In Sanjay Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. & Ors., the Supreme Court held that a High Court cannot grant pre-arrest or anticipatory bail while refusing to quash an FIR, as such orders are self-contradictory and risk prejudicing investigations. The case arose from writ petitions under Article 226 where the Allahabad High Court denied quashing of FIRs under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, yet simultaneously granted the accused blanket protection from arrest until filing of the charge sheet. The Supreme Court emphasized that powers under Article 226 are not a substitute for Section 438 CrPC, and anticipatory bail relief in writ petitions should be exceptional, not routine. Since pre-arrest relief is available under statutory provisions, accused must first approach the competent Sessions Court. Upholding the principle of separation of remedies, the Court clarified that quashing and anticipatory bail applications are distinct. The High Court’s orders were set aside, and the matter remanded for fresh consideration on merits, balancing the rights of the accused with the integrity of investigation and public interest.
In Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors., the Supreme Court clarified that while deciding an application under Section 319 CrPC to summon additional accused, the court is not required to test the credibility or weight of evidence, which is a matter for trial. The Court held that the power under Section 319 is extraordinary but enabling, allowing the court to summon anyone whose involvement appears prima facie from evidence during trial. Evidence relied upon can include witness testimonies examined in court and statements under Section 161 CrPC, including dying declarations, but charge-sheets or case diaries alone are insufficient. At the summoning stage, the standard is higher than framing charges but lower than proof for conviction. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, observing that minor inconsistencies or delays in dying declarations do not preclude summoning, and child witness testimony can be relied upon prima facie. The ruling emphasizes that courts must avoid mini-trials and ensure no guilty person escapes trial.
The Supreme Court of India set aside the murder conviction in Govind Mandavi v. State of Chhattisgarh, holding that failure to name a known accused in the FIR is a crucial omission that seriously weakens the prosecution’s case. The appellant had been convicted for murder based mainly on the testimony of the deceased’s wife, who claimed to be an eyewitness. However, the FIR lodged by the deceased’s father described the assailants as two unknown masked persons and did not name the appellant. The Court noted that although the witness later claimed she identified the accused when his mask fell and by his voice, this vital fact was absent from the FIR, despite other details being carefully recorded. The Court further found the eyewitness testimony unreliable, as the accused was named for the first time four days later in a Section 161 CrPC statement, and the witness made material improvements during trial. The Test Identification Parade was held after the accused was already named, rendering it meaningless. Recovery of blood-stained articles was also inconclusive, as the blood group could not be matched with the victim. Holding that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court acquitted the appellant and ordered his release.
The Supreme Court of India held that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be exercised to question economic or fiscal reforms, unless such measures violate constitutional or statutory provisions. In Akola Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Zishan Hussain & Anr., the Court examined a challenge to the revision of property tax by the municipal corporation after a gap of 16 years. The Bombay High Court had quashed the revision on a PIL filed by a corporator. Setting aside that judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that the PIL was not maintainable, as it reflected an individual grievance rather than any demonstrable public injury and was an attempt to bypass statutory remedies available under municipal law. On the scope of judicial review, the Court reiterated that courts must exercise restraint in matters of economic and fiscal policy, particularly taxation. Judicial review is confined to examining legality, procedure, or constitutional infirmity, and courts cannot substitute their views for those of elected bodies or policy experts. The Court noted that municipal bodies require financial autonomy to discharge public functions and are justified indeed duty-bound to revise taxes periodically. Consequently, the tax revision was upheld as lawful and reasonable.
The Supreme Court of India acquitted the accused in Dadu @ Ankush & Anr. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., setting aside their convictions under the IPC and the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The Court found serious inconsistencies between the FIR, witness testimonies, and medical evidence. While the FIR alleged both accused arrived together, the victim later claimed one accused was called by phone. Injury versions also varied materially—alleged bleeding injuries were unsupported by medical evidence, which recorded only minor scratch marks and suggested alternative causes such as falling. The prosecution failed to examine independent eyewitnesses despite claims that several locals witnessed the incident. Crucially, the Court held that the High Court erred in completely discarding the testimony of a hostile witness, reiterating that such evidence cannot be rejected in toto and that consistent, credible portions may be relied upon. The finding of caste-based motive was also termed perverse, as no witness testified to such intent. Applying the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court held the prosecution case unreliable and acquitted both appellants.
The High Court of Allahabad held that an earning wife capable of maintaining herself is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Ankit Saha vs. State of U.P. & Another, the husband challenged a Family Court order directing him to pay monthly maintenance to his wife. The Court noted that the wife was well educated, employed as a Senior Sales Coordinator, and earning about ₹36,000 per month. Despite this, she had claimed to be unemployed and illiterate in her maintenance application, suppressing material facts. The Court reiterated that Section 125(1)(a) Cr.P.C. grants maintenance only when the wife is unable to maintain herself. During cross-examination, the wife admitted her employment and income, establishing her financial independence. The Court also emphasized the doctrine of clean hands, holding that a litigant who conceals material information is not entitled to discretionary relief. Considering the wife’s earning capacity and the husband’s financial obligations toward his aged parents, the High Court set aside the Family Court’s order and denied maintenance, reaffirming that maintenance is a measure of support, not entitlement in cases of self-sufficiency.
The National Commission for Men Bill, 2025 proposes the establishment of a statutory National Commission for Men to safeguard the rights, dignity, and welfare of men and boys in India through a structured institutional framework. Introduced in the Rajya Sabha, the Bill seeks to address grievances affecting men’s physical, mental, emotional, and social well-being without diluting or compromising the existing legal protections available to women. The proposed Commission would be empowered to inquire into complaints, recommend appropriate redressal mechanisms, and review the impact of existing laws, policies, and administrative practices on men. It also aims to promote preventive outreach, awareness programmes, counselling services, legal aid, and research on issues such as mental health, family disputes, workplace stress, and social marginalisation. A key objective of the Bill is to foster a gender-balanced and constitutionally consistent approach to justice by recognising that men too may face systemic vulnerabilities requiring institutional support. By focusing on research-driven policy inputs and grievance redressal, the Bill seeks to strengthen inclusive governance while reaffirming that gender justice must operate without undermining women’s rights or statutory protections already guaranteed under law.
The Right to Disconnect Bill, 2025 was tabled in the Lok Sabha by Supriya Sule, aiming to legally protect employees’ personal time and work-life balance in the digital age. The Bill recognises an employee’s right to disengage from work-related communication outside agreed working hours, while allowing employers flexibility to frame arrangements suited to their organisational culture. A key feature is the establishment of an Employees’ Welfare Authority, tasked with overseeing implementation, framing negotiation charters, conducting studies on hyper-connectivity, and promoting counselling, awareness programmes, and digital detox initiatives. Section 7 grants employees a statutory right not to respond to calls, emails, or messages after work hours, with no disciplinary consequences. If employees choose to respond, Section 11 mandates overtime pay at the normal wage rate. The Bill also addresses remote work by requiring mutually agreed policies and awareness measures. To ensure compliance, financial penalties of 1% of total employee remuneration are prescribed for violations, making the framework both rights-oriented and enforceable.
The Supreme Court of India held that Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC does not apply where the murder is the result of a one-sided attack with no mutual exchange of blows, and upheld the conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC. In Surender Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the appellant sought conversion of his conviction to a lesser offence, arguing that the incident arose out of a sudden quarrel and fell within the exceptions to murder under Section 300 IPC. The Supreme Court examined whether Exceptions 1 (grave and sudden provocation), 2 (private defence), or 4 (sudden fight) were applicable. Rejecting the plea of self-defence, the Court noted that there was no evidence of any attack by the deceased, nor was such a defence raised in the appellant’s Section 313 CrPC statement. On Exception 4, the Court clarified that a “sudden fight” necessarily requires mutual assault. A mere verbal quarrel does not constitute a fight. In the present case, the deceased was unarmed and the appellant inflicted four knife blows on vital parts, clearly indicating a cruel and unilateral assault. The Court also found no material supporting grave and sudden provocation. Holding that none of the exceptions were attracted, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction under Section 302 IPC.
The High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam, held that an arrest is illegal if the grounds of arrest are not communicated to the arrestee as soon as possible, reaffirming constitutional safeguards under Article 22(1). In Vishnu N P & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., multiple NDPS bail applications were heard together, raising common issues on non-compliance with Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution and Sections 47–48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The Court held that grounds of arrest must ordinarily be communicated in writing; mere oral intimation is insufficient. While oral communication may be permissible in exceptional situations, written grounds must be supplied at least two hours before production before the Magistrate to enable effective legal consultation. The Court clarified that an arrest memo is distinct from grounds of arrest, as the latter must contain specific allegations and reasons for arrest. Once non-communication is alleged, the burden lies on the police to prove compliance through contemporaneous records. Failure renders the arrest illegal and void, and subsequent filing of a chargesheet does not cure the defect. Applying these principles, bail was granted in three cases due to violation of Article 22(1), while one application was rejected where proper compliance was proved.
The Supreme Court of India partly allowed the appeal in Baboo Khan vs. State of Rajasthan, holding that a demand of gold ornaments at a child’s chhoochhak ceremony does not constitute a dowry demand under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant had been convicted for dowry death and cruelty after his wife and infant child were found dead in a well. The prosecution alleged that harassment arose from a demand for a gold ring and chain. Examining the law, the Court reiterated that “dowry” under Section 304B must be directly connected with marriage. Relying on Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court clarified that demands made after marriage, particularly those linked to childbirth or related ceremonies, fall outside the statutory definition of dowry. Accordingly, the conviction for dowry death under Section 304B IPC was quashed. However, on the charge under Section 498A IPC, the Court found sufficient evidence of cruelty. It held that the husband’s conduct amounted to mental harassment of the wife, independent of the dowry death charge. Since the appellant had already undergone the sentence awarded for this offence, no further punishment was imposed. The judgment draws a clear legal distinction between dowry-related demands and post-marriage social or ceremonial expectations.
The Supreme Court of India strongly reaffirmed the need to combat the social evil of dowry and called for sensitising future generations about equality in marriage while deciding State of U.P. vs. Ajmal Beg etc. The case concerned the dowry death of Nasrin, who was harassed for demands including cash, a motorcycle, and a television, and was ultimately set on fire within a year of marriage. While the Trial Court convicted the husband and his mother, the High Court acquitted them citing inconsistencies and their poor financial status. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, holding that Section 304-B IPC raises a presumption of dowry death once harassment for dowry “soon before death” is proved. Minor inconsistencies, the Court held, do not dilute the core prosecution case. Restoring the conviction, the Court directed the husband to surrender, while granting humanitarian relief to the aged mother. Going beyond the case, the Court issued systemic directions including educational reforms on gender equality, strengthening Dowry Prohibition Officers, training police and judges, expediting dowry cases, and promoting grassroots awareness through Legal Services Authorities to eradicate dowry practices.
In Adil Noshir Mithaiwala v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., decided on 13 November 2025, the Supreme Court of India held that criminal proceedings in India cannot be sustained when the same dispute has already been finally adjudicated and dismissed by courts in a foreign country. The appellants were accused under various IPC provisions based on a complaint filed by a UAE-based firm through its Power of Attorney holder. Notably, the complainant had earlier initiated both civil and criminal proceedings in the UAE on identical allegations, which were dismissed and had attained finality. The Court ruled that continuing proceedings in India amounted to abuse of process and violated the principle against double jeopardy. It also held that suppression of material facts regarding foreign proceedings was fatal to the complaint. Further, a PoA holder cannot depose on matters within the exclusive knowledge of the principal. Accordingly, the criminal proceedings were quashed.
The Supreme Court of India clarified the scope of the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, holding that it applies even to money suits involving mortgaged property and to ex-parte proceedings. In Danesh Singh & Ors. vs. Har Pyari (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors., the Court held that once immovable property is directly and specifically in question in a suit, any transfer made during pendency of the proceedings is hit by lis pendens. Purchasers pendente lite merely step into the shoes of the judgment-debtor and are bound by the decree and execution proceedings, regardless of notice or bona fides. The Court further held that such transferees are representatives of the judgment-debtor, not independent third parties. Consequently, a separate civil suit is barred under Section 47 CPC, and execution-related disputes must be raised before the executing court itself. Upholding the auction sale, the Supreme Court set aside the contrary findings of the lower courts.
The Supreme Court of India allowed an insurance claim in North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Ltd. (NEDFI) vs. M/s L. Doulo Builders and Suppliers Co. Pvt. Ltd., holding that once loss is caused by fire, the cause of the fire becomes immaterial, unless expressly excluded by the policy. The dispute arose from a fire that damaged a cold storage unit insured against fire-related risks. The insurer resisted the claim by questioning the origin and circumstances of the fire. The Supreme Court rejected this approach, reiterating that in a standard fire insurance policy, the insurer’s liability arises once it is established that loss or damage was caused by fire. The Court clarified that the insured is not required to prove how or why the fire occurred, so long as the loss falls within the policy coverage and is not hit by any specific exclusion. The Court emphasized that insurance contracts must be interpreted in a manner favourable to the insured, particularly when exclusions are not clearly attracted. Since the loss was undeniably caused by fire and there was no policy violation, repudiation of the claim was unjustified. Accordingly, the insurer was directed to honour the claim, reinforcing consumer protection principles in insurance law.