In V D Moorthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati), the petitioner, a 65-year-old director residing in Noida, received a notice under Section 179(1) BNSS to appear before police in Vijayawada, despite medical advice against travel due to Cervical Radiculopathy. The Court examined whether police can compel attendance of persons residing outside their jurisdiction. It held that Section 179(1) BNSS restricts police power to individuals residing within the limits of the issuing or adjoining police stations. Protected categories include males above 60, women, mentally or physically disabled persons, and those with acute illness. Since the petitioner resided outside jurisdiction, the notice was invalid, and the exception for willing persons under the second proviso did not apply. The Court directed that the petitioner may be examined at his residence in Noida, in the presence of his advocate (10–15 feet away), with statement recording permitted via electronic audio-video means, ensuring prior notice and compliance with procedural safeguards.
The Waqf Amendment Act, 2025 (Supreme Court of India, Bench: C.J. B.R. Gavai & J. A.G. Masih), multiple petitions challenged the Act’s constitutional validity, seeking a stay. The Court granted limited interim relief while leaving final adjudication for main hearings. Section 3(r), requiring waqf creators to be practicing Muslims for 5+ years, was stayed until rules are framed, noting lack of verification mechanism. Section 3C, allowing revenue officers to automatically derecognize waqfs, was fully stayed as arbitrary and violating separation of powers. Provisions not stayed included deletion of ‘waqf by user,’ ASI monument restrictions (3D), tribal land protection (3E), registration requirement (36), deletion of non-Muslim creation, and Limitation Act application. The Court clarified non-Muslim representation limits in Central and State Waqf Boards and that CEO need not be Muslim, preferably should be. The verdict provides prima facie interim relief without addressing the Act’s overall validity.
In Assistant General Manager SBI v. Tanya Energy Enterprises (Supreme Court, Sept 15, 2025), the borrower defaulted on repayment of ₹8+ crore despite mortgaging seven properties. SBI offered a settlement under the OTS 2018 and later the OTS 2020 scheme, but the borrower failed to comply with mandatory conditions, including depositing 5% upfront. The High Court had directed SBI to reconsider the OTS application. The Supreme Court held that there is no absolute right to OTS; grant of benefits is at the bank’s discretion, subject to compliance with eligibility criteria. The borrower’s failure to deposit the upfront amount rendered the application incomplete and non-processable. SBI’s processing of the incomplete application was an error, and the High Courts overlooked this procedural flaw. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed SBI’s appeal, holding the OTS application fundamentally defective due to non-compliance with mandatory conditions.
In Arvind Kumar & Ors. v. State & Anr. and Pratham Vishnoi & Ors. v. State & Anr., decided by Hon’ble Justice Arun Monga of the Delhi High Court, two neighbours had filed cross-FIRs following a scuffle over their pets. Both sides later reached an amicable settlement through an MOU dated July 1, 2025. Citing Section 528 of the BNSS, the Court quashed the FIRs, observing that the matter was purely private, continuation of proceedings would serve no purpose, and quashing would foster peace between the neighbours. In an innovative move, the Court directed the parties to perform community service by jointly providing mixed vegetable pizzas—baked by one of the complainants—and Amul Chaach Tetra Packs to the inmates, attendants, and staff of Sanskar Ashram near GTB Hospital, Dilshad Garden, Delhi.
In Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul (Supreme Court, Sept 19, 2025), the accused company issued a cheque for ₹1 crore, which bounced due to insufficient funds. The complainant served a legal notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, demanding ₹2 crore instead of the actual cheque amount, claiming it was a typographical error. The High Court quashed the complaint, holding the notice invalid due to the amount mismatch. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, emphasizing that Section 138 is a penal provision requiring strict compliance. The Court held that the notice must demand the “said amount of money” as specified in the dishonoured cheque; no relaxation is permissible, even for typographical errors. Any ambiguous or excessive amount not matching the cheque renders the notice invalid. While additional claims like interest or costs may be separately specified, the principal cheque amount must be exact. Consequently, the defense of typographical error was rejected, and the complaint under Section 138 NI Act was held non-maintainable.
In State of H.P. v. Rajika Gupta (High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Rajika Gupta was convicted under Sections 279, 337, and 304A IPC for rash and negligent driving causing death. The trial court sentenced her to imprisonment and ordered compensation to the deceased’s family. The appellate court upheld the conviction but granted probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, imposing conditions such as higher compensation and community service. The State challenged this extension of probation. Citing Supreme Court precedents, including Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) and State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh (2012), the High Court held that probation cannot be granted to individuals convicted of causing death by rash or negligent driving. The Court emphasized that deterrence is paramount in such cases to reduce road accidents and that leniency through probation would undermine this objective. Consequently, the High Court allowed the State’s appeal, setting aside the probation order and remanding the matter to the trial court to reconsider sentencing in accordance with law.
In Assistant General Manager SBI v. Tanya Energy Enterprises, Tanya Energy had borrowed over ₹8 crore from SBI by mortgaging seven properties but defaulted on repayment. SBI issued demand notices under the SARFAESI Act and initiated recovery proceedings. In 2018, SBI offered a settlement of ₹5 crore under an OTS scheme, which the borrower failed to pay, leading to cancellation. Later, the borrower applied under the OTS 2020 Scheme, but SBI rejected the application. The High Court initially directed SBI to reconsider the application, and a Division Bench upheld that ongoing SARFAESI proceedings did not disqualify borrowers from OTS benefits. The Supreme Court clarified that OTS benefits are discretionary and there is no absolute right to settlement. Under Clause 4 of the OTS 2020 Scheme, an upfront deposit of 5% of the settlement amount was mandatory. The borrower’s failure to comply rendered the application incomplete and non-processable. SBI’s processing of the defective application was an error, and the High Courts overlooked this procedural violation. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed SBI’s appeal and held the OTS application fundamentally defective.
Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v. Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula & Ors. – Supreme Court Decision In this case, a complaint alleging professional misconduct was filed against advocate Rajiv Narula, claiming he defrauded a deceased father’s property rights via consent terms in a civil suit. The Bar Council referred the matter to its Disciplinary Committee, but Narula challenged this in Bombay High Court, which stayed the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that disciplinary action under Section 35 of the Advocates Act requires a professional relationship between complainant and advocate. The Court emphasized that mere attestation of affidavits or identification of parties does not constitute misconduct. The reference order by the Bar Council was “cryptic and laconic,” lacking reasoned discussion, which is mandatory under Section 35. The Court quashed all proceedings, imposed costs of ₹50,000 each on the Bar Council and complainants, and underscored that frivolous complaints against advocates cause unnecessary harassment and grief.
In Shobhit Kumar Mittal v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., the Supreme Court, per Justices B.V. Nagarathna and R. Mahadevan, quashed a dowry harassment FIR against the brother-in-law. The Court held that vague, omnibus allegations without specific details of time, place, or nature of cruelty cannot sustain prosecution under Sections 323, 498A IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act. Applying the Bhajan Lal principles, the Court cautioned against the misuse of Section 498A as a weapon of personal vengeance and emphasized judicial scrutiny in matrimonial cases. It reiterated that genuine cruelty must be distinguished from exaggerated or false allegations.
In Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v. Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula & Ors., the Supreme Court, per Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, quashed disciplinary proceedings against advocate Rajiv Narula initiated by the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa. The Court held that a professional relationship between the complainant and the advocate is ordinarily essential to invoke Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. It observed that the Bar Council’s reference order was “cryptic and unreasoned,” lacking prima facie satisfaction of misconduct. The Court clarified that mere identification or attestation of affidavits does not amount to professional misconduct. Emphasizing the need for reasoned orders while referring complaints, the Court condemned frivolous complaints as malicious harassment of advocates and imposed ₹50,000 costs each on the Bar Council and complainant for abuse of process and causing undue mental agony to the lawyer.
The Allahabad High Court held that a wife in a voidable marriage is not disentitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC unless a decree of nullity is passed. Sweta Jaiswal filed for maintenance against her husband, who had concealed a previous marriage. The Family Court denied her maintenance, granting only for the minor child. The High Court observed that a voidable marriage remains valid until annulled, and the wife retains all legal rights. Denial based on hypothetical annulment or mere concealment of prior marriage was “patently illegal and perverse.” Maintenance entitlement depends on the facts and conduct of parties, not the potential voidability. The Court reaffirmed that rights of a legally wedded wife persist until formal annulment, ensuring protection under Section 125 CrPC.
The Kerala High Court held that under Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the registered owner of a vehicle is liable to compensate accident victims, even if the vehicle was allegedly transferred before the accident, unless formal ownership transfer is completed. In this case, Abdul Khader appealed against a compensation award after a fatal accident, claiming he had transferred the vehicle and obtained an indemnity bond. The Court clarified that the “owner” is the person in whose name the vehicle stands registered, prioritizing victim protection. Informal transfers or indemnity bonds do not absolve liability. However, the registered owner can recover the compensation amount with interest from the actual transferee through due legal process, ensuring fairness while safeguarding victims’ rights.
The Supreme Court held that arbitral awards must strictly adhere to the contractual terms agreed by parties. SEPCO’s appeal was dismissed as the Tribunal exceeded jurisdiction by rewriting contract clauses, ignoring the “No Oral Modification” clause, and discriminating between parties in violation of Section 18 of the Arbitration Act. Awarding damages despite failed Unit Characteristics Test violated Section 28(3). Courts emphasized that arbitrators are bound by the contract and cannot modify terms. Judicial interference under Sections 34 and 37 is limited but justified when awards violate natural justice, public policy, or fundamental contractual provisions.The Supreme Court held that arbitral awards must strictly adhere to the contractual terms agreed by parties. SEPCO’s appeal was dismissed as the Tribunal exceeded jurisdiction by rewriting contract clauses, ignoring the “No Oral Modification” clause, and discriminating between parties in violation of Section 18 of the Arbitration Act. Awarding damages despite failed Unit Characteristics Test violated Section 28(3). Courts emphasized that arbitrators are bound by the contract and cannot modify terms. Judicial interference under Sections 34 and 37 is limited but justified when awards violate natural justice, public policy, or fundamental contractual provisions.
The Supreme Court held that the government cannot be estopped or deemed to have waived statutory powers in exercising sovereign, legislative, or executive functions. Lands in Dadra and Nagar Haveli granted under Portuguese “Alvara” system were validly rescinded for non-cultivation, following due process. Mere delay does not amount to waiver. High Court can interfere in second appeals only for perverse findings or misapplication of law. Public interest and statutory obligations override any claims of acquiescence, reinforcing that estoppel does not bind the government.
The Bombay High Court condoned a 75-day delay in filing the written statement by Gautam Dham Co-operative Housing Society in a non-commercial suit. The Court held that under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, limitation to file a written statement begins from actual service of the plaint, not from filing of vakalatnama, as the plaintiff must ensure proper service. The delay, caused by inadvertent oversight by the advocate’s office, was deemed “sufficient cause” since the society gained no advantage and corrective action was taken immediately. The Court allowed the application and directed the Registry to record the written statement.