The Supreme Court quashed the abetment to suicide case, citing no proximate link between the alleged acts and the suicide, and called the suicide note an afterthought. Referring to Prakash v. State of Maharashtra (2024), it held the time gap too remote. However, it revived cheating charges under Section 420 IPC, criticizing the High Court's casual approach and allowing the trial to proceed.
The High Court held the appeal as timely, applying the Supreme Court’s COVID-19 limitation extension. The respondent’s claim of a customary divorce lacked evidence, making his second marriage void under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act. As the first wife was comatose, impleadment was waived. Despite alimony being withdrawn, the court noted it's still applicable in void marriages. The respondent’s cohabitation, despite a valid first marriage, amounted to fraud and rape under IPC Section 375 and BNS Section 63(d)(iv).
The Allahabad High Court dismissed Taufik Ahmad's plea to quash charges of rape, unlawful confinement, and forced religious conversion, despite a compromise with the victim. The court held that serious offences under Section 376 IPC and the U.P. Conversion Prevention Act, 2020 cannot be quashed under Section 482 CrPC based on private settlements, stressing that societal justice prevails over individual compromises in heinous crimes.
The Supreme Court has recently quashed the order dated 2024 of the High Court in which it had dismissed a prior complaint. It has restored it and has directed the High Court to reconsider the Criminal Revision Case No. 2327/2018 -- filed against the summons -- within six months. While contending the paramount importance of procedural fairness, the Court reiterated that standard operating procedures must be meticulously followed in times of emergency and the necessity for a proper interpretation of statutory provisions therein. It said an acquittal under Section 256 of the CrPC was only in a situation where the case is posted under the section specifically for the appearance of the accused and mere default dismissal does not amount to acquittal. The judgment also emphasised that courts need to strike a balance between procedural rigour and fairness, especially in extraordinary situations like the COVID-19 pandemic. It reiterated that lower courts including Sessions Judge Courts are entitled to mend a procedural crack and High Courts should not misapprehend factual scenario. The Court also emphasized the legal recourses available to complainants, such as revision petitions under Section 397 CrPC and with respect to invoking inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, in the event of improper dismissals.]
The Bombay High Court held that citizens do not have a fundamental right to demand cremation at a specific location, as the responsibility to provide crematoriums lies with planning authorities like CIDCO. CIDCO had already established a fully functional crematorium about 3.5 km from the disputed site. The court noted, based on photographic evidence, that nearby societies were located close to the designated cremation ground. The villagers’ concern about having to travel a longer distance was deemed insufficient to justify retaining the current crematorium. The court allowed the petition, directing authorities to utilize the land as per the Sanctioned Development Plans and applicable laws, thereby disallowing the continued use of the disputed plots for cremation purposes.
Amresh Shrivastava, a Tehsildar, passed a land settlement order in 1997 after following due process. Twelve years later, a Show Cause Notice was issued, followed by a chargesheet in 2011 alleging dishonesty. He challenged it under the Judges Protection Act, 1985. The Supreme Court allowed his appeal, set aside the Division Bench's ruling, and reinstated the Single Judge’s order quashing the chargesheet.
The Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC) advertised 12 vacancies for the post of Boat Lascar, requiring a valid Lascar’s licence as an essential qualification. Jomon K.K., the appellant, applied with a Syrang’s licence (a higher qualification) and was selected, securing the top rank. However, he was later removed after the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (KAT) ruled that candidates without a valid Lascar’s licence were ineligible. The appellant challenged this decision in the Kerala High Court, which dismissed his plea. He then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court expressed concerns about fairness, noting that allowing overqualified candidates, such as those holding a Syrang’s licence, could unfairly disadvantage Lascar-qualified candidates and disrupt the statutory framework and employment equity. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s ruling.
Court’s Analysis: Revision under Sections 397/401 CrPC is confined to saying that jurisdictional error, patent illegality and gross miscarriage of justice has happened. Referring to the case of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, the court maintained that revision is not a forum where the evidence is reappreciated unless there are findings that are grossly erroneous. In case of Offences under sections 279/304A IPC, rashness and negligence needs to be proved. The vague and undefined statement that a vehicle was at “high speed” — without establishing a relationship to negligent conduct — is inadequate. The prosecution also did not exclude mechanical failure, such as a tyre blow-out, or demonstrate how speed on its own caused the accident. Quoting Ram Chander v. State and Moti Singh v. State of Maharashtra, the court said that mere speed does not prove that the driving was rash and the burden is on the prosecution to show the absence of reasonable doubt. Decision: The High Court accepted the revision and quashed the conviction and sentence since there was no evidence to show that the speed of the vehicle caused negligence and other causes of the accident were not excluded. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not substitute for hard evidence.
The Tribunal had awarded the workers the minimum bonus (8.33% of annual earnings), which the High Court upheld with the modification that the bonus be paid after deducting ex-gratia amounts already given. The Supreme Court ruled that: The appellant’s factories qualify as "factories" under the Factories Act, 1948, making the Bonus Act applicable. Since 1985, the trust had shifted its focus to larger-scale commercial activities. No evidence suggested that the trust was affiliated with the Indian Red Cross Society or had similar objectives. The appellant severed all ties with the Swedish Red Cross Society in 1989. Operating under a trust engaged in charitable work does not exempt the factories from providing workers benefits under the Bonus Act. Ex-gratia payments cannot replace the statutory bonus. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, directing the appellant to pay the bonus to workers as per the Bonus Act from 1996-1997 onwards, with compliance to be done within one month.
The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s order and upheld the Trial Court’s dismissal, ruling that the suit was severely time-barred. It emphasized that registered sale deeds and revenue records serve as constructive notice, and the plaintiffs' decades of inaction had extinguished their rights.
The court overturned the order denying the petitioner’s request for premature release and instructed the State to reconsider the Jail Advisory Committee’s recommendation in light of the court’s observations, within a period of three months.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and overturned the High Court’s order. Taking into account the accused's age, the Court modified the sentence to a fine of ₹32,00,000, to be paid within four months. It clarified that failure to pay the fine would lead to reinstatement of the original sentence, including imprisonment and fine.
The Court held that the Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. It noted that the respondents’ letters dated 04.02.2015, 07.09.2015, and 25.02.2016 acknowledged liability—despite contesting the retrospective fee revision—thereby triggering a fresh limitation period lasting until 03.02.2018. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order quashing the recovery proceedings and reinstated NMPT’s writ petitions, directing that they be considered only after the Division Bench rules on the appeals challenging the retrospective fee hike.
The Supreme Court declared Rule 55A(i) of the Tamil Nadu Registration Rules as ultra vires the Registration Act, 1908, holding it to be inconsistent with the Act’s provisions. It also set aside the Madras High Court judgments that had relied on this rule and permitted the appellant to present the sale deed for registration within one month. The Court directed the registering officer to proceed with the registration upon fulfillment of all procedural requirements.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the NCDRC’s order, holding that the special condition in question was not material and had been impliedly waived by the parties. It further ruled that the respondent was not justified in repudiating the insurance claim based on the alleged breach of this condition. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the NCDRC for determination of the amount payable to the appellant.