The Patna High Court in this case clarified the meaning of “living separately” under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act. The parties filed for mutual divorce claiming they had been living separately for over one year. However, the husband admitted that they had resumed conjugal relations shortly before filing the petition. The Court held that “living separately” does not merely mean physical separation. It means cessation of marital relationship, including absence of conjugal relations and intention not to resume cohabitation. Even if parties live in different places, continuation of marital relations would mean they are not “living separately” in the legal sense. In this case, the admitted resumption of conjugal relations broke the required one-year continuous separation period. Since Section 13B mandates uninterrupted separation for one year immediately before filing, the statutory condition was not fulfilled. The Court also emphasised that admissions by a party carry strong evidentiary value and can override general pleadings. Accordingly, it upheld the Family Court’s decision rejecting the petition. However, it allowed the parties to file a fresh petition after satisfying the legal requirements.
The Supreme Court held that there is no legislative vacuum in dealing with hate speech, as existing criminal laws already cover such offences. The petitions sought stricter laws and judicial guidelines, arguing that hate speech incidents were increasing and current laws were inadequate. The Court rejected this argument and emphasised the doctrine of separation of powers. It clarified that creating new offences is the exclusive domain of the legislature, and the judiciary cannot step in to frame penal provisions. Doing so would amount to judicial overreach and disturb the constitutional balance. The Court further observed that the real issue is not absence of law but weak enforcement. Provisions relating to promoting enmity, outraging religious sentiments, and maintaining public order already exist under criminal law. Authorities have the power to register FIRs and take action, but implementation remains ineffective. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the petitions seeking guidelines and new offences, while leaving it open for Parliament or State Legislatures to consider reforms. The judgment reinforces judicial restraint and highlights the need for better enforcement of existing laws.
The Supreme Court in this case highlighted serious gaps in the sentencing process for death penalty cases. The appeals arose from a Patna High Court judgment confirming a death sentence, where the Court found that mitigating and aggravating factors were not properly collected at earlier stages. It noted that such reports are often gathered only at the Supreme Court level, leading to delay and incomplete sentencing analysis. The Court held that sentencing in death penalty cases must be individualised, evidence-based, and constitutionally compliant under Article 21. It emphasised that a fair trial includes fair sentencing, which requires a proper evaluation of both aggravating factors (nature and gravity of the crime) and mitigating factors (background, mental health, and possibility of reform). Recognising this as a systemic issue, the Court directed that trial courts must mandatorily collect mitigation and aggravation reports immediately after conviction. High Courts must also ensure such reports are available during death reference proceedings. The Court further stressed the importance of effective legal aid and ordered the constitution of dedicated defence teams in such cases. This judgment reinforces the “rarest of rare” doctrine and ensures that death penalty is imposed only after a thorough and balanced assessment of all relevant circumstances.
Sikkim has become India’s first fully paperless judiciary, marking a major step in the digital transformation of courts. This development was highlighted during the Conclave on Technology and Judicial Education in Gangtok, where Justice Surya Kant emphasised the need for a technology-driven judicial system. The shift means that all court processes, including filing, record-keeping, hearings, and case tracking, are now conducted digitally without reliance on physical documents. This move significantly improves access to justice, especially in remote regions, by removing geographical barriers and reducing time and cost involved in litigation. It aligns with ongoing initiatives like the e-Courts Project and strengthens transparency through real-time tracking and online access to proceedings. The Court also discussed the role of Artificial Intelligence in assisting judicial functions such as data analysis and pattern recognition in decisions. However, it cautioned that AI must be used carefully due to risks of bias and lack of transparency. Judicial decision-making must remain human-centric. Further, emphasis was placed on judicial education, requiring judges to understand digital and AI systems. The need to bridge the digital divide through e-Seva Kendras was also highlighted to ensure inclusive access to justice.
The Uttarakhand High Court held that Article 22(1) does not require a separate written document for “grounds of arrest” if the arrest memo itself clearly conveys essential allegations. The petitioner argued that failure to provide written grounds made the arrest illegal. The Court clarified that the purpose of Article 22(1) is to ensure that the accused understands why he is being arrested and can defend himself. It distinguished between “grounds of arrest” (basic factual allegations) and “reasons for arrest” (justification), holding that only the former must be communicated. Adopting a functional approach, the Court applied the “meaningful communication” test and held that substantial compliance is sufficient. Since the arrest memo contained offences and factual details, the accused was adequately informed. Accordingly, the arrest and remand were upheld as valid.
In Chairman v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that minority educational institutions have a constitutionally protected right under Article 30(1) to appoint a Principal of their choice. The dispute arose when government authorities attempted to appoint the senior-most teacher as Principal of a minority aided college based on State circulars. The Court ruled that administration of minority institutions includes the power to select Principals, teachers, and manage internal affairs. It emphasized that executive instructions or government circulars cannot override constitutional protections granted under Article 30(1). The Bench further clarified that receiving government aid does not dilute the minority status or autonomy of the institution. Courts and State authorities cannot question the management’s decision once a qualified person is appointed. Relying on landmark Supreme Court judgments like T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka and St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat, the Court upheld institutional autonomy and set aside the earlier interference.
In Sahil Manoj Machare v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The accused was charged with murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and had remained in custody since November 2022. Despite charges being framed in 2024, no witness had been examined, showing complete stagnation of the trial. The Court observed that prolonged incarceration without progress in trial amounts to violation of personal liberty and cannot be justified merely because the offence is serious. It clarified that gravity of offence alone is not an absolute ground to deny bail. The Bench emphasized that undertrial detention should not become a form of punishment before conviction. Considering the systemic delay and absence of trial progress, the Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s order and granted bail, reinforcing the constitutional principle of “bail not jail” where delay threatens fairness and liberty.
The Rajasthan High Court ruled that police authorities cannot publicly humiliate arrested persons by posting their photographs or videos on social media platforms. In Islam Khan and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, the Court observed that police-led “media trials” violate the constitutional principles of dignity, privacy, and presumption of innocence guaranteed under Articles 14, 21, and 22 of the Constitution of India. The High Court strongly criticized the practice of circulating photos and videos of accused persons before trial, stating that the police have the power to investigate but not to publicly declare someone guilty. The Court held that public shaming, forced parading, and online circulation of arrest visuals amount to “extra-legal punishment” not recognized under criminal law. Emphasizing the importance of the right to dignity and fair trial, the Court noted that even arrested individuals retain constitutional protections. The judgment also highlighted the permanent reputational damage caused by digital circulation on social media, which may continue even after acquittal. The Court directed strict compliance with police SOPs prohibiting publication of arrestees’ images online.
The Madhya Pradesh High Court recently ruled that the right against double jeopardy is a constitutional protection that can be invoked at any stage of a criminal trial and cannot be rejected merely because of delay. In Harsh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court emphasized that Article 20(2) of the Constitution and Section 300 CrPC protect an accused person from being prosecuted twice for the same offence. The case involved multiple prosecutions based on substantially the same fraudulent bank draft transactions. The petitioner argued that he had already been convicted in an earlier case and a second trial violated the doctrine of double jeopardy. While the lower court rejected the plea citing a four-year delay, the High Court held that constitutional rights cannot be defeated on technical grounds. The Court clarified that even if evidence is required to examine the issue, courts are duty-bound to consider the plea. This judgment strengthens the principles of criminal law, constitutional rights, Article 20(2), Section 300 CrPC, and protection against repeated prosecution in India
The Supreme Court of India held that a long-term consensual relationship between adults cannot automatically become a rape case merely because the promise of marriage was not fulfilled later. In Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra, the Court quashed FIRs under Sections 376, 377, and 506 IPC, observing that both parties willingly continued the relationship for nearly four years. The bench clarified that a “false promise of marriage” amounts to rape only when the accused never intended to marry from the beginning and used the promise solely to obtain consent for sexual relations. The Court noted that the complainant and accused were mature adults, aware of each other’s marital status, and had voluntarily cohabited and travelled together. Since the complaint was filed only after the relationship deteriorated, the Court found no case of rape by deception. The judgment reinforces that failed relationships or broken promises cannot automatically be criminalized as rape under Indian law.