The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad held that a woman cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. despite long cohabitation if her first marriage is subsisting. In Smt. Madhu @ Aruna Bhajpai vs. State of U.P. & Another, the Court found that the revisionist’s first marriage was never legally dissolved. Consequently, her subsequent marriage was void ab initio under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The Court ruled that the term “wife” under Section 125 Cr.P.C. strictly means a legally wedded wife and cannot be extended to relationships arising from void marriages. Distinguishing Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, the Court noted that unlike that case, the revisionist was fully aware of her subsisting first marriage. Upholding the Family Court’s order, the revision was dismissed, reaffirming that cohabitation or social recognition cannot override statutory requirements for a valid marriage.
The Supreme Court of India held that permission to cut or remove trees must comply with the definition of “forest” laid down in the T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad judgment, even if the land is not formally notified as forest. The case arose from a land exchange in Uttar Pradesh where agricultural land was swapped for forest land due to wildlife damage, after which the Forest Department developed plantations and the land merged with surrounding forest areas. Parts of this land were later illegally sold, and the purchasers sought permission to cut trees, which the High Court allowed without examining relevant forest notifications. Setting aside that approach, the Supreme Court clarified that the term “forest” must be understood broadly as per Godavarman, covering any land recorded as forest in government records irrespective of ownership or notification. The Court emphasized that all statutory procedures under forest and wildlife laws must be strictly followed before granting any permission for tree felling or removal. It also reiterated that illegal transactions involving forest land do not confer enforceable rights. The appeal was disposed of with directions that any future application for cutting trees must be decided strictly in accordance with forest laws and environmental safeguards.
The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, held that mere diagnosis of severe dementia is not sufficient to stall criminal trial proceedings unless a duly constituted Medical Board certifies the accused’s unfitness to stand trial. In Sonu Ram Pachauri vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., the Court examined whether the procedure under Section 329 CrPC was properly followed after an accused was released to family custody on medical grounds. The existing medical report stated that the accused suffered from severe dementia and cognitive impairment but failed to clearly opine on his capacity to understand proceedings or instruct counsel—a mandatory requirement under Section 329. The Court emphasized that a trial cannot be deferred solely on vague medical opinions. It directed constitution of a fresh Medical Board, comprising senior psychiatric experts from a government hospital and medical college, to specifically assess whether the accused is mentally fit to comprehend and participate in the trial. The Court ordered a re-evaluation by the Medical Board and fixed timelines for appearance and reporting, reinforcing that fair trial rights must balance both the accused’s mental health and the victim’s right to justice, strictly in accordance with statutory safeguards.
The Supreme Court of India held that issues relating to a party’s capacity to invoke arbitration and questions of maintainability fall within the exclusive domain of the Arbitral Tribunal, not the referral court. In APGENCO vs. Tecpro Systems Ltd. & Ors., the dispute arose from an EPC contract awarded to a consortium. Tecpro, a consortium member, invoked arbitration individually, which APGENCO opposed, arguing that only the consortium could do so. The Court reiterated the limited scope of scrutiny under Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration Act, confining courts to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Finding such prima facie existence since the arbitration clause in the GCC was incorporated into the purchase orders the Court held that all detailed objections, including whether an individual consortium member could invoke arbitration, must be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 (kompetenz-kompetenz). Accordingly, the appointment of the tribunal was upheld.
The Supreme Court of India underscored that child trafficking is a disturbing social reality and laid down important guidelines on evaluating evidence of trafficking victims in K.P. Kirankumar @ Kiran v. State by Peenya Police. The Court upheld the conviction of the accused for trafficking and sexual exploitation of a minor, emphasizing that the testimony of a minor victim must be assessed with sensitivity, realism, and latitude. It held that minor inconsistencies or contradictions do not erode the credibility of a trafficking victim, especially when her account is corroborated by surrounding circumstances such as decoy operations, NGO testimony, and recovery of incriminating material. The Court clarified that a trafficking victim is not an accomplice, and her sole testimony can sustain conviction if found reliable. On age determination, it reaffirmed that school records prevail over medical or ossification tests under the Juvenile Justice framework. Addressing procedural objections, the Court ruled that non-strict compliance with search requirements under the ITPA is a curable irregularity, unless prejudice is shown. The judgment reinforces judicial responsibility to avoid secondary victimisation and to protect the dignity of child victims.
The Supreme Court of India quashed criminal proceedings under Section 498A IPC in Belide Swagath Kumar v. State of Telangana & Another, holding that a husband sending money to his parents or asking his wife to track household expenses does not amount to cruelty. The case arose from an FIR filed by the wife after the husband issued a legal notice seeking restitution of conjugal rights. The wife alleged dowry demands, financial control, and mental harassment. The Court noted that both parties were software engineers, financially independent, and the allegations were vague, omnibus, and unsupported by specific instances of cruelty or dowry demand. The Court observed that complaints relating to maintaining expense records, remitting money to parents, or marital discord fall within the ordinary wear and tear of married life. Such conduct, without evidence of grave mental or physical harm or dowry-linked harassment, does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 498A IPC. Financial dominance alone, the Court clarified, cannot be criminalised. Applying the Bhajan Lal principles, the Court held that continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of law. It cautioned against misuse of matrimonial laws as tools for retaliation or pressure. Accordingly, the FIR and all consequential proceedings were quashed, reaffirming that criminal law must not be invoked for routine marital disagreements.
The Supreme Court of India clarified the scope of Section 27 of the Evidence Act in Shaik Shabuddin v. State of Telangana, holding that materials voluntarily handed over by an accused during a police check or at the time of arrest cannot be treated as recoveries under Section 27. The Court observed that for Section 27 to apply, the discovery must be pursuant to information leading to the concealment of an object. Articles merely taken from the accused’s possession at the time of arrest do not qualify as admissible recovery evidence. The Court also rejected reliance on an inadmissible confession made in police custody and corrected the improper application of the “last seen” theory. While convictions under the SC/ST Act were set aside due to lack of proof of caste knowledge, convictions for rape and murder were upheld on the strength of medical and circumstantial evidence. The sentence was modified to 25 years’ imprisonment without remission.
The Supreme Court of India held that mutation of revenue records can be carried out on the basis of a will, clarifying the limited scope of mutation proceedings. In Tara Chandra v. Bhawarlal & Anr., the dispute concerned mutation based on a registered will executed by the deceased tenure holder. While revenue authorities allowed mutation on this basis, the High Court set aside the order, relying on an earlier view that mutation could not be founded on a will. Reversing the High Court, the Supreme Court held that neither the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 nor the 2018 Rules prohibit mutation based on a will. A Tehsildar cannot reject such an application merely because the claim flows from a testamentary instrument. The Court reiterated that mutation is a summary, administrative process for fiscal purposes and does not determine title, which must be adjudicated by a civil court if seriously disputed. As no legal heir challenged the will and the opposing claim rested on an unregistered agreement, the mutation order was rightly passed. The appeal was allowed, restoring the mutation, subject to civil proceedings.
The High Court of Kerala held that bail conditions cannot be used to convert bail into detention, and quashed a condition requiring a foreign national to stay in a transit home until completion of trial. In Apple Barua vs. State of Kerala & Anr., the petitioner, a Bangladeshi national, was granted default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC in a case relating to alleged forgery and illegal procurement of an Indian passport. However, the Magistrate imposed conditions mandating his stay in a transit home, effectively amounting to continued custody. The petitioner challenged this as a violation of Article 21. The Court held that the purpose of bail conditions under Sections 437(3) and 439 CrPC is limited to ensuring fair trial—such as preventing absconding or tampering with evidence—and cannot be punitive or excessive. The phrase “interest of justice” cannot be stretched to justify detention-like conditions. The Court further clarified that powers to detain or restrict movement of foreigners lie with the civil authorities under the Foreigners Order, 1948, not with criminal courts granting bail. Since default bail is a facet of personal liberty under Article 21, imposing such conditions defeats its very object. Accordingly, the impugned conditions were struck down as unconstitutional.
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, Srinagar Bench, held that the presence of a capable and caring parent excludes the application of “child in need of care and protection” under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. In Oasis Girls School, Gogji Bagh vs. Ms. XXX (Minor), a six-year-old student was expelled after her father raised complaints regarding school fees. The matter was referred to the Child Welfare Committee (CWC), which conducted an inquiry and issued directions against the school. Challenging this, the school contended that the CWC lacked jurisdiction. The Court examined Section 2(14) of the JJ Act and held that the child did not fall within its scope. She had a caring father, a stable home environment, and there were no allegations of neglect, abuse, abandonment, or vulnerability. The Court clarified that CWC jurisdiction is confined strictly to children requiring care and protection, and cannot extend to disputes such as school expulsion. Distinguishing reliance on Supreme Court precedents dealing with extreme vulnerability, the Court set aside the CWC’s order as ultra vires, reaffirming the limited statutory role of CWCs.
The Supreme Court of India held that the government cannot act contrary to its own binding policy, and quashed the Rajasthan Government’s decision to name newly created revenue villages after private individuals. In Bhika Ram & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., the dispute arose from a notification creating two revenue villages Amargarh and Sagatsar named after individuals who had donated land. The appellants challenged this action on the ground that it violated a Revenue Department circular dated 20.08.2009, which expressly prohibited naming villages after any person, religion, caste, or sub-caste, and required names to be decided by general consensus. The Supreme Court held that the circular represented a policy decision binding on the State and was intended to preserve communal harmony and neutrality in public nomenclature. The Court ruled that unless such a policy is lawfully amended or withdrawn, the government is bound to follow it. Any deviation would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Rejecting the reasoning of the High Court’s Division Bench, the Supreme Court restored the Single Judge’s view and held the naming of villages after individuals to be impermissible. The appeal was allowed, with liberty granted to the State to rename the villages strictly in accordance with law and policy.
The High Court of Delhi suspended the life sentence of Kuldeep Singh Sengar pending appeal in the Unnao rape case, granting him bail under Section 389 CrPC. The Court examined whether the appellant could be treated as a “public servant” under the POCSO Act. It held that an MLA does not fall within the definition of “public servant” under Section 21 IPC, which POCSO adopts by reference. Consequently, conviction under Section 5(c) POCSO (applicable to public servants) was found prima facie unsustainable. On suspension of sentence, the Court noted that the appellant had already undergone over 7 years and 5 months of incarceration, meeting the minimum sentence prescribed under the pre-2019 POCSO regime. Given the delay in disposal of the appeal, continued incarceration would offend the right to speedy justice under Article 21. Addressing concerns of threat to the victim, the Court held that such risks can be mitigated through adequate police/CRPF protection and cannot, by themselves, defeat statutory bail rights. The Court clarified that issues on merits—such as age determination, alibi, or alleged investigative lapses would be decided at the final hearing. Accordingly, the sentence was suspended and bail granted subject to strict conditions.
The Supreme Court of India reiterated that the power under Section 311 CrPC must be exercised sparingly and only when the proposed evidence is indispensable for discovering the truth, and not to fill lacunae or prolong trials. In Mayankkumar Natwarlal & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., the prosecution sought to examine the deceased’s minor daughter as a witness nearly seven years after the incident, after completion of evidence of 21 prosecution witnesses. The Trial Court rejected the application, but the High Court allowed it. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court found no material indicating the child’s presence at the scene, as neither the FIR nor earlier statements mentioned her as an eyewitness. The Court highlighted the tender age of the child at the time of the incident, the long delay, and the real risk of tutoring, particularly since she was residing with the complainant’s family. Memory at such a young age, the Court observed, is fragile and vulnerable to influence. The Court held that permitting such evidence at an advanced stage would cause serious prejudice to the accused and unnecessarily delay the trial. Restoring the Trial Court’s order, the Supreme Court clarified that Section 311 CrPC is meant to serve the ends of justice, not to repair weaknesses in the prosecution case.
The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad held that a registered adoption deed carries a statutory presumption of validity and cannot be brushed aside as “suspicious” unless it is disproved in appropriate independent proceedings. In Ram Kumar vs. Narain and Others, the petitioner claimed rights over ancestral agricultural land on the basis of a registered adoption deed executed in 1982 under Hindu rites. Mutation was granted in his favour, but was later set aside by revenue authorities without recording proper reasons, merely branding the adoption deed as doubtful. The Court relied on Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, which creates a rebuttable presumption that a registered adoption has been validly made. It noted that the respondents never challenged the adoption deed in any civil or independent proceedings. Mere suspicion or conjecture, without evidence, cannot displace the statutory presumption. Emphasising that reasons are the soul of judicial orders, the Court held that unreasoned findings are perverse and unsustainable. Accordingly, the appellate and revisional orders were quashed, and the writ petition was allowed, reaffirming that registered adoption deeds remain operative unless lawfully disproved.
The Supreme Court of India set aside as “manifestly perverse” a High Court order granting bail to accused persons who allegedly murdered a key eyewitness while already on bail. In Lakshmanan v. State, the Court noted that the accused were initially granted bail in a serious offence under the IPC and the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. While on bail, they allegedly committed a second grave offence by killing a crucial witness, striking at the very foundation of a fair trial. Despite this, the High Court granted bail again and even directed a joint trial of two distinct cases. The Supreme Court held that although the victim had been heard as required under Section 15A(5) of the SC/ST Act, the High Court failed to meaningfully assess the gravity of offences, prior bail cancellation, criminal antecedents, and threat to witnesses. The reliance on unrelated civil disputes was termed irrelevant. The direction for a joint trial was also quashed, as the cases involved different incidents and could not be mechanically clubbed. The bail was cancelled, and the accused were directed to surrender, reaffirming that misuse of bail and witness intimidation cannot be tolerated.