The Bombay High Court, in **Siddhesh Pradeep Satpute v. State Bank of India & Ors.**, held that an Internal Committee (ICC) under the POSH Act has no jurisdiction to inquire into an alleged incident of sexual harassment occurring during a routine commute in public transport not provided by the employer. The Court interpreted Section 2(o) of the POSH Act and ruled that only transportation arranged by the employer forms part of the "workplace." Since the alleged incident occurred in a shared autorickshaw, the ICC lacked authority to conduct disciplinary proceedings. Consequently, the Court quashed the ICC report and the disciplinary action against the employee. However, it clarified that the criminal case under Section 354A of the IPC would continue independently. The judgment emphasizes that while the POSH Act should be interpreted to protect women, its jurisdiction cannot be extended beyond the statutory definition of "workplace."
The Supreme Court has once again expressed serious concern over the continuing menace of dowry deaths, emphasizing that such cases require heightened judicial scrutiny and cannot be treated as ordinary criminal matters. Referring to recent judgments, the Court observed that bail in dowry death cases should not be granted mechanically, particularly where a married woman dies under unnatural circumstances within seven years of marriage and there is evidence of dowry-related cruelty. The Court reiterated the importance of the statutory presumption under **Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023** (earlier Section 113B of the Evidence Act), which shifts the burden to the accused once foundational facts are established. While acknowledging concerns regarding misuse of anti-dowry laws, the Court clarified that isolated instances of misuse cannot dilute legal protections for genuine victims. It also called for stronger implementation of anti-dowry laws, improved investigation, and greater judicial sensitivity to combat this deeply rooted social evil.
In a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court in **Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr. v. P. Ayyappan & Ors.** declared that the **Right to Walk on safe and demarcated footpaths is a Fundamental Right under Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution**. The case arose from the tragic death of a five-year-old child who was hit by a water tanker while walking on a road without a footpath. Setting aside the High Court's order, the Supreme Court enhanced the compensation from ₹4.70 lakh to **₹11.44 lakh** with interest. The Court observed that roads should prioritize pedestrians and held that urban local bodies have a mandatory duty to construct and maintain footpaths. It also directed that the matter be treated as an Article 32 petition to develop a broader legal framework for pedestrian rights. The judgment reinforces that the right to life includes the right to safe mobility and dignified access to public spaces.
In M. Paramesh v. VRL Logistics Ltd. and Another (2026 INSC 655), the Supreme Court held that compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act must be based on functional disability, not merely the percentage of physical disability. The appellant, a 30-year-old mason, lost his right leg above the knee in a road accident caused by a rashly driven lorry. Although the medical disability was assessed at 70%, the Court ruled that the amputation rendered him completely incapable of continuing his manual profession, resulting in 100% loss of earning capacity. Relying on Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011), the Court corrected the High Court’s mathematical errors in computing future prospects, restored omitted compensation under conventional heads, and increased the amount for prosthetic care from ₹1 lakh to ₹2 lakhs. The total compensation was enhanced to ₹40,29,730 with 7.5% annual interest, reaffirming the principle of awarding “just compensation.”
In Israfil @ Pappu @ Naimuddin Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (decided on 23 June 2026), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that sentencing must remain proportionate and that a long period without similar criminal conduct is a significant mitigating factor. The appellant was convicted under Sections 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC for using a forged revenue document as surety. While upholding the conviction, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone, noting that the appellant had not engaged in any similar offence since the incident in 2014 and had endured over 12 years of criminal proceedings. Relying on Padum Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020), the Bench held that punishment should balance the gravity of the offence with the offender’s conduct, possibility of reform, and surrounding circumstances. The judgment reiterates that conviction and sentencing are distinct issues, allowing courts to maintain guilt while modifying punishment in the interests of justice.
The Gujarat High Court, in **Shahnawaz Sirajuddin Siddiqui v. Marufa D/O Mohammedamin Hakim** (2026:GUJHC:36438-DB), held that parties to a valid extra-judicial Muslim divorce by **Mubara’at** are entitled to seek a judicial declaration of their dissolved marital status. The Court ruled that Section 7(1) Explanation (b) of the Family Courts Act empowers Family Courts to declare matrimonial status, even where the divorce has already taken effect under Shariat law. It clarified that the need for a formal decree for administrative purposes, such as updating passports, visas, and official records, itself constitutes a valid cause of action. The High Court found that the Family Court wrongly rejected the suit under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC by insisting on a dispute or denial by the wife. Since both parties admitted the divorce, the Court held that a decree on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC ought to have been passed and accordingly declared the marriage dissolved from 15 July 2024.
The Allahabad High Court held that a husband's legal obligation to maintain his wife does not cease merely because her parents provide financial or emotional support during times of distress. The Court observed that assistance from the wife’s parental family is temporary and cannot substitute the husband’s statutory duty to provide maintenance. It emphasized that maintenance is a legal right intended to ensure that a wife lives with dignity and is not forced to depend on her parents or relatives for survival. The Court further clarified that a husband cannot avoid his responsibility by arguing that the wife is being supported by her family. Such support is an act of compassion and does not extinguish the husband’s continuing obligation under the law. Reiterating the welfare-oriented object of maintenance provisions, the Court upheld the principle that a financially capable husband must provide adequate maintenance to his wife, irrespective of any temporary assistance she may receive from her parents or other family members.
In Smt. Savitha.R v. State of Karnataka & Others, the Karnataka High Court held that a married daughter is eligible for compassionate appointment if she was dependent on and living with the deceased employee. The Court ruled that the 2021 amendment to the Karnataka Civil Services (Appointment on Compassionate Grounds) Rules, 1996, replacing “unmarried daughter” with “daughter,” operates by substitution and is deemed to have been part of the Rules from the beginning. Consequently, marital status cannot be a ground to deny compassionate appointment. The Court further clarified that the mere receipt of a government pension by the surviving parent does not automatically disqualify an applicant. Instead, the family’s financial condition must be assessed in accordance with the eligibility criteria prescribed under the Rules. Setting aside the Tribunal’s order and the State’s rejection, the High Court directed the authorities to reconsider the petitioner’s application within three months in light of the amended Rules and the principles governing compassionate appointment.
In Mrs. N G v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., the Bombay High Court quashed criminal proceedings against the wife of the husband’s cousin, holding that vague allegations based on suspicion of an alleged extra-marital relationship were insufficient to constitute “cruelty” under Section 498-A of the IPC. The complainant relied on allegations that her husband frequently spoke with the petitioner, had the petitioner’s son’s name tattooed on his hand, and shared her photographs on social media. The Court held that, even if accepted at face value, these allegations did not establish any wilful conduct, dowry demand, or active participation by the petitioner in subjecting the wife to physical or mental cruelty. Emphasising that criminal liability under Section 498-A requires specific and intentional acts of harassment, the Court cautioned against the routine implication of relatives without concrete evidence. Accordingly, it exercised its inherent powers to quash the proceedings against the petitioner while allowing the trial to continue against the remaining accused.
In The State of Maharashtra v. Bhimrao Prabhakar Kamble, the Special POCSO Court, Pune, sentenced a 65-year-old man to death after convicting him of the rape and murder of a three-year-old girl. The Court completed the trial within 55 days and held that the case satisfied the "rarest of rare" standard due to the gravity of the offence and the vulnerability of the victim. The conviction was based on a consistent chain of circumstantial evidence, including CCTV footage, DNA evidence, forensic reports, and the "last seen together" principle. The Court found that the prosecution had proved the charges beyond reasonable doubt and rejected the defence's request for a lesser sentence, observing that the circumstances of the case outweighed any mitigating factors. The accused was convicted under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the POCSO Act and sentenced to death, subject to confirmation by the Bombay High Court, as required by law.
The Supreme Court, in Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors. (2026 INSC 662), upheld the setting aside of a 1994 compromise decree, ruling that an advocate cannot compromise a client's substantive rights without express authorization. Interpreting Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, the Court held that a valid compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties themselves. A lawyer's signature alone, without specific authority, cannot bind a client in matters affecting property rights. The Court found that Defendant No. 5 had never signed the compromise petition, making the decree legally invalid. Rejecting the appellants' limitation argument, the Bench observed that fraud and non-compliance with mandatory legal requirements cannot be protected merely because of the passage of time. Exercising powers under Section 151 CPC, the Court upheld the restoration of the original 1989 partition suit for fresh adjudication. The ruling reinforces that advocates require explicit client consent for settlements and that courts may invalidate fraudulent or procedurally defective compromise decrees irrespective of long delays.
St. Anthony's Boys Secondary School, a Christian minority institution, challenged a Directorate of Education order stopping its staff recruitment and ordering surprise inspections of aided minority schools. The school argued appointments met prescribed qualifications and DoE had no power to interfere or withhold grant-in-aid. Delhi HC (Justice Jasmeet Singh) held Article 30(1) protects minority institutions' right to appoint staff; DoE may regulate only qualifications, experience and standards, not recruitment procedure, and no prior approval is needed. Relying on T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002), the Court quashed DoE's order and directed release of grant-in-aid for 19 employees within four weeks, subject to a pending Division Bench reference on DoE's 2014 marking scheme.
In Ranjanni Gaur v. State of Punjab and Another (2026), the Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed an FIR against a woman who dressed her pet dog as Lord Krishna on Janmashtami and shared the image as her WhatsApp status. The Court held that the act, done out of devotion and affection, did not constitute an offence under Section 298 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), as there was no malicious intent to insult religious sentiments. Justice Subhas Mehla observed that Hindu philosophy recognises divinity in all living beings, citing the Bhagavad Gita, Mahabharata, and traditions associated with Lord Shiva and Lord Dattatreya. The Court ruled that a pet dog dressed in deity-like attire cannot be considered a "sacred object" under Section 298, and criminal law cannot be invoked based on the subjective hypersensitivity of a few individuals. Emphasising Articles 19(1)(a) and 25 of the Constitution, the Court held that genuine expressions of faith and devotion are protected, and accordingly quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings.
In Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd. & Anr. (2026), the Supreme Court held that citing AI-generated fake or hallucinated judgments amounts to professional misconduct by advocates and renders judgments based on such precedents legally unsustainable. The case arose after six non-existent judgments were found to have been relied upon by the NCLT and NCLAT while admitting insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. A Bench of Justice P.S. Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe ruled that advocates have a duty to verify every citation before presenting it to the court, while judges must ensure reliance only on authentic legal authorities. The Court clarified that AI may assist legal research but cannot replace human verification. It set aside the NCLT and NCLAT orders and directed the Bar Council of India to frame guidelines regulating the use of AI-generated legal material in legal practice.