Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust (KNMT), a charitable trust established in 1975, was allotted 125 acres of industrial land in Uttar Pradesh by UPSIDC in 2003 for floriculture, with specific payment terms. Despite extensions, KNMT repeatedly defaulted, leading to cancellation of the allotment in January 2007 after a final demand notice in November 2006. KNMT challenged the cancellation, arguing that UPSIDC failed to issue three proper legal notices. The Supreme Court clarified that a valid legal notice must include: a clear factual basis, indication of legal breach, intention to take action, and unambiguous communication. It held that the three communications dated 14.12.2004, 14.12.2005, and 13.11.2006 met these standards. The Court emphasized substance over form, stating that a notice need not be labeled “legal notice” if its content meets the required criteria. It upheld UPSIDC’s actions, ruling the notices valid and the cancellation justified due to KNMT’s persistent defaults.
The parties married on June 18, 1997; they had a son born on August 5, 1998. In 2008 the husband got a divorce on the grounds of the wife being cruel Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. In 2016, the Trial Court dismissed the divorce petition on a finding that no case concerning its other ground of claim namely cruelty was proved. This decision was overturned by the Calcutta High Court in 2019 and it granted divorce on the basis of mental cruelty and irretrievable breakdown of marriage Permanent alimony maintained by the Supreme Court was increased to Rs. 50,000 per month (increased by Rs. 20,000) and changed the cycle of increments to two years (2%, the increase) instead of three years. It stopped the mandatory financial allowance given to its 26-year old son and he said that this does not affect the right of the son to inheritance.
In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court discharged Thangavel, a school administrator, from charges under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide). The case involved the tragic suicide of a student who was scolded by Thangavel after a complaint was made against him by another student. Following the reprimand, the student locked himself in a room and died by suicide. The Court held that mere scolding does not amount to abetment of suicide, as there was no evidence of mens rea (guilty mind) or intention to provoke the act. Thus, Thangavel was cleared of all charges based on the admitted facts.
The petitioner was a government servant of age 51 years wanting her date of birth in her passport to be rectified as per the birth certificate. The Regional Passport Officer did not even take her case and argued that she would be run by first rectifying the service records on her date of birth and then she would rectify the passport thereafter. The Court ordered the writ petition to be granted and the passport office was to give the application, consideration without direction that the services record be filled.
Sadhguru Jagadish Vasudev (a world-famous spiritual guru and founder of Isha Foundation) sued several defendants who used his personality rights by means of the AI-generated content in deep fake. Type of Infringement: Deepfake materials that morphed the voice, image and likeness of Sadhguru were created through AI by the defendants, in the following ways: The Delhi High Court provided a Dynamic+ injunction - a contemporary type of injunctions which are aimed at combating booming on-line pirating.
The first petitioner (Zahad) is female at birth and considers him or herself as transgender man and the second petitioner (Ziya) is male at birth and considers him or herself as transgender woman. The third Petitioner is their biological child (born by the transgender man (Zahhad) after pregnancy). The birth certificate obtained by Kozhikode Corporation had Zahhad and Ziya Paval as the mother and father respectively, even though they psyched as female and male accordingly. The Petitioners wanted a corrected copy of birth certificate that will refer to both of them as parents (not mother/father) so that the child will not face discrimination in future. The court directed the Kozhikode Corporation to make a modified birth certificate in Form 5 so as to change the words mother/father to parents and remove the gender bit also. The gendered terms were found in the Original register entries which were not to be altered to be compliant with statutory requirements.
Here, there is a widow Meena, who applied under the Protection of Women against Domestic Violence Act, 2005 against her in-laws (brother-in-laws, sister-laws, mother-in-law). Since the death of her husband Gopi in 2009, her in-laws had tried to vacate her out of the matrimonial house and had hindered her peaceful stay at the home. The Court upheld the decision of Sessions Court that had awarded the reliefs of the following reliefs to Meena: 1. Protection Order- Entailing that the respondents (in-laws), restrain themselves against committing an act of domestic violence against Meena and her children 2. Residence Order- Preventing the respondents by acts of obstructing Meena and her children to: Enjoy the entry into the shared household (matrimonial home) as well as peaceful living in the shared household
Their marriage functioned was performed on the 27 th of February, 2009 under Hindu customs and rites and they have a male child born on the 11 th of March, 2015. The couple broke up on March 16, 2020, because of incompatibility in marriage. The husband approached the court by filing a petition of divorce, under Section 12(1) (c) read with Section 13(1) (ia) and 13(1) (iii) of Hindu marriage Act, 1955. The wife then also approached the court by making an application under Section 24 of the HMA applying for 30000 rupees interim maintenance per month. Family Court granted a sum of 15,000 per month including 8000 to the wife and 7000 to the child. The monthly investment of the husband was measured as 47,128. When it was appealed, the decision of the Family Court was affirmed by the court and no illegality, perversity or procedural impropriety was found to exist. The ruling was arrived at using credible evidences such as bank statements, tax returns, and income affidavits.
The appellant, Sunaina Rao Kommineni, an Indian-origin woman residing in the USA, lived with her husband, Abhiram Balusu, a Green Card holder employed in Arizona. The couple’s minor child, born in 2017 in the USA, is an American citizen. In November 2022, the family traveled to India for a vacation. However, during their stay, the wife retained the child in Delhi with the help of airport security and subsequently filed a custody petition under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. In response, the husband secured a custody order from an Arizona court in March 2023, directing the return of the child to the USA. When the wife failed to comply, he approached the Delhi High Court by filing a writ of habeas corpus. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the wife to return the child to the USA by 1st July 2025. It further instructed the husband to bear the travel expenses and provide monthly maintenance of \$2000. In the event of the wife’s non-compliance, the child was to be handed over to the husband for return to the USA.
The petitioner, Saurabh Mishra, sought appointment as the nominated representative of his aunt, who suffers from moderate intellectual disability and is entitled to a family pension of ₹14,400. The Mansik Swasthya Punarvilokan Board, Barabanki rejected his application due to two pending minor criminal cases under sections 143 and 341 IPC, citing character concerns. The High Court ruled that such non-heinous cases cannot be sole grounds for rejecting appointment under the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017. Applying the Mohinder Singh Gill principle, the Court refused to accept new reasons raised later and held that these pending cases did not involve moral turpitude. Exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction, the Court considered the patient’s “wills and preferences,” as per UNCRPD, over merely her “best interests.” The Court quashed the rejection, appointed the petitioner as representative, and granted him authority over her financial and personal affairs, subject to Board supervision and prohibiting immovable property transfers without approval.
The Supreme Court recently dealt with the issue of whether a trial court has the jurisdiction to cancel bail granted by a higher court. The case arose from the 2016 murder of Yogesh Goudar, a Zilla Panchayat member from Dharwad, Karnataka, who was killed outside his gym in a suspected political conspiracy. Initially investigated by local police, the matter was later handed over to the CBI, resulting in additional accused being named. Respondent Vinay Rajashekharappa Kulkarni was arrested in 2020 and, after his bail was denied by the trial court and High Court, was granted bail by the Supreme Court in August 2021, with strict conditions, including refraining from influencing witnesses. However, the CBI alleged that Kulkarni violated these conditions by contacting witnesses and influencing an approver who subsequently retracted his statement. The CBI moved the trial court to cancel the bail, but the trial court wrongly held that it lacked jurisdiction to do so as bail had been granted by the Supreme Court. Reversing this view, the Supreme Court clarified that under Section 439(2) CrPC (now Section 483(3) BNSS), trial courts do have the authority to cancel bail granted by superior courts when bail conditions are breached. Accordingly, the Supreme Court canceled Kulkarni’s bail, emphasizing that violations such as witness tampering are serious grounds warranting cancellation.
This Supreme Court ruling arose from an appeal filed by Nagarajan, who was convicted under Sections 354 (outraging modesty) and 448 (trespassing) IPC for entering the deceased Mariammal’s house at night and attempting to outrage her modesty. Following the incident, the deceased committed suicide with her infant. The Trial Court had acquitted him under Section 306 (abetment to suicide) due to lack of evidence. The High Court, however, not only dismissed his appeal under Sections 354 and 448 but also took up suo motu revision and convicted him under Section 306, enhancing his punishment. The Supreme Court allowed Nagarajan’s appeal in part, holding that he cannot be convicted under Section 306 as there was no evidence of instigation to suicide. Importantly, the Supreme Court laid down the principle of "reformatio in peius," emphasizing that when an accused appeals, the appellate court cannot enhance his sentence or put him in a worse position. This is grounded in fair procedure and natural justice.
This Supreme Court ruling arose from a missing person case where Amlesh Kumar was accused of dowry harassment and suspected in his wife’s disappearance. The key issue was whether a High Court could accept a police proposal for narco-analysis tests on the accused during bail proceedings. The Supreme Court held that involuntary narco-analysis tests violate Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution, infringing the right against self-incrimination and personal liberty. Even if taken voluntarily, such tests have limited evidentiary value they cannot be the sole basis for conviction and can only support material evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Moreover, accused persons have no absolute right to demand such tests; the Court must examine consent, stage of trial, and whether appropriate safeguards under the Selvi v. State of Karnataka guidelines have been met. The Supreme Court set aside the Patna High Court’s order allowing such tests at the bail stage, reinforcing these legal protections and procedural requirements.
The Supreme Court recently granted bail to an appellant charged under the Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion Act, 2018, and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, arising from his interfaith marriage. Despite the marriage being consensual and arranged with the full knowledge of both families, objections were raised by certain groups, and the appellant was jailed for nearly six months. The Uttarakhand High Court had earlier rejected bail. The Supreme Court observed that the State cannot interfere with a consensual interfaith marriage and that the couple should be allowed to live together peacefully. The Court emphasized that pending criminal proceedings cannot prevent a lawfully married couple from cohabiting. It further noted that bail ought to be considered where allegations lack merit and seem intended to harass. Affirming the right of interfaith couples, the Supreme Court held that anti-conversion laws cannot be misused to persecute such marriages.
This Supreme Court ruling arose from a 1998 marriage where the wife alleged dowry harassment under Section 498A IPC against her husband, a Delhi Police Sub-Inspector, and his family. Multiple complaints were filed between 1999 and 2002. Though the Magistrate took cognizance in 2004, the Sessions Court discharged the husband in 2008 as the cognizance was beyond the limitation period of 3 years under Section 468 CrPC. The High Court set aside this order, but the Supreme Court reversed it. The Court held that limitation is computed from the filing of the complaint, which was timely. However, it quashed the FIR as the allegations were vague and generic, lacking dates, specifics, medical reports, or supporting evidence. The Supreme Court emphasized that accusations under Section 498A must be specific and credible, noting increasing misuse of matrimonial laws. Courts must scrutinize such complaints carefully to prevent unjustified harassment of distant relatives in matrimonial disputes.