In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukum Chand @ Monu, the Supreme Court of India reaffirmed that minor inconsistencies in testimony cannot defeat a rape prosecution. The case involved sexual assault of a minor, where the trial court convicted the accused, but the High Court acquitted him citing improbability in travel time. The Supreme Court held that such minor discrepancies are natural and do not affect the core allegation if the victim’s testimony remains consistent. It emphasized that criminal trials do not require mathematical precision, and medical evidence corroborating the victim strengthens the prosecution. Importantly, the Court reinforced strict compliance with Section 228-A IPC, mandating non-disclosure of a rape victim’s identity, linking it to dignity and privacy under Article 21. Relying on principles from Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, the Court restored conviction and directed the accused to surrender.
In Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., decided on 24 March 2026, the Supreme Court of India held that conversion to Christianity results in the loss of Scheduled Caste (SC) status. The complainant, originally from the Madiga community, had converted to Christianity and worked as a Pastor but claimed protection under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The Court interpreted Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, which limits SC recognition to Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists. It ruled that this restriction is absolute, and conversion to Christianity extinguishes SC status, regardless of caste certificate possession. The Court further held that the SC/ST Act applies only to legally recognized SC/ST members. Since the complainant had converted, he was not entitled to its protection. The High Court’s decision quashing the complaint was upheld.
The legal foundation of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill, 2026 traces back to NALSA v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court recognised transgender persons as a “third gender” and affirmed that self-identification of gender forms part of dignity and personal liberty under Article 21. Following this landmark ruling, Parliament enacted the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, India’s first comprehensive statute granting legal recognition, anti-discrimination protections, and welfare measures to transgender persons. The 2026 Amendment Bill, introduced in the Lok Sabha on 13 March 2026 by Social Justice and Empowerment Minister Virendra Kumar, seeks to substantially restructure this framework. While the 2019 law recognised self-perceived gender identity through a self-declaration model, the proposed amendment narrows the definition of “transgender person” to specified socio-cultural identities and medically recognised intersex variations, explicitly excluding identities based solely on self-perception or sexual orientation. It also introduces a mandatory medical board recommendation before issuance of a transgender identity certificate, replacing the earlier affidavit-based process. The Bill further mandates revised certification after gender-affirming surgery, enables correction of names in official records, and introduces stricter criminal penalties for coercive mutilation or forced gender identity practices. However, critics argue that the medicalisation of identity may conflict with constitutional guarantees of equality, expression, autonomy, and dignity recognised in NALSA, raising serious questions under Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(a), and 21.
Uniform Civil Code (UCC) refers to a single set of civil laws applicable to all citizens regardless of religion, governing areas like marriage, divorce, maintenance, adoption, and succession. It aims to replace diverse personal laws with one uniform legal framework. The concept is rooted in Article 44 of the Constitution, a Directive Principle of State Policy, guiding the State to work towards a UCC. Though not enforceable, it holds significant constitutional value. Currently, India follows religion-based personal laws, leading to legal diversity and complexity. States like Gujarat (2026), after Uttarakhand, have taken steps toward implementing UCC, with certain exclusions like Scheduled Tribes. The primary objectives include ensuring equality (Article 14), promoting gender justice, simplifying legal systems, and fostering national integration. However, concerns remain regarding religious freedom under Article 25, cultural diversity, and fears of majoritarian dominance. The Supreme Court of India has consistently supported UCC in principle, as seen in cases like Shah Bano case and Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, emphasizing that its implementation lies with Parliament.
In Anjum Mehmood v. Union Territory of J&K, the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court held that bail for juveniles under Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice Act is not absolute, especially in heinous offences. The applicant, a 16-year-old, was accused of serious offences under the UAPA, including links with ISI and sharing sensitive security information. The Court ruled that although bail is the general rule for juveniles, it can be denied where release would defeat the “ends of justice.” This includes consideration of the gravity of the offence, national security implications, and societal impact. Relying on Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan, the Court emphasized that reformative justice cannot override threats to national interest. Bail was therefore rejected.
In All India Shiromani Singh Sabha v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India held that Article 25 does not grant a fundamental right to demand declaration of a public holiday on religious occasions. The petitioner sought nationwide recognition of Guru Gobind Singh Ji’s Prakash Parv as a gazetted holiday, citing religious significance and equality. The Court clarified that Article 25 (freedom of religion) protects the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion, but does not impose a duty on the State to declare public holidays. It emphasized that public holiday declaration is a policy matter, falling under executive discretion, and courts cannot interfere unless there is a clear constitutional violation. The judgment reinforces the doctrine of separation of powers, limiting judicial intervention in administrative decisions. It also highlights the balance between religious freedom and governance, noting that excessive holidays may affect productivity and administrative efficiency.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is reshaping legal practice, from research to drafting, but its growing use in courts raises concerns about accuracy, ethics, and accountability. Courts in India now face a key question: can AI be trusted in legal proceedings? AI tools like ChatGPT, Manupatra, and SCC Online have evolved from research assistants to tools capable of generating arguments and citations. However, “AI hallucination” where false cases or reasoning are produced poses serious risks. Instances of fake citations, flagged by judges like Justice B.V. Nagarathna, highlight misuse and professional negligence. Globally, cases like Mata v. Avianca, Inc. show courts penalising lawyers for relying on unverified AI outputs. The core principle remains: lawyers bear absolute responsibility for accuracy and cannot shift blame to AI. While AI offers benefits like faster research and improved access to justice, it also raises issues of bias, confidentiality, and misinterpretation of complex judgments. The Supreme Court of India has termed such risks an “institutional concern.” Ultimately, AI is a powerful assistant, not a substitute for legal reasoning courts will judge the lawyer, not the machine.
In Pardeep Kumar @ Banu v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court of India held that prolonged undertrial detention without commencement of trial violates Article 21 and may amount to punishment. The accused had been in custody for nearly two years, facing serious charges, yet the trial had not begun and no witnesses were examined. The Court emphasized that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right under Article 21. It observed that continued incarceration without progress in trial becomes punitive and unjustified, as the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. While acknowledging the gravity of offences, the Court clarified that seriousness alone cannot justify indefinite detention. Where there is undue delay and no likelihood of early trial, personal liberty must prevail. Accordingly, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and granted bail, reinforcing that delay in trial can outweigh the gravity of allegations in appropriate cases.
In Shobha Kanwar v. Narpat Singh, the Rajasthan High Court held that a wife’s right to permanent alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act is independent and cannot be defeated by the earning capacity of adult sons. The Court emphasized that permanent alimony is not mere subsistence but ensures dignity, financial security, and a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed during marriage. It clarified that while children may have a moral or legal duty to maintain parents, this does not substitute the husband’s obligation toward his wife. Rejecting the husband’s contention, the Court held that the wife’s qualifications alone do not prove financial independence, and the burden lies on the husband to establish her stable income. Considering the husband’s financial capacity and the wife’s lack of secure residence, the Court enhanced permanent alimony from ₹25 lakh to ₹40 lakh. The judgment reinforces that spousal maintenance is a distinct legal right grounded in equity and dignity.
In Pradeep Kori @ Pradeep Harijan (Minor) v. State of U.P., the Allahabad High Court held that ossification (bone age) tests are not required when valid documentary evidence establishes juvenility. The accused relied on his High School certificate showing he was below 16, while another school record showed a minor discrepancy, yet still indicated he was a minor. The Court interpreted Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act and emphasized that documentary evidence must be given primacy, and medical tests can be ordered only in the absence of such documents. It held that the Juvenile Justice Board and appellate court acted illegally in directing ossification testing despite available records. Reaffirming that medical tests are only approximate, the Court set aside the orders, declared the accused a juvenile, and granted bail, reinforcing the principle that law favors juvenility in case of doubt.
In Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court of India upheld the conviction of a husband for murdering his wife by burning her, emphasizing that a credible dying declaration alone can be sufficient for conviction. The victim, before her death, gave a detailed dying declaration before a Judicial Magistrate, clearly stating that her husband poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. The Court found the declaration to be voluntary, reliable, and recorded when the victim was in a fit mental condition, duly certified by a doctor. Rejecting the accused’s argument, the Court held that hostile witnesses do not weaken the prosecution case if other strong evidence exists. In this case, medical evidence corroborated the injuries and aligned with the victim’s statement, forming a complete chain of proof. Importantly, the Court made strong socio-legal observations, noting that despite strict laws like the Dowry Prohibition Act, domestic violence persists due to deep-rooted patriarchy. It described dowry-related violence as a continuing social “disease,” particularly in rural and semi-urban India. Reaffirming principles under Section 32 of evidence law, the Court held that a trustworthy dying declaration can independently sustain conviction. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction upheld, reinforcing both legal accountability and the urgent need for societal change.
In Dr. S. Balagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., the Supreme Court of India held that a surgeon’s professional judgment in choosing an appropriate medical procedure does not attract criminal liability unless gross negligence is proven. The case involved a paediatric surgeon who performed an orchidectomy instead of orchidopexy on a minor, based on medical necessity and risk factors. The Court noted that the consent form included both procedures, and there was no evidence of manipulation. Relying on expert opinion, the Court emphasized that when a doctor follows a recognized medical practice, liability cannot arise merely because another option existed. Applying the Bolam Principle, it held that a doctor is not negligent if acting in accordance with accepted medical standards. The Court clarified that criminal negligence requires a high threshold of recklessness or gross misconduct, which was absent here. Accordingly, criminal proceedings were quashed, reaffirming that courts must respect medical expertise and good faith decisions in treatment.
In Lakshmi Narayan Tripathi & Anr. v. Union of India, before the Supreme Court of India, transgender individuals have challenged the 2026 amendment to the Transgender Act, arguing that it takes away something deeply personal—the right to define one’s own identity. The petitioners say the law replaces self-identification with medical checks and government approval, making identity a matter of paperwork rather than personal truth. This, they argue, affects dignity, privacy, and freedom—core aspects of life under Article 21. They rely on the landmark NALSA v. Union of India, where the Court recognized that gender identity is based on self-perception, not medical validation. They also cite K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, emphasizing that personal identity is part of the right to privacy. At its heart, the case is about whether the State can control how a person identifies themselves. The matter is still pending, but it raises an important question can a law take away a person’s right to be who they are?
The decision of the Supreme Court of India in this case highlights the expansive scope of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to ensure complete justice between parties. The Court recognized that prolonged matrimonial disputes, especially those involving excessive and vindictive litigation, can amount to an abuse of the judicial process. In the present case, the filing of over 80 cases by the husband against the wife, her family members, and even legal professionals demonstrated a clear misuse of legal mechanisms for harassment rather than genuine grievance redressal. The Court observed that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, with no possibility of reconciliation after years of separation and continuous conflict. To bring finality and prevent further harassment, it exercised its constitutional authority to dissolve the marriage, quash all pending civil and criminal proceedings, and grant a comprehensive financial settlement. This judgment reinforces the principle that courts must not allow litigation to become a tool of oppression and that they possess inherent powers to terminate all related disputes in order to secure justice, protect parties, and uphold the integrity of the legal system.
In a remarkable ruling, the Supreme Court of India invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to dissolve a long-standing matrimonial dispute and quash over 80 related criminal and civil cases between the parties. The Court described the prolonged litigation as a “matrimonial battle of Mahabharata,” highlighting how personal disputes had escalated into multiple proceedings, burdening both the parties and the judicial system. Observing that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, the Court held that continuing legal battles would serve no meaningful purpose and only perpetuate hostility. Exercising its power to do “complete justice,” the Court granted divorce and put an end to all pending litigations arising out of the matrimonial dispute. It emphasized that Article 142 can be used to bring finality to cases where strict application of law may not provide an effective remedy. The judgment underscores the need to prevent misuse of legal processes in matrimonial conflicts and reinforces the Court’s role in ensuring equitable and practical justice.