The Supreme Court in this case clarified the scope of presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act. The appellant, a tuition teacher, was accused of sexually assaulting a minor. While the trial court acquitted him due to lack of reliable evidence, the High Court reversed the decision by applying the statutory presumption under Section 29. The Supreme Court held that such presumption is not automatic. It applies only after the prosecution proves foundational facts of the offence. In this case, the Court found material inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony and contradictions with her mother’s statements. The delay in filing the FIR and absence of medical examination further weakened the prosecution’s case. The Court emphasised that the initial burden of proof always lies on the prosecution, and reverse burden provisions are conditional. Since the foundational facts were not established beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption could not be invoked. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and restored the acquittal, reinforcing the principle that benefit of doubt must go to the accused.