implementation, while recommending comprehensive legislation governing end-of-life decisions.
The Supreme Court in Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India recognised adoption as an integral part of reproductive autonomy protected under Article 21. The challenge concerned Section 60(4) of the Social Security Code, 2020, which limited maternity benefits for adoptive mothers to cases where the adopted child was below three months of age. The Court held that reproductive autonomy extends beyond biological reproduction and includes the conscious decision to form a family through adoption. It ruled that denying maternity leave based solely on the child’s age created an arbitrary classification, violating Articles 14 and 21. Parenthood, the Court emphasised, is defined by care, responsibility, and emotional bonds rather than biology alone. Applying the doctrine of reading down, the Court removed the restrictive condition instead of striking down the provision. Adoptive mothers were held entitled to maternity benefits irrespective of the child’s age, affirming dignity, equality, and child welfare as core constitutional values.
The Ravi Khokhar & Ors v. Union of India & Ors., decided by the Supreme Court of India, expanded the scope of Article 12 by holding that the Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) qualifies as “State.” The dispute arose when AFGIS employees challenged the Society’s decision to delink its pay structure from Central Pay Commission recommendations. While the Delhi High Court treated AFGIS as a private welfare body, the Supreme Court adopted a functional approach rather than a formal ownership test. The Court applied the public function, instrumentality, and deep and pervasive control tests, observing that AFGIS performs welfare functions closely connected to sovereign duties of the armed forces. Its establishment with presidential sanction, compulsory membership for Air Force personnel, and administration by serving officers demonstrated strong governmental integration and control. Holding that performance of public duties outweighs funding structure, the Court ruled that AFGIS is amenable to writ jurisdiction. The High Court’s judgment was set aside, and writ petitions were directed to be heard on merits, reinforcing accountability of quasi-governmental bodies.
The Rajasthan High Court held that criminal liability under Section 498A IPC cannot be imposed on a husband’s relatives merely because they resided in the matrimonial home. The case concerned the death of a woman after ten years of marriage, following which allegations of cruelty and dowry harassment were made against multiple family members. While the police filed a charge sheet only against the husband due to lack of evidence against others, the trial court later summoned additional relatives under Section 319 CrPC. Setting aside this order, the High Court ruled that prosecution under Section 498A requires specific and distinct allegations of cruelty against each accused. Vague and omnibus accusations based solely on familial relationship are insufficient to attract criminal liability. The Court emphasised that criminal responsibility requires intentional conduct supported by evidence and that powers under Section 319 CrPC must be exercised cautiously. However, proceedings against the husband’s father were allowed to continue due to specific allegations against him.
The Supreme Court, in Hemendra Patel v. Union of India, expressed serious concern over police and digital platforms publicly displaying images and videos of accused persons, observing that such practices may amount to a form of “digital arrest.” The Court noted that unregulated social media platforms can operate like “blackmailers,” causing reputational confinement without any legal process. It emphasised that publishing humiliating visuals of accused individuals undermines the presumption of innocence and violates the right to dignity and reputation protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Bench recognised that uncontrolled circulation of online content can prejudice fair trial rights and create irreversible social stigma. Highlighting the growing misuse of digital media, the Court stressed the urgent need for regulatory guidelines governing police briefings and platform accountability. While no final directions were issued, the Court allowed amendment of the petition and indicated that a balanced framework is required to reconcile freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) with protection of individual dignity and fair administration of justice.
The Rajasthan High Court strongly criticised an 11-year delay in filing a chargesheet, calling it “shocking” and a clear violation of the right to speedy investigation under Article 21 of the Constitution. In Jitendra Meena v. State of Rajasthan, the Court noted that despite repeated judicial directions, the investigation remained incomplete because the investigating officer was simultaneously handling law and order duties. The Court held that administrative workload cannot justify prolonged delay, as such inaction prejudices both the accused and the justice system. Relying on Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006), the Court emphasised the urgent need to separate police investigation from law and order functions to ensure efficiency, professionalism, and fair investigation. It observed that failure to implement long-standing police reforms has resulted in systemic injustice. The Court directed completion of investigation within six weeks and ordered senior state authorities to formulate a policy for functional separation of police wings, stressing that structural reforms are essential to protect constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court held that a foreign divorce decree granted on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not automatically valid or enforceable in India unless the ground is recognised under Indian matrimonial law. The parties were married in India under Hindu rites but later moved to the United States, where a US court granted divorce. The Court ruled that marriages solemnised in India remain governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, and foreign judgments must satisfy Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be recognised. Since irretrievable breakdown is not a statutory ground under the Hindu Marriage Act and the husband had not meaningfully submitted to the foreign court’s jurisdiction, the decree was held unenforceable in India. The Court also emphasised that compliance with natural justice and effective participation are essential for recognising foreign judgments. However, considering long separation and complete breakdown of marital ties, the Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to grant divorce and finally settle the dispute.