The Supreme Court examined whether a husband can be prosecuted for rape of his wife while the constitutional validity of the marital rape exception remains under consideration. In Hrishikesh Sahoo v. State of Karnataka & Ors., a three-judge Bench considered challenges concerning Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC, corresponding to Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. The Court questioned whether prosecution could continue under the existing statutory framework while the constitutional challenge to the exception remains pending. The proceedings also arose from a Karnataka High Court decision which had permitted prosecution of a husband for allegedly forcing non-consensual sexual intercourse upon his wife. The Court indicated that it would examine both whether prosecution can proceed if the exception remains legally valid and whether the exception itself survives constitutional scrutiny. During the hearing, the Bench discussed Articles 20 and 21, individual autonomy, mens rea and the interpretation of penal provisions. The matter was posted for detailed final hearing, with the constitutional and statutory questions to be considered together.
The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court independently reconsidered a death sentence imposed in a case involving allegations of aggravated penetrative sexual assault against minors. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Chandran, the Court examined the prosecution evidence with particular care because confirmation of a death sentence requires independent judicial scrutiny. The Court identified deficiencies relating to identification of the accused, medical evidence, inconsistencies concerning dates and the circumstances surrounding the complaint. It emphasised that identification is a foundational fact and that the prosecution must establish the accused's identity through legally reliable evidence. The Court also examined whether the medical evidence sufficiently supported the prosecution's version and found significant deficiencies when the evidence was considered as a whole. Since the prosecution was required to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, the cumulative deficiencies created doubt regarding the prosecution case. The High Court therefore set aside the conviction and death sentence and acquitted the accused. The judgment highlights the standard of proof, identification evidence, medical evidence, independent scrutiny in death-reference proceedings and evidentiary requirements under the POCSO Act.
The Supreme Court examined whether a trust itself can be prosecuted as an accused in a criminal case. In Madasa Masih-Ul-Uloom Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Karnataka & Ors., the Court considered the legal status of a trust and the criminal liability arising from acts allegedly committed by its trustees. The Court explained that a trust is not equivalent to a company or other juristic entity possessing an independent legal personality. A trust is essentially a legal arrangement under which trustees hold and manage property for beneficiaries. Consequently, rights and liabilities ordinarily attach to the trustees rather than to the trust as an abstract entity. The Court also considered conflicting precedents and reiterated the principle of stare decisis. Where decisions of Benches of equal strength conflict, the earlier decision continues to operate as binding precedent until the issue is settled by a larger Bench. The Court further observed that merely tracing funds through a trust does not automatically establish criminal liability against the trust itself. Liability must be connected to the individuals responsible for managing and controlling the relevant affairs.
The Madras High Court quashed criminal proceedings against a man accused of cruelty to an animal after allegedly throwing a stone at a dog that had bitten him. In Balaji v. State rep. by Inspector of Police, Peerkankaranai Police Station & Anr., the petitioner alleged that a neighbour's dog had bitten his leg while he was walking on the street. A counter-complaint was registered alleging that the petitioner had injured the dog by pelting it with a stone. The Court noted that the alleged offence under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act was non-cognizable and therefore required prior permission from the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 174(2) BNSS before police could register and investigate the case. No such permission had been obtained. The Court also found no supporting evidence showing that the dog had actually suffered injury, whereas the petitioner's version concerning the dog bite was supported by medical records and photographs. Considering the procedural defect, absence of evidence and apparent counterblast nature of the complaint, the Court held that continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process and quashed the case.
The Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act against a school teacher accused of physically touching and disciplining girl students. In Bhaskar Paul v. State of West Bengal, the allegations arose after students complained that the teacher would hit them on the upper back and pinch them around the waist when they were inattentive in class. The Court examined the statements recorded during the inquiry and before the Magistrate and found that the material did not disclose an act having the sexual character or intent required for an offence under the POCSO Act. The Court observed that the teacher's conduct could require greater sensitivity while dealing with children, but such conduct could not automatically be converted into an offence under Section 10 POCSO without the necessary ingredients being established. The Court also noted delays and evidentiary concerns in the manner in which the criminal process had been initiated. Holding that continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of the process of law, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and quashed the proceedings.
The Supreme Court urged the Union Government and the Bar Council of India to develop a regulatory framework for dealing with sexual-harassment complaints involving women lawyers practising before High Courts, district courts, tribunals and other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. A Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Augustine George Masih observed that the POSH Act, 2013 may not be capable of being applied in a uniform manner to every aspect of the legal profession and judicial environment. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's existing Gender Sensitization and Sexual Harassment Regulations, 2013, which specifically govern the Supreme Court premises, and suggested that a similar framework could provide wider coverage. The Court requested counsel appearing for the parties to consult and work towards drafting appropriate regulations applicable to women lawyers across different forums. It also directed the Bar Council of India to ascertain whether State Bar Councils already have regulations addressing such complaints. The proceedings therefore focus on institutional mechanisms for prevention and redressal of sexual harassment involving women advocates and the need for appropriate safeguards across courts and tribunals.
The Supreme Court clarified that the principle of “equal pay for equal work” cannot be applied mechanically merely because employees perform similar functions. In G.P. Sangeetha & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., the dispute concerned different groups of Higher Secondary School Teachers appointed through direct recruitment and through transfer or promotion. The direct recruits claimed parity with teachers receiving a higher pay scale, arguing that their qualifications, duties and responsibilities were substantially similar. The Supreme Court held that functional similarity alone is insufficient to establish complete equality for the purpose of pay fixation. Factors including educational qualifications, experience, source of recruitment, mode of appointment, responsibilities and accountability may justify a reasonable classification between employees. The Court observed that previous service experience can constitute a legitimate basis for differential pay where the classification has a rational connection with the object of the pay structure. The judgment examined Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution and emphasised that courts should not interfere with a reasonable administrative classification merely because employees perform comparable functions. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.
The Supreme Court acquitted a public servant in a corruption case, holding that mere receipt of bribe money by an intermediary is insufficient to establish the public servant's criminal liability without reliable evidence connecting the demand and acceptance to the accused. In Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation, the accused, a former Railway Protection Force officer, was alleged to have obtained illegal gratification through subordinate personnel in connection with transfers and postings. The prosecution relied on several transactions and evidence concerning intermediaries who allegedly collected money. The Court reiterated that proof of demand and voluntary acceptance or obtainment of illegal gratification is fundamental to offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The statutory presumption under Section 20 can arise only after foundational facts are established by reliable evidence. The Court also observed that accomplice or approver evidence requires material corroboration connecting the accused personally with the offence. In the absence of sufficient independent evidence establishing the accused's demand and involvement, reasonable doubt remained. The Supreme Court consequently allowed the appeals and acquitted the appellant.
The Supreme Court sought the Union Government's response to a constitutional challenge concerning the 2026 amendment to the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, and directions relating to singing Vande Mataram. The petition was filed by Carnatic musician T.M. Krishna under Article 32 and challenges provisions extending penal protection to the National Song as well as government directions concerning its performance. During the hearing, the Bench referred to the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, whicha recognised protection for conscientious objectors who declined to sing the national anthem on genuine religious grounds. The Court indicated that it expected the constitutional principle recognised in Bijoe Emmanuel to continue governing the issue and observed that a person exercising protected religious or conscientious objection should not face criminal consequences merely for declining to sing. The Court also stated that determining the content or form of the National Song is primarily a matter for the democratic State. The proceedings therefore involve Article 25 rights, freedom of conscience, secularism, compelled expression and the limits of criminalisation under national-honour legislation.
The Supreme Court laid down additional safeguards governing the re-arrest of a person whose earlier arrest violated Articles 22(1) and 22(2) of the Constitution. In Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, the accused had not been furnished written grounds of arrest and was also not produced before a Magistrate within the constitutionally prescribed period. The Court held that informing an arrested person of the grounds of arrest is a fundamental right and not a mere procedural formality. If an arrest is declared unconstitutional, subsequent filing of a chargesheet or taking of cognizance cannot retrospectively validate it. The Court further held that the investigating agency cannot simply re-arrest the person on its own. It must first furnish the grounds of arrest and then approach the Magistrate with reasons explaining the need for custody and the earlier failure. The application must carry the endorsement of a superior police officer and the Magistrate must provide judicial approval after considering the matter. The Court also directed departmental action where appropriate. The ruling reinforces Articles 21 and 22 and procedural safeguards concerning arrest and detention.
The Supreme Court acquitted four accused convicted in a 2001 murder case after finding that the prosecution failed to establish their identity and involvement beyond reasonable doubt. In Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena & Anr. v. State of Odisha, the prosecution relied substantially on eyewitnesses who were relatives of the deceased. The Court noted material inconsistencies in their statements and agreed that identification of assailants on a pitch-dark night was inherently unreliable. Once the eyewitness evidence was discarded, the prosecution case depended entirely on circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court applied the principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, requiring every circumstance to be fully established and to form a complete chain pointing only towards guilt. The Court observed that suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. It also found gaps concerning alleged recoveries, motive and the weapons used. Since the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances excluding other reasonable possibilities, the accused were given the benefit of doubt and their convictions were set aside.