In Karam Singh v. Amarjit Singh & Ors. (2025), the Supreme Court held that a plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC merely because the dispute dates back several decades if even one relief sought is within limitation. The plaintiffs challenged a 1976 will and sought possession based on title after mutation proceedings concluded in 2017. The High Court had rejected the plaint as time-barred, citing delay since 1983. Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra ruled that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and must be determined based solely on plaint averments. The Court clarified that mutation entries do not confer ownership and that for possession based on title, the limitation is 12 years from when possession becomes adverse under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The appeal was allowed, and the trial court was directed to proceed with the suit on merits without being influenced by technical grounds.
In Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand (2025), the Supreme Court held that marks obtained in vocational subjects must be included when calculating eligibility for Scheduled Tribe teacher appointments. The appellants, appointed as Intermediate Trained Teachers, were terminated on the ground that their vocational marks were excluded, reducing their aggregate below 40%. The Court ruled that such exclusion was unjustified as vocational marks formed part of the aggregate per official guidelines. It further held that Rule 21 of the Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 applies only to merit list preparation, not eligibility determination. Finding a clear violation of natural justice, the Court observed that the termination was based on a new ground not mentioned in the show cause notice. The Court allowed the appeals, reinstated two teachers with full service benefits, and directed that the deceased teacher’s heirs receive arrears and compassionate appointment consideration.
In Arjun Lal @ Prahlad & Ors. v. Rameshwar Prasad & Ors. (2025), the Rajasthan High Court reaffirmed that the rule of limitation is meant to fix the lifespan of a legal remedy, not to extinguish substantive rights. The petitioners’ delay of about 37 days in filing an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to set aside an ex-parte decree was condoned by the Assistant Collector. However, the Board of Revenue reversed it on the technical ground that the condonation plea under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed later. Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand quashed the Board’s order, holding that procedural lapses can be cured and courts must prioritize substantial justice over technicalities. The Court observed that genuine reasons like illness warranted a liberal approach in condonation. It restored the Assistant Collector’s order and directed speedy disposal of the suit, emphasizing that justice must prevail over formality.
In Prathima v. Sundar (2025), the Madras High Court held that visitation rights must not adversely affect a child’s physical, emotional, or educational development. The wife, residing in Hosur and working in Bangalore, challenged a Family Court order directing her to bring the child to Chennai twice monthly. Justice M. Jothiraman ruled that the burden of facilitating visitation should not rest solely on the custodial parent, especially when the non-custodial parent provides no maintenance. Citing Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan (2020) 3 SCC 67, the Court emphasized the child’s welfare as paramount. The order was modified to allow the father to meet the child at the Child Care Centre, Krishnagiri, on the same schedule. The Court reiterated that parental access should promote, not hinder, a child’s well-being and overall development.
In General Manager, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Achchey Lal & Anr. (Supreme Court, September 11, 2025), a Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Sandeep Mehta ruled that canteen workers employed by the U.P. Cooperative Bank Employees Society were not employees of the Bank. The Society independently managed appointments, operations, and salaries, though the Bank provided infrastructure and subsidies. Applying the control, organization, and multiple-factor tests, the Court held that an employer-employee relationship requires effective and complete administrative control, which the Bank lacked. It reiterated that financial aid or subsidies do not create employment. Distinguishing between statutory and non-statutory canteens, the Court clarified that, absent legal or contractual obligation, canteen staff cannot be deemed Bank employees. Accordingly, it set aside the Labour Court and High Court orders directing reinstatement, emphasizing that mere facilitation does not establish an employment nexus.
In Nawang & Anr. v. Bahadur & Ors. (Supreme Court, October 8, 2025), the Court, comprising Justices Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, examined whether the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies to Scheduled Tribes in Himachal Pradesh. The Himachal Pradesh High Court had directed that daughters in tribal areas should inherit property under the Hindu Succession Act rather than customary law. The Supreme Court set aside this direction, holding that Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act expressly excludes Scheduled Tribes unless the Central Government issues a notification extending the Act’s application. Referring to Tirith Kumar v. Daduram (2024), the Court reiterated that only such notification can alter the legal position. It further held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing directions on an issue not raised in pleadings or arguments. The Court reaffirmed that inheritance among Scheduled Tribes continues to be governed by customary law, not by Hindu succession provisions.
In Jane Kaushik v. Union of India & Ors. (2025), the Supreme Court strongly criticized the Union and State governments for their failure to implement the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, calling such inaction “intentional” and a violation of constitutional equality. The petitioner, a transgender teacher, faced harassment and discrimination in two schools in Rajasthan and Gujarat. The Court held that the schools and governments failed to provide reasonable accommodation and effective grievance redressal as mandated by law. It directed the Union and concerned States to pay ₹50,000 each as compensation to the petitioner and ordered nationwide compliance within three months, including appointment of Complaint Officers, formation of Transgender Welfare Boards, and establishment of protection cells. The Court also set up a high-level committee headed by Justice Asha Menon (Retd.) to frame a comprehensive Equal Opportunity Policy for transgender persons within six months.
The Delhi High Court in Punita Khatter v. Explorers Travel & Tour Pvt. Ltd. clarified the strict liability imposed by Section 452 of the Companies Act. The petitioner, removed as Managing Director on 11.04.2016, failed to return company property despite repeated demands, arguing she remained a Director and later returned all items. The Court held that her obligation to return property arose immediately upon removal as Managing Director, regardless of her continuing directorship. Section 452 does not require proof of entrustment—once possession becomes unauthorized, failure to return constitutes wrongful withholding. The demand notices were found sufficiently specific, and the Local Commissioner’s report supported the company’s claim that documents remained with her. The Court upheld the trial court’s decision to frame charges, finding a clear prima facie case. The ruling reinforces that officers must promptly return company assets upon cessation of their role and cannot rely on continued association with the company to justify retention.
In a significant ruling, the Madras High Court held that cryptocurrency constitutes “property” capable of being owned and held in trust. In Rhutikumari v. Zanmai Labs Pvt. Ltd., the applicant had invested in XRP on WazirX, whose unrelated ERC-20 wallet was later hacked. Despite her assets being unaffected, withdrawals were frozen. The Court ruled that a Section 9 petition is maintainable in India even for foreign-seated arbitrations when assets and transactions connect to India. Analysing the nature of crypto, the Court held it to be intangible property and a “virtual digital asset” under Section 2(47A) of the Income Tax Act. Because XRP was stored separately from the breached wallet, the issue of loss allocation must be decided in arbitration. Granting interim protection, the Court directed WazirX to furnish a bank guarantee or escrow deposit equivalent to the applicant’s holdings. The decision strengthens investor protection and clarifies crypto’s legal status in India.
The Supreme Court in Zoharbee & Anr. v. Imam Khan (D) Thr. LRs. & Ors. (October 16, 2025), decided by Justices Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, dealt with a property dispute between a Muslim widow and her brother-in-law over the estate of the deceased Chand Khan, who died childless. The widow claimed three-fourths of the property, while the brother contended that the land had already been sold through an Agreement to Sell. The Court held that an Agreement to Sell does not transfer ownership or create any charge over property; only a registered sale deed does so under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Since the sale deed was executed after the deceased’s death, the land remained part of his matruka (estate). Applying Muslim inheritance law, the Court ruled that the widow was entitled to one-fourth share, reaffirming that no one can transfer a better title than they possess (nemo dat quod non habet).
The Supreme Court in P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh set aside the High Court’s conviction and restored the Trial Court’s acquittal, reaffirming that mere recovery of tainted currency is insufficient for conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act without clear proof of demand and acceptance. The appellant, an Assistant Labour Commissioner, was accused of demanding a bribe for licence renewal, but the prosecution relied solely on the complainant’s testimony. The mediator was kept outside during the trap, contrary to procedure, leaving no independent corroboration. The phenolphthalein test was negative, and defence witnesses supported the claim that the complainant had the opportunity to plant the money in the drawer. The Supreme Court emphasized the “double presumption of innocence” in acquittal appeals and held that the Trial Court’s view was a reasonable one, not perverse. Since the prosecution failed to prove demand and voluntary acceptance beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction could not stand.
The Supreme Court in Jemaben v. State of Gujarat upheld the conviction for murder, emphasizing the primacy and reliability of the first dying declaration. The deceased, Leelaben, who suffered 100% burns, clearly named the appellant Jemaben in her initial statement to the doctor, who certified her mental fitness. The Court held that minor discrepancies in subsequent dying declarations or witness accounts do not undermine a clear, voluntary, and consistent first declaration, especially when corroborated by independent evidence. Medical findings, the smell of kerosene on the body, recovery of an empty kerosene container at the scene, and the limited burns suffered by the child sleeping beside the victim supported the prosecution’s version and ruled out accident. The Trial Court’s acquittal was deemed perverse, as the evidence led to only one reasonable conclusion—guilt. The High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal, and the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
The Supreme Court looked at the issue of whether such refusal to marry by a man after promising to marry him and rejecting his promise may constitute an abetment of suicide as provided in the Section 306 IPC. The deceased was also an advocate of the government and had relationship with the appellant who had the desire to get married, however, his family did not agree with the marriage. The deceased took poison and died under emotional distress due to this conflict. Her mother claimed that the refusal to marry and the so-called exploitation was an abetment. The Court further determined that in order to prove the applicability of Section 306 IPC there need to be clear instigation, incitement, or intentional aid as it is construed under Section 107 IPC. Instigation involves active encouragement, that is, goading or provoking and leaving the victim with no alternative other than committing suicide. Simple unwillingness or refusal to get married, following intimacy or family pressure does not qualify to this standard. The appellant did not actually intend suicide and did not also do anything to force a suicide. The Supreme Court, on discovering that there was no evidence of mens rea or instigation, aborted the proceedings and described the proceeding as a travesty of justice to continue.
The Supreme Court, in a suo motu proceeding, addressed the misuse of police powers in summoning lawyers during criminal investigations. The case arose after an advocate representing an accused was summoned under Section 179 BNSS, 2023 merely to disclose facts of the case. Recognizing the threat to attorney-client confidentiality, a Bench led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai held that an investigating agency cannot summon a lawyer solely because they represent an accused. Such action violates the attorney-client privilege under Section 132 BSA, a core protection ensuring free communication between client and counsel. The Court clarified that a lawyer may be summoned only if the police possess specific material showing that the communication falls within the statutory exceptions—such as involvement in an illegal act or observing a crime. Even then, the summons must record reasons and must be approved by a Superintendent of Police. The Court also issued safeguards for seizure of digital devices and clarified that in-house counsel are not “advocates” for Section 132 protection. Setting aside the summons, the Court reinforced that police powers cannot undermine legal privilege or the right to fair defence.
The Supreme Court examined whether a nearly four-year delay in pronouncing an arbitral award and the failure of the award to grant final relief could justify setting it aside. The dispute arose from a Joint Development Agreement (JDA) relating to construction obligations and the validity of sale deeds executed by the developer using only a copy of a power of attorney, while the original remained in escrow. The arbitrator reserved the award in July 2012 but delivered it only in March 2016, without any convincing explanation. The Court held that delay alone is not an independent ground under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act to set aside an award. However, if such delay results in lapses in reasoning, non-application of mind, or indecisiveness, the award may become patently illegal or contrary to public policy. Importantly, a party need not seek the arbitrator’s removal under Section 14(2) before approaching the court under Section 34. The Court also ruled that an award that fails to resolve disputes, forcing parties into further litigation, is legally unsustainable. Finding the award unworkable, delayed, and contrary to public policy, the Supreme Court set it aside and, invoking Article 142, moulded a final settlement to do complete justice.