In Dorairaj v. Doraisamy (Dead) Through LRs & Ors., the Supreme Court reaffirmed that properties acquired by a Karta during the subsistence of a Joint Hindu Family are presumed to be joint family properties if ancestral, income-yielding assets are shown to exist. The dispute concerned multiple agricultural properties claimed as joint family assets in a partition suit. The appellant contended that several properties were self-acquired, relying on sale deeds and an unregistered Will. However, the Court held that mere assertions of independent income are insufficient. The burden lies on the person claiming self-acquisition to prove a clear, independent source of income and a direct nexus between that income and the purchase. The Court further clarified that separate enjoyment or individual borrowings do not amount to partition unless there is clear intention to sever joint status. Dismissing the appeal, the Court upheld the High Court’s decree, treating the properties as joint family assets except those conclusively proved otherwise.
In Meta Platforms Inc. v. Competition Commission of India & Ors., the Supreme Court questioned WhatsApp’s 2021 Privacy Policy, expressing concern over collection and commercial use of Indians’ personal data. The case arose from appeals against the NCLAT decision upholding a ₹213.14 crore penalty imposed by the CCI for abuse of dominant position through mandatory data-sharing with Meta entities. The Bench observed that consent obtained on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis in a near-monopoly platform cannot be treated as free consent. It emphasised that corporate commercial interests cannot override the constitutional right to privacy under Article 21. The Court also noted the opacity of the policy and highlighted the economic value of user data and its monetisation through targeted advertising. Meta was directed to explain its data practices, MeitY was impleaded, and the matter was kept pending for deeper examination of privacy, competition law, and digital rights implications.
In Sibin S.V. v. State of Kerala & Anr. the Kerala High Court clarified that minimal corporal punishment by a teacher for maintaining discipline is not per se illegal. The petitioner, a school teacher, was booked under Section 118(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act for allegedly beating a student with a cane. The Court held that a cane does not qualify as a “dangerous weapon” under Section 118(1) BNS. It further observed that Section 75 of the JJ Act requires proof of cruelty with mala fide intent. In the present case, there was no evidence of serious injury, excessive force, or cruel intention. The medical report showed no external injuries. Recognising the doctrine of in loco parentis, the Court stated that teachers possess limited authority to enforce discipline through reasonable means. Since the act lacked mens rea and excessive force, the FIR was quashed as an abuse of process.
In Rumaisa Arwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. , the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that marriage and pregnancy cannot be grounds to deny a woman her right to education. The petitioner, a BUMS student, was barred from appearing in exams due to shortage of attendance after childbirth. The college granted only limited relaxation despite UGC’s 2021 directive requiring maternity policies for female students. The Court ruled that attendance rules cannot be applied mechanically when they undermine fundamental rights under Article 21. It emphasized that pregnancy is a natural biological condition, not misconduct, and educational institutions must adopt a gender-sensitive approach. Maternity protection principles applicable to working women were extended to students as well. Allowing the writ petition, the Court directed the college to grant attendance relaxation up to 75%, declare her results, and permit continuation of studies, reinforcing that education and dignity cannot be sacrificed due to motherhood.
In A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court allowed termination of a 30-week pregnancy of a minor girl, holding that no court can compel a woman much less a minor to continue an unwanted pregnancy. The minor had clearly and consistently expressed her unwillingness to carry the pregnancy to term. The Court ruled that reproductive autonomy is an integral part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. It emphasized that bodily autonomy, dignity, and mental health cannot be subordinated to statutory gestational limits under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act. While the Act prescribes general limits, constitutional courts may permit termination beyond those limits in exceptional cases to protect fundamental rights. The Court directed JJ Hospital, Mumbai, to conduct the procedure with due medical safeguards, reaffirming that forced motherhood violates constitutional guarantees of autonomy and dignity.
In Feroz Ahmad v. State, the Delhi High Court had considered the question of whether the conviction of robbery could be upheld in a case where the accused was primarily identified by dock identification. The appellant stated that the witnesses were unfamiliar with him and that Test Identification Parade (TIP) could not be conducted due to the fact that he was presented to the witnesses prior to the parade without adequate face covering. The prosecution was based on the in-court identification and purported discovery of incriminating material by the witnesses. Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav believed that in criminal law, identification was paramount and when the offender is not known by anybody, the identification should be done fairly by the use of a fair TIP so that subsequent dock identification can be done. The TIP was ruled to be compromised by the Court and dock identification on its own was deemed to be weak and unreliable. It also questioned the recovery evidence saying that the additional statements seem to have been added to connect the gaps in the investigations. The Court used the principle which requires proving beyond reasonable doubt and the benefit of doubt and dismissed the conviction and acquitted the appellant after 23 years since the identity of the accused was not clear.
In Benazeer Heena v. Union of India & Ors. , the Supreme Court granted interim protection to an illiterate Muslim woman who challenged a unilateral talaq-e-hasan allegedly issued by her husband. She claimed her signatures were taken on blank papers and misused. The husband failed to appear before the Court. The Bench clarified that it was not declaring talaq-e-hasan unconstitutional but held that serious allegations of fraud and coercion warranted protection. Invoking Articles 14 and 21, the Court ordered that the marriage shall subsist unless the husband proves that a valid talaq was effected in accordance with law. The alleged divorce was stayed, and the SHO was directed to secure the husband’s presence. While refusing to impose a blanket ban on virtual talaq through email or WhatsApp, the Court referred the dispute to mediation before Justice Kurian Joseph, emphasising fairness, dignity, and procedural safeguards in matrimonial dissolution.
In Smt. Bhauri Devi v. At the Rajasthan High Court, Mahendra Kumar and Ors. dealt with a rare case of an old lady of 93 years old who had refused to acknowledge that a female had claimed herself to be heir in the ancestral property and was her daughter. The petitioner required DNA test to be conducted under the Order 26 Rule 10-A CPC to prove that she was a biological daughter of the deceased property owner. The trial court rejected the request under the privacy grounds. The justice Bipin Gupta noted that it was a rare case since the Indian Evidence Act,1872 (and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) offered a presumption in favour of paternity but not one in favour of maternity. The Court also suggested that DNA test is a desirable scientific evidence when it comes to ascertaining parentage and must be established in the case of determining right to inheritance. In order to protect the privacy and finding the truth, the Court ruled that one cannot undergo the test against his will but could forego the test and this could lead to an adverse presumption. The trial court order was reversed by the High Court and the DNA test was mandated.
In Smt. Bhauri Devi v. The Rajasthan High Court, Mahendra Kumar and Ors. were involved in a rare case involving an elderly woman of 93 who refused to admit that a woman who had declared herself heir in the ancestral property was her daughter. The petitioner wanted a DNA test to be carried out in accordance with the Order 26 Rule 10-A CPC to establish that she was the biological daughter of the deceased property owner. The trial court denied the request on the grounds of privacy. Justice Bipin Gupta observed that the Indian Evidence Act,1872 (and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) provided a presumption in favor of paternity but did not provide any presumption in favor of maternity and thus, this was a rare case. The Court also indicated that DNA testing is a good scientific evidence in determining parentage and required in establishing the right to inheritance. To safeguard privacy and truth-finding, the Court decided that one cannot be forcibly tested, but can renounce the test and this may cause an unfavorable presumption. The High Court overturned the order of the trial court and ordered the DNA test.
The second defendant in a sexual assault case petitioned against his conviction in a Madras High Court where he claimed it was unlawful to conduct a joint trial on a sexual assault offence since the offences were done independently. G.K. Ilanthiraiyan and R. Poornima found that the two crimes against the same 11-year-old victim were considered to be a part of the same transaction, and therefore a joint trial was allowable. The Court pointed out that where the case falls under Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, it is the interest of the child that is paramount and retrial would be traumatizing to the victim. It held that there was no prejudice caused by using a common Section 313 CrPC questionnaire and that simple procedural infractions do not affix a trial unless there is a demonstrable failure of justice. This was denied and the life sentence was affirmed.
In Parameshwari v. The State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., decided in February 2026 by the Supreme Court of India (Bench: Justices Rajesh Bindal and Vijay Bishnoi), the Court examined whether compensation can replace punishment in serious crimes. The case arose from a 2009 stabbing where the accused caused multiple life-threatening injuries. The Trial Court convicted them under Indian Penal Code Section 307 and sentenced them to three years’ imprisonment. The High Court reduced the sentence to two months considering delay and ₹1 lakh compensation. The Supreme Court held that compensation under Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita is restitutory and cannot replace punishment. Emphasizing proportionality and deterrence, the Court restored the original three-year sentence and rejected the idea that justice can be “purchased.”
He is Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I. the Supreme Court of India affirmed the conviction of South Indian actress Ms. Pratyusha and Siddhartha Reddy under Sections 306 and 309 IPC in a mutual suicide agreement. The Court determined that a suicide pact should have the survivor involved which psychologically supports the determination of the deceased and therefore the survivor would be guilty of abetment under the Section 107 IPC. The fact that Siddhartha bought lethal pesticide and helped him to commit suicide, after which he lied to the law enforcement agencies, showed that the action fell under the category of intentional aid under Section 106 Evidence Act, and the Court made an adverse inference because of his false words. The surgeon who carried out the autopsy (Dr. B. Muni Swamy) was also found guilty of the unprofessional act of sensationalizing untested allegations in the media and the Court noted that forensic experts should comply with ethics and sub judice principles. This appeal was overruled, the conviction affirmed and Siddhartha ordered to surrender to serve out the rest term. It is a clear cut case that proves that survivor liability in mutual suicide agreements exists and that professional restraint must be applied by forensic professionals.
In In Re: Order dated 17.03.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 1449/2024, the Supreme Court of India set aside an order of the Allahabad High Court that had reduced charges in a case involving sexual assault on a minor girl. A bench led by Surya Kant, with Joymalya Bagchi and N. V. Anjaria, held the High Court’s reasoning “patently erroneous.” The Supreme Court restored the original charges under Section 376 IPC read with Section 18 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, noting that the alleged acts went beyond mere preparation. It emphasized the need for judicial sensitivity in sexual offence cases and directed the National Judicial Academy to prepare India-centric guidelines to ensure courts handle such cases appropriately, keeping victims’ rights and social realities in focus.
In Aimuddin Sheikh & Anr. v. The State of West Bengal, the High Court at Calcutta held that a sudden fight between brothers over parents’ care was culpable homicide, not murder. The Bench of Rajasekhar Mantha and Ajay Kumar Gupta applied Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, noting the assault occurred in the heat of passion with no premeditation. The conviction under Section 302 IPC was reduced to Section 304 Part I IPC, and since the accused had already spent 14 years in prison, they were ordered to be released.
In X.Y.Z. & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., decided in February 2026 by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Aurangabad Bench), Justices Vibha Kankanwadi and Hiten S. Venegavkar addressed the rights of a child raised by a single mother. The petitioner, a 12-year-old girl born from a sexual offence, sought correction of school records to replace her father’s name with her mother’s and to change her caste entry from Maratha to “Scheduled Caste – Mahar.” Authorities had refused, citing lack of power under the Secondary School Code. The Court held that forcing a child to carry the name of an absent father violates dignity under Constitution of India, and that paternal lineage should not be imposed through patriarchal assumptions under Articles 14 and 15. Relying on Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika v. State of Gujarat, it ruled that caste depends on the child’s lived social environment, not merely biological descent. The Court quashed the rejection order, directed correction of the child’s name and caste in school records, allowed application for an SC certificate based on the mother’s status, and ordered protection of the child’s privacy and dignity.