In Prajwala v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that the right to rehabilitation is an integral part of the rights to dignity and protection against exploitation under Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution. Recognizing significant gaps in existing anti-trafficking laws, the Court issued a comprehensive “Victim Protection Plan” for survivors of human trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation. A key aspect of the judgment is the recognition of the agency and autonomy of adult survivors. The Court ruled that voluntary adult sex workers cannot be forcibly “rescued” or detained in shelter homes against their will unless there is an immediate threat to their safety. It emphasized that adult survivors are not passive objects of rescue but individuals with the right to make decisions about their own lives. The Court further directed all States and Union Territories to implement victim-centric rehabilitation measures, maintain confidentiality, and conduct threshold inquiries to distinguish between trafficked victims and adults voluntarily engaged in sex work, ensuring that consensual adult sex workers are not harassed or criminalized.
In Shephali Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court clarified the principles governing a guardian’s application under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. The Court held that while dealing with a minor’s property, courts must act as parens patriae and determine whether the proposed transaction is necessary or offers an “evident advantage” to the minor. The case involved a mother seeking permission to enter into a development agreement concerning her minor son’s inherited undivided share in land. The Supreme Court found that converting an unproductive and notional interest in undeveloped land into a constructed flat and liquid cash would significantly benefit the minor by providing a tangible asset and financial security for future educational, medical, and welfare needs. Setting aside the orders of the District Court and High Court, the Court permitted the transaction subject to safeguards, including depositing the minor’s monetary share in a nationalized bank until he attains majority. The judgment emphasizes a welfare-oriented and practical approach rather than a rigid or mechanical application of Section 8 HMGA.
In Hemanth G.M. v. State of Karnataka, the Karnataka High Court refused to quash criminal proceedings against a school headmaster accused of sexually assaulting a 15-year-old student under the POCSO Act. The petitioner sought quashing of the FIR, claiming the allegations were false, motivated by personal vendetta, and filed after an unexplained delay. Justice M. Nagaprasanna held that the allegations were serious and disclosed cognizable offences requiring a full trial. The Court emphasized that teachers and headmasters occupy positions of trust and responsibility, making allegations of sexual misconduct against them particularly grave. Observing that such accusations, if proven, would be “unpardonable,” the Court declined to exercise its inherent powers to terminate the proceedings at the threshold stage. The Court reiterated that proceedings under Section 482 CrPC cannot be used to conduct a mini-trial or assess witness credibility. Alleged defects in investigation and disputes regarding evidence can be raised before the trial court through appropriate legal remedies. The petitioner was granted liberty to seek discharge, but the criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act and BNS were allowed to continue.
In State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court held that while games of skill such as rummy, poker, and fantasy sports may enjoy constitutional protection, betting or wagering on such games does not. Upholding laws enacted by Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, the Court ruled that States have the constitutional authority under Entry 34 of the State List to regulate or prohibit betting and gambling, including online wagering platforms. The Court drew a clear distinction between playing a skill-based game and staking money on its outcome. It observed that betting remains a separate activity regardless of whether the underlying game involves skill or chance. Once monetary wagering is involved, concerns such as addiction, financial distress, and public welfare arise. The Court further held that betting and gambling are res extra commercium—activities outside the sphere of protected trade and commerce. Consequently, online gaming companies cannot claim protection under Article 19(1)(g) to conduct betting businesses. The judgment validates State regulation of online betting platforms in the interest of public order and welfare.
In C v. A & Anr., the Supreme Court held that an acquittal in a rape case does not prevent courts from ordering a DNA test in a subsequent civil dispute concerning paternity and inheritance rights. The Court clarified that criminal liability and biological parentage are distinct issues governed by different standards of proof. While a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, civil disputes are decided on the balance of probabilities. The case involved a man who was acquitted of rape but later faced a civil suit by a person claiming to be his biological son and seeking inheritance rights. Upholding the Trial Court and High Court orders, the Supreme Court ruled that DNA testing is the most reliable scientific method for determining parentage and may be directed when necessary to resolve disputes. The Court further held that the right to privacy is not absolute and must be balanced against an individual’s right to know their biological identity and establish legal rights. Since paternity could not be conclusively determined through any other evidence, the Court found the DNA test to be a necessary, proportionate, and legally justified measure.
In Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, the Supreme Court held that a consensual premarital relationship between two unmarried adults cannot, by itself, be treated as evidence of poor moral character or moral turpitude. The case concerned a police constable candidate whose appointment was denied because he had previously faced a criminal case arising from a failed romantic relationship based on an alleged promise of marriage. The Court noted that the candidate had truthfully disclosed the criminal case in his attestation form and that the dispute had been amicably settled before a Lok Adalat. Rejecting the Recruitment Board’s reasoning, the Court clarified that a compromise does not amount to an admission of guilt and that not every failed relationship constitutes cheating or moral misconduct. Recognising changing social realities, the Court observed that consensual premarital relationships are not prohibited by law and are protected by personal liberty and autonomy under Article 21. It held that moral turpitude cannot be presumed without objective evidence of dishonest or depraved conduct. Accordingly, the Court set aside the cancellation of candidature and directed reconsideration of the appellant’s appointment.
In Murugan v. State, the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court upheld the conviction of a man for sexually assaulting a 13-year-old girl under the POCSO Act, despite the victim and her parents turning hostile during trial. The Court held that a DNA report conclusively establishing the accused as the biological father of the child born to the minor constituted a “foundational fact” sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Court observed that scientific evidence can outweigh hostile oral testimony, particularly in cases involving pregnancy resulting from sexual assault. It also relied on the victim’s Section 164 CrPC statement, which she admitted had been given voluntarily. Rejecting challenges regarding the DNA procedure and chain of custody, the Court found no evidence of tampering and noted that the defence had cross-examined the forensic expert. However, since there was no reliable evidence to prove repeated assaults, the Court modified the conviction from Section 5(l) to Section 5(j)(ii) of the POCSO Act, which covers aggravated penetrative sexual assault resulting in pregnancy. The life sentence was reduced to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment, while the conviction under Section 506 IPC was set aside.
In The Commissioner, BBMP v. K.K. Umesh Kumar, the Supreme Court held that injuries caused by a falling tree branch on a stationary autorickshaw during heavy rainfall do not constitute a “motor accident” under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Court clarified that compensation under the MV Act requires a proximate nexus between the accident and the use of a motor vehicle. The victim suffered catastrophic injuries, including paraplegia, after a tree branch fell on an autorickshaw parked by the roadside for shelter. The Court observed that the vehicle merely served as the location of the incident and played no causal role in the injury. The actual cause was the falling tree branch, making the event primarily a natural occurrence rather than an accident arising from the use of a motor vehicle. However, considering the victim’s severe permanent disability and the prolonged litigation, the Supreme Court invoked its powers under Article 142 to do complete justice. While holding the claim technically outside the scope of the MV Act, the Court enhanced the compensation from ₹17.10 lakh to ₹25 lakh with interest, ensuring relief to the injured claimant.
In Jayesh Kanna v. The Assistant Commissioner of Police, the Supreme Court held that mere non-communication between spouses for a short period cannot, by itself, amount to cruelty under Section 498A IPC. The case involved a husband who allegedly stopped speaking to his wife for 13 days after she visited her parental home. Following the wife’s death by suicide, he was convicted for cruelty by the Trial Court, and the conviction was upheld by the High Court. Setting aside the conviction, the Supreme Court observed that ordinary marital differences, temporary silence, emotional distance, and misunderstandings are part of normal married life and cannot automatically attract criminal liability. To constitute cruelty under Section 498A, there must be wilful conduct of such gravity that it is likely to drive a woman to suicide or cause grave injury to her mental or physical health. The Court found no evidence of dowry demands, threats, persistent harassment, or abusive conduct. It also rejected the argument that the absence of WhatsApp messages proved non-communication. Holding that suspicion cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court acquitted the husband and reaffirmed that ordinary matrimonial discord cannot be criminalised.
In Harjindra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court held that the absence of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) is not automatically fatal to the prosecution’s case. The Court clarified that TIP is only a corroborative investigative tool, whereas identification of the accused in court (dock identification) constitutes substantive evidence. The case arose from a kidnapping-for-ransom conviction where the accused argued that no TIP was conducted and that witnesses identified them for the first time during trial. Rejecting this contention, the Court noted that the crime occurred in broad daylight, the victims had ample opportunity to observe the accused, interacted with them directly, noticed their distinctive features, and provided descriptions to the police immediately after the incident. The accused were also arrested shortly thereafter. Relying on established precedent, the Court reiterated that TIP is a rule of prudence, not a mandatory legal requirement. Where witnesses had sufficient opportunity to observe the offenders and the identification inspires confidence, a conviction can be sustained even without a TIP. Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions, emphasizing that the evidentiary value of identification depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
The Delhi High Court has issued notice to the Central Government on Telegram's plea challenging the temporary ban imposed ahead of the NEET 2026 Re-Examination. The restriction was ordered after the Centre alleged that Telegram was being used to circulate leaked question papers. Telegram argued that the blanket ban affecting nearly 150 million Indian users was disproportionate, especially when it had already removed hundreds of unlawful links. The Court questioned whether blocking the entire platform was a proportionate response and whether the mandatory procedure under the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 had been followed, particularly the invocation of emergency powers under Rule 9. However, the Court declined to grant interim relief at this stage and directed the Centre to file its response. The ban remains in force until further orders or the expiry of the temporary restriction.
In **Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL**, the Supreme Court reiterated that **dismissal from service is the severest punishment and should be reserved only for cases involving grave misconduct** such as corruption, bribery, moral turpitude, misappropriation, substantial financial loss, or complete unfitness for service. The Court held that disciplinary authorities must apply the **doctrine of proportionality**, considering factors like the employee's long service, nature of misconduct, service record, and actual loss caused before imposing dismissal. In this case, although misconduct such as indiscipline and insubordination was proved, there was no allegation of corruption, financial loss, or moral turpitude. The Court also held that a fresh show-cause notice was mandatory after the earlier inquiry was declared invalid, and clarified that suspension pending inquiry is merely preventive and cannot operate as an additional punishment. Consequently, the dismissal was set aside, subsistence allowance was directed to be paid, and the employer was asked to reconsider an appropriate penalty.
In Jayakrishna Menon v. Krishnankutty, the Supreme Court reinforced animal welfare jurisprudence by ordering the Kerala Government to take custody of Raman, Kerala’s tallest captive elephant, and shift him to a suitable rescue or rehabilitation centre. The Court emphasized that animal welfare is a constitutional and legal obligation, observing that courts “cannot be mute spectators in matters pertaining to voiceless animals.” The dispute arose after an undertaking was given to the Supreme Court that Raman would not be used for temple or commercial purposes during the pendency of an ownership dispute. However, the elephant was later found participating in a temple festival procession. Holding that such participation violated the undertaking, the Court found the caretaker guilty of civil contempt and imposed a fine. Prioritizing the elephant’s welfare over competing ownership claims, the Court held that animals are living beings entitled to dignity and protection, not mere property. Relying on constitutional principles, particularly Article 51A(g), and the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, the Court directed the State to provide care for Raman until the ownership dispute is finally resolved.
In a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court held that the child-protective principles of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 should guide not only criminal trials but also custody and visitation disputes involving child victims of sexual abuse. In Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora, the Court observed that repeated psychological evaluations, interviews, and interactions during custody litigation can themselves cause emotional harm and amount to secondary victimisation. Referring to the philosophy underlying Sections 24, 33(5), 36, and 39 of the POCSO Act, the Court emphasized the principles of minimum exposure and prevention of re-traumatisation. It distinguished therapeutic engagement from repeated forensic evaluations conducted for litigation purposes and cautioned against turning children into subjects of continuous legal scrutiny. Expanding the “best interest of the child” doctrine, the Court held that child welfare governs not only the final custody decision but also the procedure adopted throughout the proceedings. It concluded that every judicial interaction with a child must prioritize dignity, emotional safety, and psychological well-being in line with Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court of India, acting on its own motion based on media reports, intervened to address the plight of a visually impaired man and his elderly mother living in extreme poverty in Odisha. Emphasizing that Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees not just survival but a life of dignity, the Court directed the State to ensure comprehensive welfare support. It ordered verification of all benefits, including pensions and food assistance, and instructed authorities to consider providing a separate, accessible dwelling unit suited to the man’s needs. The Court also mandated immediate medical assistance and directed that the visually impaired individual be appointed as a Para-Legal Volunteer, ensuring both livelihood and empowerment through an honorarium. This approach reflects the Court’s focus on restoring dignity and agency rather than mere charity. The matter has been scheduled for further hearing to review compliance with these directions.