In X v. State of Bihar & Anr., the Supreme Court issued comprehensive guidelines for Juvenile Justice Boards while conducting preliminary assessments under Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act for children aged 16–18 accused of heinous offences. The Court held that Boards must independently evaluate four statutory factors—mental capacity, physical capacity, understanding of consequences, and the circumstances of the alleged offence—without conducting a mini-trial or determining guilt. Expert opinions are advisory and cannot be treated as conclusive. Equal importance must be given to the Social Investigation Report and Social Background Report. The Court emphasized reasoned orders, independent application of mind, protection of the presumption of innocence, and the reformative objective of juvenile justice.
In Harshita Grover v. Union of India & Others, the Supreme Court issued an interim direction prohibiting the uploading, clipping, editing, reposting, dissemination, or monetisation of audio-video recordings of court proceedings without prior permission. The Court clarified that livestreaming promotes transparency but does not permit unrestricted digital exploitation or commercial use. It expressed concern that selective clips, AI-generated deepfakes, and manipulated recordings could misrepresent judicial proceedings and undermine public confidence. The restriction does not affect fair and accurate news reporting. Permission must be obtained from the Secretary General of the Supreme Court or the concerned High Court’s Registrar General before sharing official court recordings.
In Khalid Eqbal v. The State of Jharkhand & Anr., the Jharkhand High Court quashed criminal proceedings against a father accused of kidnapping his four-year-old son from the mother’s custody. The Court held that a biological father, being a natural guardian of his minor child, cannot ordinarily be said to have kidnapped his own child under Section 363 IPC by taking the child from the mother’s custody. Kidnapping requires taking a minor from the keeping of a lawful guardian. The Court also rejected the allegation under Section 323 IPC, observing that a mere allegation of “maar peet” without medical evidence, injury report, or specific details establishing bodily pain was insufficient to constitute the offence of voluntarily causing hurt. Similarly, no ingredients of wrongful restraint under Section 341 IPC were established. Exercising its inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS, the High Court held that continuing the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law and quashed the Magistrate’s summons and the entire criminal proceeding.
In Dr. Balram Singh v. Union of India, the Supreme Court expressed serious concern over the continuing deaths of workers while cleaning sewers despite its earlier directions to eradicate manual scavenging. The Court noted that 54 sewer deaths were reported in 2024 and 46 in 2025, raising concerns about the ineffective implementation of its orders. It observed that judicial directions had not sufficiently “percolated” to the local level. The Court also emphasized administrative accountability, rejecting attempts by States to shift responsibility onto private contractors. It held that senior administrative authorities must ensure compliance with the law and court directions. The Supreme Court issued show-cause notices to the Chief Secretaries of Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh, asking them to explain why contempt proceedings should not be initiated against them. The judgment reinforces that manual scavenging violates human dignity and Article 21, and that constitutional and judicial protections must be effectively implemented on the ground.
In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju (2026 INSC 744), the Supreme Court clarified the scope of an accused’s right to legal representation during police interrogation under Section 38 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. The case arose from an alleged custodial death. While granting police custody of the accused Police Inspector, the lower courts imposed conditions requiring interrogation inside Central Prison, continuous videography including during transit, and the presence of advocates throughout interrogation. The Supreme Court held that such rigid conditions could make effective investigation unworkable. Section 38 BNSS gives an arrested person the right to meet an advocate during interrogation, but not throughout the interrogation. Therefore, a lawyer cannot remain continuously present or interfere with questioning. The Court also removed the requirement of uninterrupted videography during transit, while maintaining safeguards for actual interrogation and discovery procedures. The judgment emphasizes a balance between an accused’s Article 21 rights and the police’s power to conduct an effective investigation. Judicial safeguards must protect against custodial abuse without defeating legitimate investigative requirements.
In Shakuntala & Ors. v. Robert Anthony & Ors. (2026 INSC 765), the Supreme Court clarified how property devolves among Christian heirs under the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The dispute concerned land purchased in 1959, but the sale deed was registered jointly in the names of the deceased man’s two wives. The Supreme Court held that the wives were the legal owners of the property, holding 50% each, even though their husband had paid the purchase price. Therefore, the property could not be treated as the husband’s estate for succession purposes. The Court explained that Section 33 ISA, which governs succession to a deceased Christian male’s property, applies only to property actually owned by him. Section 35 is equally important because it gives a widower the same inheritance rights as a widow in respect of the deceased spouse’s property. The Court emphasized that succession must be examined step-by-step after each death, rather than calculating shares as a single inheritance event.
In Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh and connected cases, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of sentences requiring imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission. The petitioners argued that such a sentence created a new form of punishment not recognized under the IPC. Rejecting this contention, the Court relied on the Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India v. V. Sriharan, clarifying that life imprisonment ordinarily means imprisonment for the convict’s entire natural life. The commonly mentioned 14-year period is only the minimum period relevant for considering remission, not the duration of the sentence. The Court also reaffirmed the special-category life sentence recognized in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, allowing courts to impose life imprisonment without remission in exceptionally heinous cases where death penalty is unwarranted but ordinary remission would be inadequate. The Court further held that judicial review of the President’s mercy decision under Article 72 is limited. Finding no constitutional infirmity, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions.
The Supreme Court reserved its judgment in Mangala Bhimrao Ingle Pratik v. Additional Commissioner, Amravati Division & Ors., concerning Maharashtra’s two-child eligibility rule for local-body representatives. The case arose after Mangala Bhimrao, a Sarpanch of Kakoda Gram Panchayat, faced disqualification under Section 14(1)(j-1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act after allegedly having a third child. The provision disqualifies individuals having more than two children from contesting or continuing as members of village panchayats, subject to specified exceptions and the statutory cut-off. The case raises important questions concerning reproductive choices, electoral eligibility and the constitutional validity of population-control measures. The Supreme Court examined whether the disqualification provision continues to serve a legitimate public purpose and whether its application creates disproportionate consequences for elected representatives. The Bench reserved its decision after hearing arguments concerning the interaction between individual rights and legislative policy.
The Allahabad High Court upheld the life imprisonment of Ram Prasad and Chandra Bhan for the murder of two minor girls, Dayawati and Dharmwati, in an alleged honour-killing case. The prosecution case initially presented the deaths as suicides, but post-mortem examination established that both girls had died from manual strangulation. The bodies had also been buried without informing the police, leading to suspicion and subsequent exhumation. The Court relied upon the medical evidence, surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused before and after the crime. It applied Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act to consider relevant conduct and found that the prosecution evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court consequently upheld the convictions under Sections 302, 201 and 34 IPC. The judgment highlights how conduct, medical evidence and circumstantial evidence can collectively establish criminal liability where direct evidence is unavailable.
The 2026 Amendment Act significantly strengthens the legal framework governing unfair means in public examinations, with the primary aim of protecting the integrity of the examination system and deterring organized paper leaks, fraud, and malpractice. The amendment introduces substantially higher punishments, including imprisonment of up to ten years and fines extending to ₹10 crore for serious violations. Service providers, companies, directors, and managers may face enhanced liability where negligence, conspiracy, or complicity is established. The amendment also establishes a Special Task Force (STF) for investigation in specified cases and introduces strict statutory timelines. Investigations must be completed and chargesheets filed within two months, while trials before Special Fast Track Courts are required to conclude within three months. Appeals against judgments and bail orders lie directly before the High Court and are to be decided within three months. Overall, the amendment adopts a strict deterrence-based approach, combining severe penalties, specialized investigation, fast-track trials, and accelerated appeals to ensure swift and effective action against examination-related offences.
The Madras High Court held that advocates cannot physically obstruct police officers from producing arrested persons before a competent court, even when protesting alleged police misconduct. The case arose after two advocates were arrested in connection with an NDPS matter and were being taken before the Special Court for remand. Other advocates gathered to protest and allegedly prevented the police from carrying out the lawful production process. The petitioners argued that they were merely exercising their right to protest in support of fellow lawyers. The Court acknowledged that advocates may express dissent and protest against alleged police excess, but emphasized that such protests must remain peaceful and lawful. Once a protest obstructs the performance of a lawful police or judicial function, it loses legal protection. Relying upon video footage and other material, the Court found that the allegations prima facie disclosed offences, including obstruction of lawful custody under Section 225 IPC. The Court therefore declined to quash the proceedings.
The Supreme Court held that Section 498A IPC may apply to a live-in relationship that qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage.” In Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., the Court considered whether the expression “husband” could extend to a male partner in a genuine marriage-like relationship. The Court adopted a purposive interpretation, emphasizing that Section 498A is intended to protect women from domestic cruelty. However, the protection does not automatically cover every intimate or live-in relationship. The relationship must involve consenting adults and possess characteristics substantially resembling marriage, including stability, shared domestic life, emotional or financial interdependence and an intention to marry. The Court also stressed that the interpretation is limited to Section 498A and does not automatically alter other matrimonial or personal laws. Importantly, safeguards against unnecessary arrest under Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar must continue to be followed
The Supreme Court acquitted Arjun Jani @ Tuntun after he spent approximately 22 years in prison for a murder conviction. The case involved the deaths of three women, and the prosecution substantially relied upon the testimony of a single eyewitness. The accused had also alleged custodial torture and extraction of a confession, although such a confession was legally inadmissible. His jail appeal before the Orissa High Court was filed after a delay of 3,157 days and was dismissed without examination of the conviction’s merits. The Supreme Court adopted a liberal approach towards the delayed appeal, particularly considering the appellant’s prolonged incarceration. It found serious inconsistencies and improbabilities in the eyewitness evidence and concluded that the conviction could not safely stand. The Court criticized multiple institutional failures, including inadequate investigation, reliance on inadmissible material, insufficient evidentiary scrutiny and delayed appellate justice. The judgment emphasizes that procedural limitations should not defeat substantive justice, particularly where personal liberty is at stake.
The Supreme Court, in G. Ganesh v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., reiterated that police must immediately register an FIR whenever information is received that any person is missing, irrespective of age or gender. The Court rejected the interpretation adopted by some States that its earlier directions applied only to missing children. It emphasized that the expression “person” includes children, adults, men, women and persons of every gender. The Court stressed the importance of the initial “golden hours” following a disappearance, during which CCTV footage, mobile-location information and other evidence may be traced effectively. Police cannot insist that families first search for the missing person or wait before registering an FIR. Where circumstances suggest kidnapping, abduction or trafficking, appropriate offences must be considered and specialised anti-human trafficking units should be activated. The Court also warned States and Union Territories that continued non-compliance with its directions could result in contempt proceedings against responsible senior officials.
The Supreme Court, in X v. State of Bihar & Anr., clarified the interpretation of Section 101(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The case concerned a juvenile accused of a heinous offence who was between 16 and 18 years of age. The Juvenile Justice Board had conducted a preliminary assessment to determine whether the child possessed the mental and physical capacity to understand the consequences of the alleged offence. The Court examined whether a court hearing an appeal against the JJB’s order was mandatorily required to obtain assistance from a child psychologist or psycho-social expert. The Supreme Court held that such assistance is not mandatory in every appellate proceeding. It also emphasized that a preliminary assessment is not equivalent to a criminal trial and must focus on the child’s capacity, circumstances and rehabilitation prospects. The judgment stresses a balanced approach between child protection and accountability in serious offences.