In Petitioner v. Opposite Party, the Orissa High Court considered whether visitation rights could be denied to a non-custodial parent and grandparents due to pending criminal and matrimonial disputes. The husband challenged the Family Court’s refusal to grant visitation with his minor son, which was based on allegations against him and an apprehension of harm. The High Court set aside the Family Court’s order, reiterating that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in custody and visitation matters. Relying on Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan, the Court held that a child has a basic human right to love, care, and affection from both parents, and visitation cannot be denied unless exceptional circumstances are proved with cogent material. Mere allegations or speculative apprehensions were held insufficient. The Court also recognized that grandparents play an integral role in a child’s upbringing in Indian society and their affection contributes to the child’s overall welfare. Structured visitation rights were accordingly granted to the father and grandparents.
In MMTC Ltd. v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Ltd. (3 Nov 2025), the Supreme Court, per Justices Sanjay Kumar and K.V. Viswanathan, upheld enforcement of an arbitral award arising from a Long-Term Agreement for supply of coking coal. MMTC had refused to lift coal during the 2008–09 crash, leading to an arbitral award in favour of Anglo American. After losing challenges to the award, MMTC attempted to block execution under Section 47 CPC, alleging fraud and collusion by its officials in fixing the contract price. The Court rejected this attempt, holding that objections at the execution stage are maintainable only when the decree is void or without jurisdiction, not for re-litigating factual issues. It applied the business-judgment rule, noting commercial decisions cannot be second-guessed with hindsight. It also held that mere registration of an FIR does not invalidate a final arbitral award. Enforcement was allowed.
The Delhi High Court, in Courts on its Own Motion In Re: Suicide Committed by Sushant Rohilla, delivered on 3 November 2025 by Justices Prathiba M. Singh and Amit Sharma, addressed systemic issues in higher education following the tragic 2016 suicide of law student Sushant Rohilla, allegedly caused by being forced to repeat a year due to inadequate attendance. Though the individual dispute was settled, the Court examined the wider failures in student welfare mechanisms. It found existing Grievance Redressal Committees (GRCs) ineffective, directing the UGC to ensure at least 50% student membership, inclusion of counsellors, and immediate appointment of 2–3 student members in all GRCs. It also scrutinized the BCI’s mandatory attendance rule, holding it rigid, harmful, and contrary to NEP 2020. The Court ordered that no law student be barred from exams for low attendance, allowing only minor grade penalties, mandated supportive academic measures, and stayed biometric attendance requirements.
In Muskan vs. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the High Court’s power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS). The appellant alleged dowry harassment and cruelty by her husband and in-laws, including a demand of ₹50 lakhs. The Madhya Pradesh High Court quashed the FIR, holding that certain incidents mentioned in the FIR were absent from earlier complaints and appeared to be an afterthought. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, reiterating that the power under Section 482 CrPC is extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly. The Court held that at the quashing stage, courts cannot assess the credibility, reliability, or inconsistencies of allegations or conduct a “mini trial.” An FIR is not required to be an encyclopaedia of facts, and the test is only whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclose a prima facie cognizable offence. Since the allegations warranted investigation, the quashing was held to be erroneous.
In M/s Alchemist Hospitals Ltd. vs. M/s ICT Health Technology Services India Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court examined whether Clause 8.28 of a Software Implementation Agreement constituted a valid arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Although the clause was titled “Arbitration,” the Court held that mere use of the word is not decisive. What matters is the clear intention of parties to submit disputes to a binding and final adjudicatory process. Applying the principles laid down in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, the Court found that Clause 8.28 lacked essential attributes of arbitration. The process was not final or binding, as parties could approach civil courts after 15 days. Further, the so-called arbitrators were the Chairmen of the disputing companies, lacking neutrality. Reading the clause holistically, the Court concluded it contemplated only amicable settlement, not arbitration. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and parties were directed to pursue civil remedies.
In Mihir Rajesh Shah vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, the Supreme Court examined whether furnishing written grounds of arrest is mandatory under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and procedural law. The appellant challenged his arrest in a hit-and-run case, arguing that the police failed to provide written grounds of arrest, thereby violating his fundamental rights. Although the Bombay High Court noted the lapse, it upheld the arrest, prompting an appeal. The Supreme Court held that informing the grounds of arrest is a mandatory constitutional safeguard applicable to all arrests, including those under general criminal law now governed by the BNSS, 2023. To make this right meaningful, the Court ruled that grounds of arrest must be furnished in writing and in a language understood by the arrestee. Oral communication alone was held insufficient, except in exceptional “in-the-act” situations. Even then, written grounds must be supplied at least two hours before production before a magistrate. Failure to comply renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, entitling the accused to release.
In K.S. Manjunath & Ors. vs. Moorasavirappa, the Supreme Court held that an agreement to sell, being a non-determinable contract, cannot be unilaterally terminated unless the contract expressly permits it or termination is justified by the purchaser’s default. The Court ruled that where a vendor illegally terminates such an agreement, the purchaser need not seek a separate declaration challenging the termination and may directly sue for specific performance. The Court further held that subsequent purchasers cannot claim protection as bona fide purchasers under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act if they had actual or constructive notice of the prior agreement and failed to make reasonable inquiries. Mere reliance on a termination notice does not establish good faith. Affirming the decree for specific performance, the Court emphasized that continuous readiness and willingness must be assessed from the purchaser’s overall conduct, both before and after the dispute.
In Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., the Supreme Court examined whether an appellate decree passed in favour of persons who were already dead at the time of hearing could be treated as valid and executable. The dispute arose from a suit concerning re-allotment of ancestral land, where the trial court decreed ownership and possession in favour of the plaintiffs. During the pendency of the first appeal, two appellants died, but their legal heirs were never brought on record. Unaware of this, the appellate court partly allowed the appeal and modified the trial court decree. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that a decree passed in favour of a dead person is a nullity in the eyes of law and has no legal effect. Consequently, the doctrine of merger could not apply. Since the appellate decree was void, the original trial court decree stood revived and was executable. The Court clarified that a decree which is a nullity can be challenged at any stage, even during execution proceedings.
In R. Rajendran vs. Kamar Nisha & Others, the Supreme Court examined whether a DNA test could be directed to determine paternity when such determination had no direct nexus with the alleged criminal offence. The respondent alleged an extramarital relationship with the appellant and sought a DNA test to establish paternity in support of charges of cheating and harassment. The Madras High Court allowed the request, prompting an appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the DNA test order. The Court reiterated the primacy of Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, which creates a conclusive presumption of legitimacy of a child born during a valid marriage, rebuttable only by proof of non-access. It held that DNA testing is an exceptional measure and cannot be ordered as a routine or roving inquiry. The Court emphasized that compelling a DNA test seriously intrudes upon the right to privacy under Article 21 and must satisfy strict necessity and proportionality. Since paternity was only a collateral issue with no direct relevance to the criminal charges, the DNA test was held unwarranted.
The Supreme Court set aside the bail granted to Namdeo Ashruba Nakade and reaffirmed the stringent standards governing bail under the NDPS Act. The respondent was arrested for possession of a huge commercial quantity of ganja, ingeniously concealed in a lorry owned and driven by him, indicating prima facie involvement in organised drug trafficking. The Court held that Section 37 of the NDPS Act imposes mandatory twin conditions for grant of bail in cases involving commercial quantity: the court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The High Court failed to record either of these findings, rendering the bail order legally unsustainable. Rejecting mitigating factors, the Court ruled that custody of one year and four months is not excessive for offences punishable with a minimum of ten years’ imprisonment, and undertakings by relatives are legally irrelevant. Bail, the Court reiterated, is an exception under the NDPS Act, not the rule.
The Supreme Court set aside the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s order granting habeas corpus relief and held that the writ was wholly misconceived. It ruled that when an accused is arrested pursuant to a valid FIR and a chargesheet has been filed, the custody is lawful and cannot be termed illegal merely because bail has been denied. Habeas corpus is a constitutional remedy against detention without authority of law and cannot be used as an alternative forum to challenge rejection of bail. The Court observed that the accused had already filed multiple bail applications, all of which were dismissed by the High Court. Entertaining a habeas corpus petition thereafter amounted to bypassing the established criminal procedure. By examining the merits of the prosecution case under the guise of habeas corpus, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court cautioned that such orders undermine due process and set a dangerous precedent, reiterating the clear distinction between remedies of bail and habeas corpus.
In Supreme Court of India, answering a Presidential Reference titled In Re: Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills, the Court authoritatively clarified the constitutional scheme governing assent to Bills under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution. The Court held that when a Bill is presented to a Governor under Article 200, only three constitutional options are available: granting assent, reserving the Bill for the President’s consideration, or returning it to the legislature for reconsideration (except in the case of Money Bills). There is no independent power to indefinitely withhold assent without following these routes. Importantly, the Governor is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers while exercising discretion under Article 200, as this discretion exists to protect constitutional and federal interests. On justiciability, the Court ruled that the merits of the Governor’s or President’s decision are generally non-justiciable. However, courts may intervene in a limited manner where there is prolonged, unexplained inaction, by directing the constitutional authority to act within a reasonable time without dictating the nature of the decision. Article 361 grants personal immunity to the Governor and President, but does not bar judicial scrutiny of constitutional validity or allegations of mala fides. Crucially, the Court rejected the idea of judicially imposed timelines for assent, holding that the Constitution consciously avoids prescribing time limits. Any such prescription would amount to constitutional amendment by judicial fiat. The Court also categorically rejected the doctrine of “deemed assent,” affirming that a Bill does not become law without express assent. Article 142 cannot be used to substitute or override constitutional functions of the Governor or President. Overall, the judgment reinforces constitutional boundaries, separation of powers, and the limited role of judicial review in the legislative process.
In Supreme Court of India, the ruling in Talli Gram Panchayat vs. Union of India & Ors. settled an important question on limitation under environmental law. The issue was when the limitation period begins for challenging an Environmental Clearance (EC) under Section 16(h) of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010. The Court held that the limitation period commences from the earliest date of public communication of the EC. It clarified that the duty to communicate an EC is shared by multiple authorities, including the Ministry of Environment, the project proponent, and Pollution Control Boards. Once the EC is placed in the public domain in a clear and accessible manner—such as uploading it on an official website—the requirement of communication is fulfilled. Applying the “principle of first accrual,” the Court ruled that an aggrieved person cannot wait for later or personal knowledge, such as through an RTI reply, to compute limitation. Since the appeal was filed beyond the maximum permissible period of 90 days, it was rightly dismissed as time-barred.
The Supreme Court of India recalled its earlier Vanashakti judgment that had barred the grant of ex-post facto environmental clearances, in a split 2:1 decision in Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India vs. Vanashakti. The case arose from challenges to a regulatory framework that permitted projects which commenced operations without prior environmental clearance to subsequently seek approval. A previous judgment had invalidated this framework, holding that post-facto clearance was alien to environmental jurisprudence. Developers and the Union of India sought review, citing serious legal and practical consequences. The majority, led by B. R. Gavai, held that the earlier decision suffered from an error apparent on the face of the record. It observed that binding precedents had been selectively read and that co-ordinate bench decisions upholding the regulatory framework were ignored, violating judicial discipline and stare decisis. The Court emphasized that demolition of large public projects such as hospitals and airports would be economically wasteful and environmentally counter-productive. Accordingly, the earlier judgment was recalled and the writ petitions were restored for fresh consideration, without finally ruling on the legality of the framework. In dissent, Ujjal Bhuyan rejected the review, reiterating that ex-post facto environmental clearance undermines the precautionary principle and sustainable development. He held that permitting such clearances amounts to regression in environmental law and that the review petition impermissibly sought a re-hearing on merits. The final outcome restores the dispute for adjudication while reopening the debate on post-facto environmental clearances in India.
The Supreme Court of India cautioned against criminalising failed consensual relationships, observing that converting every sour relationship into a rape allegation trivialises the seriousness of the offence. The Court was dealing with allegations of rape based on a promise of marriage in a prolonged relationship between consenting adults. It noted that the relationship continued voluntarily for nearly three years, with frequent meetings, repeated consensual intimacy, and no complaint during its subsistence. The FIR was lodged much later, after disputes arose, indicating absence of coercion or deceit at the inception. The Court clarified that Section 376(2)(n) IPC targets cases of repeated rape arising from coercion, fear, or continuous deception, not long-standing consensual relationships that later fail. It further held that a promise of marriage vitiates consent only if it is false from the very beginning, made with mala fide intent, and has a direct nexus with the sexual act. A subsequent refusal to marry does not retrospectively convert consensual intimacy into rape. Expressing concern over misuse of criminal law, the Court held that continuation of prosecution would amount to abuse of process. Accordingly, it quashed the FIR and chargesheet, reaffirming that criminal law cannot be used to settle personal scores arising from failed relationships.