The High Court of Punjab and Haryana commuted the death sentence of the convict in the brutal rape and murder of a 5-year-old girl, holding that the ends of justice would be met by keeping him behind bars until the “sunset of virility.” In State of Haryana vs. Virender @ Bholu, the Court upheld the conviction of the accused based on a complete chain of circumstantial evidence, including last-seen proof, false explanation, recovery of the child’s body from his house, medical findings of rape and homicide, and DNA evidence. The Court held that the prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, applying the “rarest of rare” doctrine, the Bench found that the case did not warrant the extreme penalty of death. Considering the possibility of reform, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment with a minimum of 30 years of actual incarceration without remission, along with an enhanced fine of ₹30 lakh payable to the victim’s family. The Court acquitted the co-accused mother, holding that her conduct was driven by maternal instinct and not criminal conspiracy.
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh struck down a residence-based reservation clause in public employment, holding it violative of Articles 16(1) and 16(2) of the Constitution. In Balwinder Kumar v. State of J&K, the petitioner, a Scheduled Caste candidate from District Samba, was denied interview for the post of Orderly in District Baramulla solely because he was not a resident of that district. The advertisement restricted eligibility to local residents under Clause 1(i)(a). The Court rejected the State’s plea of estoppel, clarifying that while candidates who participate in a selection process usually cannot challenge it later, this rule does not apply where the selection suffers from constitutional illegality. Participation does not amount to acceptance of unconstitutional conditions. On merits, the Court held that Article 16(2) expressly prohibits discrimination on the ground of residence, and Article 16(3) allows residence-based conditions only through a law made by Parliament which did not exist for J&K. Hence, the clause was ultra vires. The Court directed authorities to interview the petitioner and complete the process within two months.
In Kumar Dashrath Kamble v. Bombay Hospital, the Bombay High Court held that denial of permanency solely on the ground of an employee being HIV-positive is unconstitutional. The Court ruled that such denial is arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It emphasized that the petitioner had continued to perform his duties satisfactorily for several years after being diagnosed, proving his fitness for work. Relying on constitutional principles and the spirit of the HIV-AIDS Act, 2017, the Court granted permanency retrospectively but limited monetary arrears due to delay, balancing equity with limitation laws.
In Dalip Singh (D) through LRs v. Sawan Singh (D) through LRs, the Supreme Court of India clarified the law relating to limitation in cases of usufructuary mortgages. The Court held that where no time limit for redemption is fixed in a usufructuary mortgage, the limitation period does not begin from the date of execution of the mortgage. Instead, limitation under Section 61(a) of the Limitation Act commences only when the mortgagor pays or tenders the mortgage money or deposits it in court in accordance with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Until such payment or deposit is made, the mortgagor’s right of redemption remains intact. Accordingly, the order allowing redemption was upheld and the mortgagees’ suit was dismissed.
The Bombay High Court upheld an arbitral award against Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Company Limited, ruling that a buyer cannot reject goods after putting them to use. In Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Company Limited v. Remi Sales and Engineering Limited, Godrej had purchased stainless steel tubes worth over ₹5 crore for an oil refinery project. The goods were supplied, accepted, installed, and even reinstalled after cleaning for alleged rusting. Despite this, Godrej later rejected the goods and withheld payment, prompting arbitration. The arbitral tribunal awarded ₹4.25 crore with interest to Remi, holding that Godrej had deemedly accepted the goods. Dismissing Godrej’s challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the High Court relied on Section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, which treats use of goods as acceptance. The Court held that once goods are accepted, rejection is impermissible; the buyer’s remedy lies only in damages for breach of warranty, if any. It also reiterated the limited scope of judicial interference in arbitral awards and applied the doctrine of election, holding that a party cannot approbate and reprobate simultaneously.
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh held that mere presence in a free fight is insufficient to sustain criminal conviction unless the prosecution proves a specific role, common intention, or common object attributable to the accused. In State of J&K v. Nazir Ahmad Bhat & Ors., the case arose from a violent clash between two village groups over a disputed pathway, resulting in injuries and the subsequent death of one person. While the Sessions Court convicted four accused under Section 304 Part I RPC and acquitted others, both the State and the convicted accused appealed. The High Court found serious contradictions in prosecution evidence regarding the place, timing, and manner of occurrence. Medical evidence did not clearly link the alleged weapons to the fatal injuries. The incident was held to be a mutual free fight, involving stone pelting from both sides, negating any inference of common intention. Applying the principle of parity, the Court ruled that when several co-accused are acquitted on the same evidence, selective conviction is impermissible. Reiterating that “suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof,” the Court extended the benefit of doubt and set aside the convictions.
The Supreme Court of India held that disciplinary action cannot be taken against judicial officers merely for allegedly wrong or inconsistent judicial orders, as doing so would seriously undermine judicial independence. In Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, a judicial officer was removed from service on the ground that he adopted an inconsistent approach while granting bail in excise cases. The Supreme Court set aside the punishment, holding that an erroneous or even inconsistent exercise of judicial discretion does not amount to misconduct. For disciplinary action to lie, there must be clear proof of corruption, mala fides, or extraneous considerations, none of which were established. The Court cautioned High Courts against initiating mechanical disciplinary proceedings, warning of a “chilling effect” that would deter judges from exercising discretion fearlessly, particularly in bail matters. Judicial independence, the Court reiterated, is a basic feature of the Constitution and must be zealously protected. While affirming that genuine corruption must be dealt with strictly, the Court stressed the need to balance judicial accountability with institutional independence. The appellant was reinstated with full back wages and benefits, and the judgment was directed to be circulated to all High Courts.
In Sarang Vaman Yadwadkar v. Union of India & Others, the Supreme Court of India declined to entertain a writ petition seeking enforcement of international standards for packaged drinking water in India. The petitioner argued that existing standards under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 were inadequate and posed public health risks. The Court, however, described the plea as “luxury litigation”, observing that it reflected an urban-centric concern for bottled water quality while a large section of India’s population still lacks access to basic drinking water, particularly in rural areas. Emphasising socio-economic ground realities, the Bench held that judicial intervention should prioritise fundamental necessities over premium standards. The Court further noted that adoption of international benchmarks involves policy decisions, best left to the legislature and executive, and Article 32 cannot be used for abstract policy debates. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty granted to approach competent authorities.
In Moin Akhtar Qureshi v. Central Bureau of Investigation, the Delhi High Court held that compelling an accused to provide a voice sample does not violate Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The Court clarified that a voice sample is material evidence, similar to fingerprints or handwriting, and does not amount to testimonial compulsion. It observed that Article 20(3) protects against forced testimony, not the collection of physical or biological samples. The Court also held that while the right to privacy is a fundamental right, it is not absolute and can be reasonably restricted for legitimate state interests such as criminal investigation. Importantly, the Court emphasised that procedural safeguards are mandatory to prevent misuse. Finding that adequate safeguards were already in place, the petition was dismissed and the accused was directed to provide the voice sample.
In Adani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India reaffirmed the doctrine of stare decisis, holding that law cannot fluctuate with a change in judicial composition. Adani Power, operating within a Gujarat SEZ, supplied electricity to the Domestic Tariff Area. In 2015, a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court struck down the levy of customs duty on such supply as unconstitutional; the decision attained finality after Supreme Court affirmation. However, a 2019 coordinate bench refused to extend the benefit for later periods, prompting the appeal. The Supreme Court held that a coordinate bench is bound by an earlier decision of equal strength and cannot dilute or disregard it; any disagreement must be referred to a larger bench. It further ruled that exemption notifications under Section 25 of the Customs Act cannot be used to impose a tax, especially absent a charging provision electricity generated domestically is not an “import.” Once a levy is declared ultra vires, subsequent notifications perpetuating it are invalid. The Court set aside the 2019 judgment and directed refunds for 2010–2016 collections (without interest).
In Shereefa Munvara v. Muhammed Kabeer, the Kerala High Court held that a divorced Muslim woman can claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS) even after receiving matah and iddat maintenance under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The case involved a divorced Muslim woman who had received ₹1 lakh as matah and ₹25,000 as iddat maintenance under an agreement executed at the time of divorce. The Family Court denied her claim for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, holding that the husband had discharged his statutory obligations under the 1986 Act. The High Court reversed this view, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana (2024), and held that Section 125 CrPC is a secular, welfare-oriented provision that continues to apply irrespective of religion. The Court clarified that remedies under Section 125 CrPC and the 1986 Act co-exist, and receipt of matah or iddat maintenance does not extinguish the statutory right to maintenance if the woman is unable to maintain herself. The Court further held that an agreement waiving future maintenance cannot automatically bar a statutory claim and that the Family Court must assess the adequacy of the amount paid and the woman’s ability to sustain herself. Finding ₹1 lakh as lifetime provision prima facie inadequate, the High Court set aside the Family Court’s order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration of maintenance for both the wife and the minor daughter.
In Umar Khalid v. State of NCT of Delhi, the Supreme Court of India partly upheld the Delhi High Court’s decision on bail in the Delhi riots “larger conspiracy” case under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Court denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, while granting bail to other accused, holding that bail under UAPA must be decided accused-specific, not collectively. The Bench ruled that under Section 43D(5) UAPA, if prosecution material discloses a prima facie case, courts must deny bail and cannot conduct a mini-trial at the bail stage. It further held that delay in trial is not an automatic ground for bail in special statutes like UAPA. The Court found Khalid and Imam to be on a different footing due to their alleged leadership and strategic roles in the conspiracy. Other accused, with comparatively limited roles, were granted bail with strict conditions. The trial court was directed to expedite proceedings, and Khalid and Imam were permitted to renew bail pleas at a later stage.
In The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Haazari Singh Rawat & Ors. (31 January 2026), the Delhi High Court held that mere allegation of intoxication of a pillion rider cannot automatically amount to contributory negligence without proof of causation. The claimant, injured in a motorcycle accident, had his compensation reduced by 10% by the MACT based solely on a remark in the Medico-Legal Certificate stating he was under the influence of alcohol. Justice Prateek Jalan observed that the claimant was only a pillion rider and had no control over the vehicle. The insurer failed to establish a direct causal link between the alleged intoxication and the accident. Relying on Mohd. Siddique v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2020), the Court reiterated that mere violation of law does not justify reduction of compensation unless it contributed to the accident. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the deduction and enhanced the compensation, reinforcing the victim-centric approach under motor accident law.
In Jitendra Azad v. Meena Gupta, the Jharkhand High Court dismissed the husband’s appeal seeking restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The parties lived separately due to employment in different cities. The husband alleged withdrawal without cause, while the wife maintained she was willing to continue the marriage but could not leave her job and also alleged monetary demands by his family. The Court held that restitution is not automatic and can be granted only when withdrawal is without “reasonable excuse.” Employment was recognized as a valid and lawful ground. Applying constitutional principles of equality and dignity under Articles 14 and 21, the Court emphasized that marriage is a partnership of equals. A husband has no absolute right to compel his wife to abandon her career. Insisting otherwise was deemed unreasonable, and the wife’s separate residence was justified.
In Union of India v. G. Kiran, the Supreme Court of India clarified that a reserved category candidate who avails relaxation at any stage of a competitive examination cannot later claim an unreserved vacancy, even if they secure a higher final rank. The case arose from the Indian Forest Service Examination, 2013. The respondent, an SC candidate, qualified the preliminary examination by availing a relaxed cut-off, while a general category candidate qualified on general standards. Although the SC candidate secured a higher rank in the final merit list, there was no SC insider vacancy for his cadre. He sought adjustment against a general category insider seat, which was denied by the Union but later allowed by the CAT and High Court. Reversing those rulings, the Supreme Court held that the IFS examination is a single integrated selection process. Rule 14(ii) clearly bars candidates who avail any relaxation at any stageincluding prelims from being considered against unreserved vacancies. Higher final merit cannot nullify earlier relaxation. The original cadre allocation was upheld.