In Gurdial Singh v. Jagir Kaur & Anr., the Supreme Court of India addressed the validity of a Will executed by Maya Singh, who owned 67 kanals 4 marlas of land and died on November 10, 1991. Gurdial Singh, his nephew, produced a Will dated May 16, 1991, bequeathing the entire property to him. Jagir Kaur, Maya Singh’s wife, contested the Will, asserting her legal entitlement as his surviving spouse. The Will made no mention of Jagir Kaur or any reason for disinheriting her, despite her living with Maya Singh until his death. While the Trial and First Appellate Courts upheld the Will, the High Court found it invalid due to suspicious circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's view, holding that the unexplained omission of the wife, absence of marital discord, her nomination for pension benefits, and the Will’s vague content raised legitimate doubts. The Court emphasized that a Will must be free from real, germane suspicion and reflect the testator’s free will. The appeal was dismissed, and Jagir Kaur was declared rightful heir.
In Kaushal Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, decided on July 18, 2025, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of judicial propriety and procedural fairness concerning a District Judge criticized by the Rajasthan High Court for granting bail in a serious criminal case. The High Court had passed personal strictures against the judge, alleging procedural lapses and misapplication of law, and forwarded the matter for disciplinary action. The Supreme Court expunged these remarks, emphasizing that High Courts should avoid making personal observations against judicial officers in their judgments. Instead, any concerns regarding judicial conduct should be raised confidentially with the Chief Justice, allowing the officer an opportunity to respond. Public criticism without hearing violates natural justice, harms reputations, undermines authority, and demoralizes the judiciary. Additionally, the Court directed all High Courts to consider framing rules mandating disclosure of criminal antecedents and prior bail applications by accused persons, ensuring transparency and consistency in bail decisions.
In Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. LRs & Ors. v. Parasram & Ors., the Supreme Court of India, on July 18, 2025, addressed the issue of abatement in a second appeal arising from a property dispute. The original suit filed by Parasram for declaration of title, possession, and mesne profits was dismissed by the trial court but decreed in his favor by the first appellate court. Suresh Chandra and Ram Babu jointly appealed to the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Ram Babu died in 2015, but his legal representatives were not substituted until 2022. The High Court rejected the application for condonation of delay and declared the appeal abated. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, holding that the appellants failed to show sufficient cause for the delay. It further ruled that the second appeal abated in its entirety due to the joint and inseparable nature of the defense. Since the defendants based their claim on a common title, allowing the appeal to proceed only for one would result in inconsistent and conflicting decrees. The Court also clarified that Order XLI Rule 4 CPC, which permits one party to appeal on behalf of all, does not apply where the appeal is jointly filed and one party dies without substitution. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the delay was unjustified and the entire appeal had abated.
In Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh, decided on July 17, 2025, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act. The petitioner was convicted under Section 21(c) for possession of 236 vials of Codeine-based cough syrup and sentenced to 12 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine. The High Court reduced the sentence to the statutory minimum of 10 years, wrongly holding that only the factors listed under Section 32-B clauses (a) to (f) can justify a sentence above the minimum. The Supreme Court corrected this view, ruling that Section 32-B preserves judicial discretion, and the listed factors are illustrative, not exhaustive. Courts may consider any relevant factor, including the nature and quantity of the substance or the accused’s background. While the Court upheld the reduced sentence without intervening, it clarified that trial courts are not limited to the enumerated factors under Section 32-B when imposing a sentence above the statutory minimum.
In BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields Limited, the Supreme Court on July 18, 2025, dismissed an appeal seeking appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The dispute centered around Clause 13 of the contract, which stated that redressal of disputes “may be sought” through arbitration. The Court held that such language does not amount to a binding arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Act. It emphasized that a valid arbitration clause must reflect a clear intention to arbitrate, be in writing, and establish consensus ad idem between parties. The clause in question was deemed an enabling provision, lacking mandatory force, and requiring fresh consent at the dispute stage. Relying on precedents like Jagdish Chander and Mahanadi Coalfields, the Court clarified that permissive wording like “may be sought” fails to create enforceable arbitration obligations. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court’s rejection of the arbitration application and refused to appoint an arbitrator.
In Metpalli Lasum Bai v. Metapalli Muthaih, the Supreme Court on July 21, 2025, reaffirmed that a registered Will carries a presumption of genuineness, placing the burden of proof on the person disputing its validity. The case involved a property dispute among heirs of late Rajanna, who had executed a registered Will in 1974, dividing land among his second wife Lasum Bai, son Muthaiah, and daughter Rajamma. While the trial court upheld the Will and gave full ownership to Lasum Bai, the High Court reduced her share. The Supreme Court restored the trial court’s judgment, holding that the Will was valid, as Muthaiah had admitted Rajanna’s signatures, and Lasum Bai had long possessed the land and even sold part of it. The Court noted that the oral family settlement and revenue records further supported her claim. It ruled that the High Court erred in questioning the Will's authenticity without sufficient grounds.
In Jaykishor Chaturvedi & Others v. SEBI, decided on July 15, 2025, the Supreme Court clarified the applicability of interest on unpaid penalties under the SEBI Act. The appellants, directors of Brijlaxmi Leasing and Finance Ltd., were penalized in 2014 for insider trading. After their failure to pay and the 2019 Supreme Court upholding of penalties, SEBI initiated recovery in 2022, demanding interest from 2014. The appellants argued interest should apply only from the 2022 notice. The Court, however, ruled that under Section 28A of the SEBI Act, read with Section 220 of the Income Tax Act, interest is mandatory from the date the penalty became payable—i.e., from the 2014 adjudication order, which acted as a notice of demand. The 2022 notice was merely a reminder. It further held that interest is compensatory, not punitive. Dismissing the appeals, the Court directed the appellants to pay interest from 2014 within 15 days, confirming that liability accrues automatically after the initial 45-day deadline.
In Saneesh Soman v. Narcotics Control Bureau, the Delhi High Court granted bail to the petitioner, arrested for allegedly collecting a parcel containing 100 LSD blots (3.5 grams). The Court noted that conscious possession under the NDPS Act requires both knowledge and control over contraband, which the prosecution failed to establish. The petitioner consistently claimed ignorance, stating he was collecting the parcel for a neighbor. The Court found no corroborative evidence like call records, financial links, or digital communications tying him to the drug network. Additionally, the phone number used to track the parcel belonged to the DTDC office, not the petitioner. The Court emphasized that a Section 67 confession without corroboration has limited evidentiary value. Considering the petitioner’s clean record, cooperative conduct, and over two years in custody, the Court held that both bail conditions under Section 37(1)(b) NDPS Act were met and granted bail with strict terms, including a ₹25,000 bond, appearance compliance, and no evidence tampering.
In K S I Q v. I A Q, decided on 21st July 2025 by the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench), Justice Shailesh P. Brahme dealt with a custody dispute involving a 9-year-old Muslim boy. The mother, who had left the matrimonial home due to alleged harassment and dowry demands, was initially denied custody by the trial court, which ruled in favor of the father under Muslim personal law. On appeal, the High Court emphasized the welfare of the child as the foremost consideration. Though Muslim law under the Hanafi school grants custody of a male child to the father after age 7, the court found the child had a strong emotional bond with the mother, who provided proper education, care, and financial stability. In contrast, the father lacked steady income and familial support. Invoking Section 17 of the Guardians and Wards Act, the Court held that welfare must prevail over personal law. The child’s preference to stay with his mother was honored, and custody was granted to her, with visitation rights to the father. The court reaffirmed its parens patriae role to prioritize children's best interests.
In the case of M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan & Ors., the Supreme Court dealt with the maintainability of successive quashing petitions under Section 482 CrPC. The appellant had repaid loans taken from the respondents and sought the return of his property documents. Upon their refusal and alleged fraudulent sale of his Thanjavur property, he filed a criminal complaint. The accused first sought quashing of the complaint, which was dismissed by the Madras High Court in 2021. After six months, a second quashing petition—based on the same grounds—was filed and allowed by the High Court. The Supreme Court reversed this order, holding that no new grounds were presented in the second petition. It ruled that allowing such petitions would amount to an impermissible review barred under Section 362 CrPC (now Section 403 BNSS). The Court emphasized that inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC cannot override statutory bars and allowing repetitive petitions on the same grounds would amount to abuse of process. The original complaint was restored for trial.
In Shivangi Bansal v. Sahib Bansal, the Supreme Court resolved a long-standing matrimonial dispute between IPS officer Shivangi Bansal and her husband Sahib Bansal, who married in 2015 and separated in 2018. The case involved multiple litigations, including dowry harassment, domestic violence, custody, and property disputes. On July 22, 2025, a bench led by CJI B.R. Gavai and Justice Augustine George Masih facilitated an amicable settlement. Custody of their daughter was granted to the mother, with the father receiving limited visitation rights. Shivangi waived all claims to alimony, and existing maintenance orders were quashed. In return, her mother agreed to transfer agricultural land to the husband. All pending cases were quashed. The wife was directed to publish an unconditional public apology, and both parties were barred from interfering in each other’s lives. The Court dissolved the marriage under Article 142 and provided police protection to the husband.
In Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., the Supreme Court held that a Magistrate’s order to register an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC is not invalid merely because the complainant did not first pursue remedies under Section 154(3). While approaching the police and Superintendent of Police is preferred, a direct approach to the Magistrate is not fatal if the court has jurisdiction. The Court stressed that Magistrates must issue speaking, reasoned orders reflecting judicial application of mind. It also ruled that courts should not quash FIRs post-investigation unless clear illegality exists. Distinguishing civil from criminal disputes, it held that allegations of fraud, inducement, and conspiracy can invoke criminal liability, even if rooted in contractual issues. Multiple FIRs are valid if filed on different facts, at different stations, or involving new parties. Dismissing all SLPs, the Court upheld the FIR and refused to interfere with the High Court's decision.
In M/s ASP Traders v. State of U.P., the Supreme Court held that mere payment of penalty under Section 129(5) of the CGST Act does not eliminate the need for a formal, reasoned order under Section 129(3), especially when objections are raised. The Court emphasized that such orders are mandatory to uphold the taxpayer’s right to appeal under Section 107. Payment made under business compulsion does not amount to accepting liability, and the absence of a mechanism to mark payments as "under protest" on the GST portal further supports this. The Court also reaffirmed that Article 265 of the Constitution bars tax collection without proper legal authority. The judgment ruled that authorities must issue a formal adjudication order to comply with statutory provisions and ensure natural justice, even if goods are released after penalty payment.
In S. Srividhya and Ors. v. Assistant Director and Anr. [SLP(Crl) No. 10113-10115/2025], the Supreme Court bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta stayed the trial of four accused under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). The petitioners, represented by Senior Advocate PB Suresh, highlighted that they were not named in the predicate offence and that no chargesheet had been filed in the CBI case for over seven years. The CBI had registered an FIR in 2018 against M/s Cethar Limited based on Indian Bank’s complaint under IPC sections 120B, 406, 420, 468, and 471. Subsequently, the Enforcement Directorate registered an ECIR and initiated proceedings under PMLA. The petitioners, all women and family members of the company's former Chairman, contended they were dragged into prosecution merely due to family association, with no direct link to proceeds of crime. The Court's stay order underscores the importance of timely prosecution in predicate offences and reinforces that PMLA proceedings must be rooted in substantial evidence and procedural fairness, not assumptions or indefinite delays.
The Supreme Court on Monday strongly criticized the Enforcement Directorate (ED) for issuing summons to advocates solely for representing or advising clients in legal matters. Hearing a suo motu case, a bench led by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice K. Vinod Chandran said such actions potentially infringe on lawyer-client privilege and could have a chilling effect on the legal profession. The court emphasized that even incorrect legal advice remains privileged communication. “They are crossing all limits,” the CJI said, noting that legal advice cannot become grounds for investigation. Senior advocates like Arvind Datar and Pratap Venugopal were reportedly issued notices, prompting widespread concern in the legal community. Attorney General R. Venkataramani and Solicitor General Tushar Mehta acknowledged the issue and confirmed that ED officials had been instructed not to summon lawyers for rendering legal opinions. The court directed all parties to submit detailed notes and set the next hearing for July 29, affirming the need for formal guidelines.