The Supreme Court has mandated that candidates must have a minimum of three years of legal practice before appearing for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination. This practice period will be calculated from the date of provisional enrolment as an advocate, not from the date of passing the All India Bar Examination (AIBE). To prove eligibility, candidates must submit a certificate of practice either from a senior advocate with over ten years of standing along with a Principal Judicial Officer or demonstrate experience as a law clerk with a judge or judicial officer. Ongoing recruitment processes initiated before this judgment are exempt from these requirements. Additionally, newly appointed Civil Judges (Junior Division) will be required to undergo one year of training before they can preside over courts. The Supreme Court has directed High Courts to amend their rules within three months and mandated that State Governments approve these amendments within a further three-month period.
The Supreme Court upheld that Respondent No. 2 was a juvenile at the time of the offense, citing the statutory hierarchy under Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. The Juvenile Justice Board erred by ignoring valid school and municipal birth certificates showing a birthdate of September 8, 2003, prematurely ordering a medical test, and unlawfully reviewing its own earlier order. The Court distinguished this case from *Shubam Sangra (2022)*, where documentary evidence was unreliable. Regarding bail, the Supreme Court declined to interfere, noting that over three years had passed since bail was granted, and there was no evidence of its misuse. However, it clarified that bail could be revoked if misused in the future. The Court also noted that the JJB had conducted a valid preliminary assessment under Section 15, as the accused was aged 16–18 and charged with a heinous offense, and correctly directed his production before the Juvenile/POCSO Court under Section 18(3).
The appellant, Padman Bibhar, took Akash Garadia, who was later killed and another witness with him to a river for bathing on April 4, 2016. At a later time, the appellant and the deceased went to a nearby cashew field to gather the nuts. The following morning, the police found the deceased’s body floating in the river. The prosecution accused the appellant of murder as stated in Section 302 and hiding evidence as stated in Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code. After the trial, both courts ruled the appellant guilty and gave him a life sentence. Police charged the appellant due to the last seen theory since there was not much else to link the crime and the appellant. The court thought that the motive for the murder—her belief about the wife’s reputation—was not credible and logical. In addition, the authorities did not recover the supposed weapon (a stone) since the appellant said he did not have it. It was pointed out that the appellant fully participated in the investigation and didn’t try to avoid the authorities. The Supreme Court decided the appellant should be acquitted, because the evidence, though it made the case seem guilty, was not enough to prove the person was guilty.
The dispute involved the trademark "NEHA," claimed by both parties for different products. The plaintiffs, Neha Herbals Pvt. Ltd. and Vikas Gupta, used "NEHA" for Mehandi and herbal products since 1992, while the defendant, Sahni Cosmetics, used the mark for face creams since 1990. The plaintiffs sued for trademark infringement and passing off, and the defendant sought cancellation of the plaintiffs’ trademark registrations. The court held that the plaintiffs were the registered proprietors of "NEHA" for Mehandi and herbal products and had proven continuous use since 1994, whereas the defendant failed to substantiate prior use due to lack of credible evidence. The defendant’s challenge to the plaintiffs’ registration was dismissed. However, no infringement was found as the products were functionally dissimilar, despite being in the same class. The plaintiffs also failed to prove passing off or consumer confusion. The suit was not barred by delay, as the plaintiffs acted promptly upon discovering the defendant’s use. Ultimately, the plaintiffs’ suit was dismissed, and the defendant’s cancellation petitions were rejected.
Prashant B. Narnaware, who joined Vijaya Bank in 1999 as a Probationary Assistant Manager, later applied for the post of Senior Manager–Cost Accountant under a 2006 recruitment notification. The notification required selected candidates to sign an indemnity bond of ₹2 lakhs, mandating a minimum service period of three years, with a penalty of ₹2 lakhs as liquidated damages for early resignation. Narnaware accepted the terms and signed the appointment letter containing Clause 11(k), which outlined this condition. However, in 2009, before completing the required three years, he resigned to join IDBI Bank and paid the ₹2 lakhs under protest. He subsequently filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the clause. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Clause 11(k) and allowed the bank’s appeal, ruling that the clause did not amount to a restraint of trade or violate public policy. The Court highlighted that in the post-liberalization era, it is reasonable for public sector entities to adopt such measures to retain skilled employees and remain competitive.
The petitioner, Lakshya Tawar, had been in custody for over four years in connection with a CBI case and had approached the Supreme Court through a Special Leave Petition seeking bail. Despite repeated efforts, the Allahabad High Court had adjourned his bail application 27 times without deciding the matter, causing undue delay. Observing the prolonged incarceration and the fact that the complainant’s evidence had already been recorded, the Supreme Court granted bail, noting the unreasonable delay by the High Court in considering the application.
In Special Case No. 4/2017, registered by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), one of the accused was found to be a juvenile at the time of the offence. The Juvenile Justice Board, after assessing the circumstances, directed that the juvenile be tried as an adult and transferred the case to the Children’s Court. Since the offences were scheduled under the NIA Act, a jurisdictional conflict arose between the Children’s Court and the Special NIA Court. The Madhya Pradesh High Court resolved this by interpreting the respective non-obstante clauses of both statutes. It held that the Juvenile Justice Act, being later in time (2015) and broader in scope, prevails over the NIA Act (2008), which only overrides the Code of Criminal Procedure. The JJ Act’s clause overrides “any other law in force,” affirming its primacy. The Court concluded that when a juvenile is tried as an adult, the Children’s Court—not the NIA Court—has jurisdiction, even for NIA-scheduled offences.
The incident took place on 27th September 2018, when the appellant attacked the deceased with an iron pipe, striking his head while the latter was cutting grass in a field. A witness present at the scene fled after being chased by the appellant. The appellant was charged under Sections 302 (murder), 352 (assault), and 201 (causing disappearance of evidence) of the Indian Penal Code. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Trial Court, a decision later upheld by the High Court. However, a medical examination conducted in December 2023—over five years after the incident—was found to have little evidentiary value. Witness statements raised substantial doubt regarding the appellant’s mental condition at the time of the offense. Given the uncertainty, the Court ruled that the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered the appellant to be released immediately.
The appellants, Dileep Kumar Pandey (Physical Education Teacher) and Sanjay Kumar Sharma (Commerce Teacher), challenged their dismissal by the Air Force School, Bamrauli, through writ petitions filed before the Allahabad High Court. They argued that the school qualifies as a “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution due to significant control by the Indian Air Force (IAF) and receipt of public funds. While the Single Judge accepted this view, the Division Bench held that the school was a private entity and thus not subject to writ jurisdiction. On appeal, the matter reached the Supreme Court. One of the judges opined that the school is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 because it performs a public function (education), is governed by IAF officers through its Managing Committee, receives public funding (including tax exemptions and land), and because teachers, as part of the educational process, have service conditions that involve a public law element. However, by a 2:1 majority, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the writ petitions were not maintainable.
The Supreme Court examined whether the grounds of arrest met the standards required under Article 22(1) of the Constitution. Referring to the precedent set in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (2025), the Court reiterated that grounds of arrest must be clear and specific—not merely a citation of legal provisions—and must be communicated effectively in a language understood by the arrestee. Additionally, such grounds must be provided "as soon as may be" to allow the individual to seek legal remedies. In this case, the Court found that the arresting authorities had listed detailed allegations, including conspiracy, receipt of kickbacks, and wrongful gains. Therefore, it held that the requirements under Article 22(1) were met and that the provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) were duly complied with. As a result, the appeal was dismissed.
KRB Enterprises and others, engaged in the trade of rice and coffee, were sued by KRBL Limited, a reputed rice company operating since 2000, for alleged trademark infringement. KRBL claimed that the mark "KRB KREB" used by KRB Enterprises was deceptively similar to its registered trademark "KRBL LIMITED," which includes a diamond-shaped paddy device. KRBL asserted prior use, registration, and international recognition. KRB Enterprises defended the use of "KRB" as an honest adoption derived from family initials and contended that KRBL had not used the mark directly on goods. The Commercial Court granted an interim injunction, restraining KRB Enterprises from using "KRB" or any similar mark. On appeal, the Delhi High Court upheld the injunction, citing deceptive similarity between the marks, KRBL’s established rights and continuous use, and the absence of acquiescence or abandonment by KRBL.
The accused, Neeraj, diagnosed with severe mental retardation and having the mental age of a four-year-old, was charged under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act for an alleged attempt to sexually assault a minor. The Sessions Court discharged him, relying on a medical report from IHBAS indicating he was unfit to stand trial. The State appealed, arguing that the court failed to follow the mandatory procedure outlined under Sections 328 to 330 of the Cr.P.C. The appellate court agreed, setting aside the discharge order and remanding the matter to the Sessions Court to issue a fresh decision in compliance with Section 330(3).
The petition challenged the continued application of Section 33(2) of the POCSO Act—which requires cross-examination questions to be routed through the Special Court—after the victims turned 18. The case involved FIRs under Sections 376(D), 363 IPC and Sections 5(g)/6 of the POCSO Act, alleging sexual assault of minors. During the trial, the victims attained majority, and the accused argued that Section 33(2) should no longer apply. The High Court agreed, ruling that once victims become adults, they must be directly cross-examined by the defense. However, trial courts retain the authority to regulate such cross-examinations to prevent undue harassment.
The appellant and the complainant met via a matrimonial website and mutually agreed to marry, even signing an agreement in the presence of police. However, the appellant later withdrew from the arrangement, prompting the complainant to file two FIRs. The first alleged cheating and fraud under Sections 417 and 420 IPC. The second accused the appellant of rape under Section 376(2)(n) IPC and caste-based atrocity under the SC/ST (POA) Act. After the High Court declined to quash the second FIR, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. The Court quashed both FIRs, terming them an abuse of the legal process and a miscarriage of justice.
In Puthiya Purayil Shaji vs. State of Kerala & Anr., the Kerala High Court considered whether sending a draft divorce agreement could amount to abetment of suicide. The petitioner’s wife had died by suicide in 2005, three days after receiving a draft divorce agreement allegedly sent by the petitioner through an associate. Her mother filed a complaint alleging cruelty and abetment of suicide under Sections 498A and 306 IPC. However, the police filed a chargesheet only under Section 498A. During trial, the Public Prosecutor moved an application under Section 216 CrPC to include Section 306 IPC, which the Magistrate allowed. The petitioner challenged this order. Justice Dr. Kauser Edappagath, on 22nd May 2025, held that merely sending a draft divorce agreement does not constitute instigation or intentional aid to commit suicide, a necessary element for abetment under Section 306. The Court thus quashed the order adding Section 306 IPC.