The Supreme Court set aside a conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act after finding serious deficiencies in the prosecution evidence. The accused had been convicted of aggravated penetrative sexual assault against an 11-year-old girl with an intellectual disability. The prosecution primarily relied upon statements made by the victim and other family witnesses. However, the Supreme Court found material inconsistencies concerning the identification of the accused, omissions in the FIR and contradictions in the statements recorded during the investigation and trial. The Court also noted that an important witness, whose testimony could have clarified the circumstances in which the allegation first emerged, had not been examined. It reiterated that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to shift the prosecution's primary burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court acknowledged the sensitivity required while appreciating evidence given by child victims and persons with disabilities but emphasised that a conviction must still rest on reliable evidence. Giving the accused the benefit of doubt, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction and directed his release. The judgment discusses POCSO, identification evidence, material witnesses and the standard of proof in criminal trials.