The High Court overturned the appellate court’s decision and sent the case back for fresh consideration. It ruled that the appellate court was wrong in insisting on the registration of the gift deeds, as Section 129 of the J\&K Transfer of Property Act exempts Islamic law gifts from such requirements. Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hafeeza Bibi v. Sheikh Farid (2011 SCC 654), the court affirmed that a gift under Islamic law does not require registration to be valid if the three essential conditions are met. However, the High Court did not make a final judgment on whether all three conditions were fulfilled in this case.
The case challenged the constitutionality of Sections 34(1), 47(1)(a)(i), and 58(1)(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (CPA 2019), which determine the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District, State, and National Consumer Commissions based on the "value of goods or services paid as consideration" rather than "compensation claimed" as under the 1986 Act. The petitioners, a widow whose husband died in a vehicle fire and another widow whose husband died from COVID-19, argued that these provisions unfairly limited their access to higher commissions. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these sections, affirming that they do not violate Article 14. The Court also emphasized the need for the Central Consumer Protection Council and Authority to review and advise the government on measures to enhance the functioning of the consumer protection regime.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Jayaramappa, holding that the suit property was his self-acquired, not ancestral. The property, originally part of a joint family, was partitioned in 1986, and Jayaramappa purchased it from his brother Thippeswamy in 1989 using personal funds and a loan. Plaintiffs, Jayaramappa’s children, filed a suit claiming the property was ancestral, but the Court found no evidence that the property was acquired through joint family income. The Court also clarified that the doctrine of blending did not apply, as there was no clear intention to abandon separate rights. Since the property was self-acquired, the sale to Chandranna was valid. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court’s judgment was set aside.
The Supreme Court, in a 4:1 majority decision, addressed whether courts can modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 or 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The case, referred to the Constitution Bench due to conflicting smaller bench decisions, clarified the issue. The majority, led by CJI Sanjiv Khanna, held that courts have limited powers to modify arbitral awards in specific situations, including when the award is severable, to correct clerical, computational, or typographical errors, or to modify post-award interest in certain cases. The Court emphasized using its powers under Article 142 with caution and within constitutional boundaries, ensuring judicial intervention remains minimal and respects arbitral autonomy.
The appellant was awarded a contract by the respondent for constructing an office building and incubation centre, with a completion deadline of January 15, 2007. However, the appellant completed the work by November 30, 2007, causing a delay of around 10 months. The respondent imposed liquidated damages of ₹82,43,499, as per Clause 26 of the contract. Although the respondent had granted multiple extensions, it reserved the right to levy liquidated damages. The appellant appealed, but the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the Single Judge had exceeded permissible grounds under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The Court affirmed the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract and upheld the Division Bench’s decision to restore the arbitral award.
The Supreme Court of India, in a landmark judgment, declared that the right to digital access is a part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court highlighted the barriers faced by persons with disabilities in accessing digital services, especially the inaccessibility of biometric devices used for eKYC processes. Citing the Representation of People with Disabilities Act, 2016, and international obligations under the UNCRPD and Incheon Strategy, the Court directed regulatory bodies like RBI, SEBI, and TRAI to amend digital KYC processes. This includes introducing alternative "liveness" checks, accepting thumb impressions, and allowing offline KYC. Additionally, it mandated compliance with accessibility standards for digital platforms, sensitization of officials, and the establishment of grievance redressal mechanisms. The Court emphasized the importance of public awareness campaigns on accessible KYC methods. This judgment reinforces the expansion of fundamental rights to include digital accessibility for all citizens.
The case involved a motor vehicle accident on February 22, 2015, where a woman, riding pillion on a motorcycle, succumbed to her injuries two days later. Her husband (first appellant) and children (second and third appellants) filed a compensation claim for her death. The Supreme Court upheld the finding of rash and negligent driving by the motorcycle rider. While the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) had awarded ₹18,81,966/- in total compensation, and the High Court made some modifications, the Supreme Court made further adjustments and awarded ₹17,84,766/-.
Aman Bhatia, a licensed stamp vendor, was accused of demanding an additional ₹2 for a ₹10 stamp paper from a complainant in 2003. The Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) set up a trap, and Bhatia was caught accepting the bribe. He was convicted by the Trial Court and Delhi High Court under Sections 7 (bribery) and 13(1)(d) (criminal misconduct) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Supreme Court examined Section 2(c)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which defines a public servant as someone "remunerated by the Government for performing a public duty." The Court concluded that stamp vendors, who ensure access to stamps for legal transactions and receive remuneration through discounts under the Delhi Stamp Rules, 1934, qualify as public servants. Regarding Bhatia’s conviction, the Court noted significant discrepancies in the testimonies of the complainant, panch witness, and Raid Officer about the demand and acceptance of the bribe. The Court emphasized that merely recovering tainted money is not enough; the prosecution must prove the demand beyond reasonable doubt. Due to insufficient evidence, the conviction was overturned.
The case involves appellant Raju @ Umakant and co-accused Jalandhar Kol, who were convicted for kidnapping, wrongful confinement, and gang rape of the prosecutrix ('R'). On June 23, 2004, the prosecutrix attended a wedding with her friend 'SA'. While returning around 1:00 AM, they were intercepted by the accused. While 'SA' managed to escape, the prosecutrix was abducted. The accused took her to the appellant's house, where both raped her. She was later confined at various locations before being rescued on June 28, 2004. A missing report was filed by the prosecutrix's father on June 24, 2004. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant under Sections 366, 342, and 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). However, it set aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. In addition, the Court modified the sentence for the offense under Section 376(2)(g) from life imprisonment to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment, aligning it with the sentence given to the co-accused. The Court maintained the other sentences imposed by the trial court.
Kabir Paharia, a Scheduled Caste candidate with 42% benchmark disability, was denied MBBS admission despite securing 542 marks in NEET-UG 2024 and ranking 176th in the SC-PwBD category. Medical boards at Safdarjung Hospital and AIIMS declared him ineligible under NMC norms. His writ petition and appeal were dismissed by the Delhi High Court. The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s decision, ruling that “reasonable accommodation is not charity, but a fundamental right.” It directed AIIMS to grant Paharia admission under the SC-PwBD quota for the 2025-2026 session and exempted him from reappearing in NEET-UG 2025.
In a recent ruling, the Kerala High Court held that a wife’s statutory right to maintenance under the Domestic Violence Act cannot be waived through a private agreement. The case involved a divorced couple, where the wife sought interim maintenance under Section 20 of the PWDVA. The husband, a pilot earning ₹8.35 lakh per month, claimed she had waived her right post-divorce. The Court ruled such waivers are unenforceable as they violate public policy. Citing Rajnesh v. Neha, it granted interim maintenance, considering the wife’s lack of income and standard of living. The husband was ordered to clear arrears within 30 days.
The appellant, Ravish Singh Rana, and the respondent ‘X’ met on Facebook in February 2021 and started a live-in relationship. They lived together in a rented room in Khatima for over two years. On November 19, 2023, they signed a settlement agreement expressing mutual love and intention to marry. However, on November 23, 2023, ‘X’ filed an FIR accusing the appellant of repeatedly establishing a physical relationship with a promise to marry, but later refusing marriage and threatening her. The FIR was registered under Sections 376 (rape), 323, 504, and 506 of the IPC. The appellant’s application to quash the FIR and proceedings was rejected by the Uttarakhand High Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the FIR and subsequent proceedings, highlighting that the parties had lived together consensually for over two years, which created a presumption of valid consent. The Court emphasized that a mere breach of promise to marry does not amount to rape unless there is evidence the promise was false from the start. It also noted that the settlement agreement expressing mutual love negated the allegations of forcible relations. Recognizing changing social dynamics, the Court affirmed that financially independent women have the right to make conscious decisions about their relationships on their own terms.
The Delhi High Court thoroughly examined the principle of Constructive Res Judicata, which bars parties from raising issues in later proceedings that could have been raised earlier. It clarified that Constructive Res Judicata means any matter that should have been a ground of defense or attack in a previous suit is treated as if it was directly and substantially in issue in that suit. Although Section 141 of the CPC excludes Article 226 writ proceedings, the Court held that Constructive Res Judicata still applies to writs due to public policy, preventing multiple litigations and ensuring finality. Since the petitioner failed to challenge Clause 3.3 of the Guidelines in the earlier writ, the Court dismissed the current petition as barred by Constructive Res Judicata and not maintainable.
The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT’s order condoning the delay and upheld Tata Steel’s appeal, stressing that statutory appeal timelines must be strictly followed. It held that when the law does not permit condonation, even a one-day delay is fatal, underscoring the importance of adhering to prescribed limitation periods.
The Court differentiated between two types of settlements: bilateral negotiated settlements and "no dues/claims certificates" or discharge vouchers given as a condition for releasing admitted dues. It emphasized the "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" principle, which grants arbitral tribunals the authority to decide on their own jurisdiction, including the validity of the arbitration agreement. At the Section 11 stage, courts must only verify the existence of an arbitration agreement, without delving deeper. Allegations of economic duress related to signing discharge vouchers should be examined by the arbitral tribunal, not courts during arbitrator appointment. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, appointed Justice (Retd.) Suresh Chandrakant Gupta as sole arbitrator, and directed the parties to report to him by May 15, 2025.